

UCLF22

Independent Review

2022 UEFA Champions League Final

Chaired by

Tiago Brandão Rodrigues

February 2023

Independent Review Panel

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Foreword

After two years of restrictions and compromised European club competition finals due to the Covid-19 pandemic, including the UEFA Champions League Finals in 2020 and in 2021, expectations for the 2022 final match of one of the most - if not the most - prestigious football tournaments in the world were again very high worldwide. Real Madrid CF and Liverpool FC are true legends of football, and the UEFA Champions League Final is much more than a football game. It therefore came with no surprise that on 28 May 2022 many thousands of supporters of both clubs decided to travel to Paris to attend an eagerly awaited match and experience a true festival of football.

Unfortunately, the enthusiasm around the game rapidly turned into a real “near miss” which was harmful to a significant number of fans from both clubs. This should never have happened at such an important sporting event, and it is unacceptable that it took place at the heart of the European continent. Since the first moments, as a football fan myself watching the game with friends in my hometown, I realised that what was happening should constitute a source of immense concern, profound reflection, intense analysis, and consequent action. The 2022 UEFA Champions League Final will be remembered as a moment of suffering for many fans but should also be a reminder of a situation we certainly do not want to witness again in the future at any sporting event in Europe or anywhere in the world.

It is, therefore, imperative that relevant and significant lessons are learned from those events. For this reason, it was of the utmost importance that the UEFA President established this Independent Review, to provide clarity and understanding of the events. A healthy organisation welcomes scrutiny and criticism based on facts and evidence, even if the outcome is challenging and requires changes for the organisation itself. Trustworthiness, critical evaluation, and a continuous quest for improvement should be at the centre of any organisation’s roadmap. That is why independent inquiries based on evidence are so important: they provide clarity regarding past events and constitute a tool to help prevent a repetition of errors which might otherwise have devastating consequences. Hence, it is fundamental that these proceedings have been conducted in a way that enhances public trust in its outcomes.

I am thankful to have had the unique opportunity to chair this Herculean task and I am grateful for the general openness with which most of the stakeholders involved have collaborated in the process, investing significant time to share their perspectives, experiences, insights, and expertise with the Panel. Throughout the whole process, I felt that the different stakeholders have generally demonstrated a true commitment to improve themselves to avoid future similar events.

Supporters are the lifeline of football, and organisers should pay attention to their organisational needs to the same extent they do with all other stakeholders. Personally, the most impacting moments of this entire process have been hearing the direct and touching testimonies of many fans affected by the shocking events. I would like to unequivocally stress

that supporters attending this match were the main victims of the disgraceful events of that day, not being their promoters or instigators. I would therefore like to respectfully thank each individual supporter and each supporters' association for the clear and unhesitating way in which they have engaged with this review.

The independence of the Panel and the integrity of this report are paramount. From the outset, I have indicated that the Panel would gather as much relevant evidence as it could within the relatively short timeframe of its work. As a Panel, we have made it clear that we would only reach conclusions based upon evidence, and that we would reference our report and publish all documents, interview transcripts and other material as far as possible. The openness and transparency with which this review has been conducted are cornerstones for trust in its conclusions and recommendations. Anyone wishing to question the findings of the Panel must do so with the knowledge of the thorough work carried out during the past months, and mindful that the evidence collected is an integral part of this report, being available for effective public scrutiny.

The Panel has undertaken three tasks to reach the main objectives of this review. It has i) established a factual narrative of what happened based on the evidence collected; ii) determined what failures and conduct caused or contributed to the events, and who is accountable for them; and iii) made recommendations to optimise safety and security standards in the organisation of sporting events, in order to prevent any such incident from occurring again at a UEFA Champions League Final, or any other major sporting event held at the Stade de France, or indeed elsewhere.

Avoiding future disasters and improving the service provided at football events was the aim of the Panel's work during this process. I would like to thank the Panel for that and for its tireless work in putting collaboratively together the exhaustive and comprehensive report that is now presented. In conducting this Review, I have highly valued their expert input and advice. The report results from a collective writing process, reflecting an exercise which involved compromise. This Review has been collectively signed off by the Panel. Any public declaration of a Panel member after the publication of this report represents his/her individual opinion only.

Sports are an essential part of our democratic societies, inspiring, guiding and uniting us, with unique excitement and pleasure. Sports equally reflect and shape our communities. Accordingly, they must express and defend our common democratic values. It is thus of crucial importance that sporting events meet the standards that people – and its supporters, in particular – expect and are respectful of all dimensions of Human Rights. We must act collectively for the progress of our societies, so that they are safer, healthier, kinder, more developed, and equal and true promoters of Human Rights, democracy, and the rule of law, also through sports. And through sports we should be able to set examples. That is why we must guarantee that evenings like the one on 28 May 2022 in Saint-Denis must never happen again.

Tiago Brandão Rodrigues

Chair

February 2023

1. Executive Summary

1. Executive Summary

1.1. Introduction

1.1.1. At about 15:30 on 28th May 2022, a highly experienced external UEFA Security Officer appointed by UEFA to monitor safety and security measures at the UEFA Champions League Final (UCLF22), arrived at the Stade de France and began an inspection of the temporary additional security and ticket check perimeter surrounding the stadium. At Additional Security Perimeter entrance 3 (ASP3), positioned at the south-west corner of the stadium, he immediately noted that the arrangements were “not fit for purpose”, and reported such to his UEFA colleagues.

1.1.2. ASP3 was a known bottleneck involving a narrow ramp up to the concourse between the ASPs and the turnstile entrances. In addition, the approaches to ASP3 were problematic, involving a narrow pedestrian underpass which was prone to flooding and congestion, and a confined avenue with little means of escape. ASP4 was a far wider and more accessible entrance on the Avenue Stade de France.

1.1.3. By about 18:00, it was clear that the assessment of the UEFA Security Officer was correct, with very serious congestion occurring ahead of ASP3, and soon after, at about 18:50, the stadium control room, alarmed that the congestion at that point had become dangerous, issued a request to the police to divert arriving supporters away from that entrance towards ASP4, the other entrance at the south of the stadium.

1.1.4. Despite the request to divert those still arriving, the police were slow to react, and no effective action resulted. Thousands of supporters remained corralled in this unsafe environment, unable to progress or escape, as others unwittingly joined them at their rear. Those corralled were exposed to criminality, with some accounts of stolen match tickets and pickpocketing shared with the Panel.

1.1.5. By about 19:45, seventy-five minutes before the official kick-off time, the police abandoned ASP3 and both police officers and stewards withdrew. Consequently, thousands of supporters, and locals, flowed up the ramp onto the concourse between the ASPs and the turnstile perimeter. This area, which was confined and meant to be accessible in a controlled way only to those with tickets, was quite full as there had already been problems at the turnstiles, and some gates had been closed. As a result of the flow of thousands more into this space, such

arrangements as there were to optimise the entry rate of supporters through the turnstiles, were swept away. There was a clear and immediate danger of a fatal crush.

1.1.6. Subsequently, a decision to delay kick-off was taken. The Panel has concluded this was the correct decision, although the lack of messaging to those outside the turnstile perimeter meant that it probably made little difference to the congestion. The dangerous conditions on the concourse outside the turnstiles were compounded by the police deploying tear gas at disorderly groups of locals, as well as using pepper spray on supporters trying to gain entrance with valid tickets. It is remarkable that no one lost their life.

1.1.7. All the stakeholders interviewed by the Panel have agreed that this situation was a near-miss: a term used when an event almost turns into a mass fatality catastrophe.

1.1.8. Many Liverpool supporters in that crowd were survivors of the 1989 Hillsborough disaster where 97 football supporters died, others were vulnerable – with disabled supporters, elderly people, and children amongst them. The parallels between Hillsborough 1989 and Paris 2022 are palpable. The similarities include the fact that both events were preventable, and both were caused by the failures of those responsible for public safety. Neither was a ‘black swan’ event, or the result of a ‘perfect storm’¹. Both events were foreseeable. In the judgment of the Panel, the different outcomes were a matter of chance: in one nearly a hundred died, the other none, but through no merit of those in charge.

1.1.9. As the crisis in Paris unfolded, UEFA announced on big screens within the stadium and thereby via broadcasters to the world, that the delay in kick-off was due to ‘late’ arriving supporters. This claim was objectively untrue.

1.1.10. On the night and in the immediate aftermath of the events, French Ministers, UEFA and others blamed thousands of supporters at the Liverpool end of the stadium whom they asserted sought to actively enter the stadium without valid tickets. As addressed below, the Panel has found that the evidence does not support these assertions.

1.1.11. It has been a feature of our investigations that several key stakeholders have

¹ — A ‘black swan’ event is one which is unpredictable and has a high impact. A ‘perfect storm’ is a rare combination of events which create a bad outcome.

not accepted responsibility for their own failures but have been quick to attribute blame to others. Some have continued to make allegations – in particular against supporters – based upon ‘facts’ for which there is no evidence. Assertions that late, ticketless supporters were either the primary cause or contributed to the dangerous events have a particular resonance with Hillsborough where similar allegations were made 33 years ago and persisted for decades before being comprehensively disproved.

1.1.12. Institutional defensiveness, putting reputation and self-interest above truth and responsibility, prevents progressive change. A healthy organisation welcomes scrutiny and criticism based on evidence, an unhealthy one hides behind prejudice and baseless assertions, and contributes to a carousel of blame, where it is everyone else’s fault. That is why independent investigations based on evidence are so important, because otherwise the same will happen next week or next year with devastating consequences.

1.1.13. It is a matter of the greatest regret that during the currency of our work two mass fatality crowd crushes have occurred elsewhere. On 1st October 2022, at least 125 people died in a crush at an Indonesian football match². On 29th October 2022, 156 people died in a Halloween celebration in South Korea³.

1.1.14. The starting point for our investigations and review has therefore been the realisation that crowd events always carry known and predictable dangers, and consequently, those responsible for public safety are under a duty to plan and operate all reasonable measures to minimise the risk to life and threat of serious injury.

1.1.15. The imperative to protect against risks to life is a matter of common sense, but it is also a duty enshrined in domestic and international laws. In Europe, Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)⁴, requires member States to ensure that all reasonable measures are taken to protect life from known threats.

1.1.16. In the footballing context, there are also a range of international agreements to ensure the safety and security of supporters and others at football fixtures with an international dimension. These instruments were developed following the Heysel disaster in 1985 and have evolved since. The duties and obligations

2 – [Indonesia football crush: How the disaster unfolded](#), BBC

3 – [Itaewon crush: How South Korea let down its young people](#), BBC

4 – [European Convention on Human Rights](#), Council of Europe

arising from these are currently reflected in the provisions of the Council of Europe (CoE) Convention on an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports Events (CETS No. 218), referred to as the '2016 Convention', or hereafter the 'Saint-Denis Convention'⁵. Consequently, the Panel's conclusions have been set out with these in mind and measured against the obligations set out in the Saint-Denis Convention.

1.2. The Review: process

1.2.1. UEFA established this review to examine events surrounding the 2022 UCLF and appointed Dr Tiago Brandão Rodrigues as its Chair, who gathered a Panel of experts from several countries with different types of expertise.

1.2.2. The independence of the Panel, and the integrity of this report are paramount. From the outset, the Panel has indicated that it would gather as much relevant evidence as it could within the tight timeframe in which it agreed to work. The Panel has made clear that it would only reach conclusions based upon evidence, and that it would reference its report and publish all documents, interview transcripts and other material so far as it could. Only through openness and transparency can there be confidence in the conclusions and recommendations. Anyone wishing to question the findings and conclusions of the Panel must do so in the knowledge that we have published almost all the evidence and interview transcripts alongside the report, which is heavily referenced. The process is set out in detail in Chapter Two.

1.2.3. The Panel has undertaken three tasks. It has:

- a. Constructed as definitive a factual narrative of what did and did not happen as has been possible on the evidence.
- b. Determined what failures and conduct caused or contributed to the events, and who is accountable for them.
- c. Made recommendations to ensure that everything possible is done to prevent any such incident occurring again at a UEFA Champions League Final (UCLF), or other major sporting event held at the Stade de France, or indeed anywhere else.

1.2.4. In order to complete those tasks, the Panel has approached as many stakeholders, organisations, and individuals as it determined might be able to

⁵ – [CETS 218 – Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Sports Events, 3.VII.2016](#), Council of Europe

assist. Those who have been approached include: the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) and its wholly-owned subsidiary UEFA Events SA (together the 'event owner'), the Fédération Française de Football (FFF), the Préfecture de Police, the Inter-ministerial Delegate for Major Sporting Events (DIGES), and Inter-ministerial Delegate to the Olympic and Paralympic Games (DIJOP), the Consortium Stade de France (CSDF), the Public Prosecutors in Bobigny and Paris, the Mayor of Paris, the Mayor of Saint-Denis, Régie Autonome des Transports Parisiens (RATP), Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (SNCF), Liverpool FC (LFC), Real Madrid CF (RMCF), the Spirit of Shankly (SOS), the Liverpool Disabled Supporters Association (LDSA), Football Supporters Europe (FSE), Merseyside Police, United Kingdom National Football Information Point (NFIP-UK), Football Association England (FA), Spanish National Police, Sponsors/Partners (through UEFA). Individuals who have provided assistance, include Richard Bouigue (Deputy Mayor of the 12th Paris Arrondissement), Adrian Dinca (Chair of the CoE Committee on Safety, Security and Service), Steve Rotheram (Metro Mayor for the Liverpool City Region), Ian Byrne (Member of Parliament for West Derby, Liverpool, UK), Lord Birt (Member of the House of Lords, UK), and a large number of Liverpool FC and Real Madrid CF supporters, as well as others who attended at the UEFA Champions League Final 2022 (UCLF22).

1.2.5. The level of cooperation has generally been very good, although a small number of stakeholders have declined to assist, as we note in Chapter 2.

1.2.6. In the course of its work, the Panel has taken account of two official post event reports from the DIGES and the French Senate and a pre-event report from Football Supporters Europe (FSE). The Panel has also considered evidence, analysis and footage reported by responsible journalists, including at: Le Monde, the Guardian and the Daily Mail. Furthermore, the Panel has been assisted by the report of Professor Scraton et al (2022)⁶, in particular regarding its empirical evidence. This has all contributed to our work, but we have only relied upon it where it is supported by evidence we have seen, and our own analysis.

1.3. What went wrong

1.3.1. The Panel has concluded that there were two overarching organisational failures that lie at the root of what went so disastrously wrong in Paris. Firstly, the UEFA 'model' for organising the UCLF22 was defective in that there was an

⁶ – ["Treated With Contempt": An Independent Panel Report into Fans' Experiences Before, During and After the 2022 Champions League Final in Paris](#), Phil Scraton et al. (2022)

absence of overall control or oversight of safety and security. Secondly, the safety, security and service model laid out in the Saint-Denis Convention, was ignored in favour of a securitized approach which was inappropriately based on incorrect assumptions that Liverpool FC supporters posed significant threats to public order. That inexplicable misconception resulted in a policing approach that lacked capacity for engagement, and which actively failed to integrate into a coherent multi-agency framework.

1.3.2. The UEFA 'model'

1.3.2.1. UEFA, through its wholly owned subsidiary, UEFA Events SA, delegated private safety and security responsibility to the French Football Federation (FFF) and deferred to the Préfecture de Police on safety and security matters falling within its policing duties, as per UEFA's standard operating procedures when organizing Champions League Finals. This would have been an entirely reasonable approach with one crucial addition: UEFA should have retained a monitoring and oversight role, to ensure it all worked. It self-evidently did not. This 'delegation and deference' model led to a lacuna whereby mobility and access plans, and communication and interoperability were not properly monitored. Flaws were not identified, and consequently they were not rectified. The panel concluded this represented an unacceptable abdication of responsibility by UEFA.

1.3.2.2. The fact that UEFA failed to take this oversight responsibility must be viewed in the context that it had a mechanism to monitor, advise and assist with the safety of planning and operational measures: UEFA's own Safety and Security (S&S) Unit. On the evidence, the Panel has concluded that the senior management of UEFA Events SA marginalised the UEFA S&S Unit and thereby removed the mechanism through which the safety and security of the event could be ensured. The Panel's view is that UEFA Events SA's lack of oversight upon delegation of private safety and security matters, deference of all such matters in the public space to policing authorities, and simply not following its own safety, security and service requirements, was a recipe for the failures which in fact occurred. Senior officials at the top of UEFA allowed this to happen, even though the shortcomings of its model were widely known at senior management level, as acknowledged to the Panel⁷.

1.3.2.3. The Panel notes that the UCLF is UEFA's annual flagship event. It can

⁷ – Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 728-729, 731); Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1295-1297)

compel private partners to comply with its requirements, and it has considerable 'soft power' with which to encourage State authorities to fully engage with its project and comply with their Saint-Denis Convention obligations. At UCLF22 UEFA did neither.

1.3.3. Policing

1.3.3.1. The police, unchallenged and accepted without question by other stakeholders, adopted a model aimed at a non-existent threat from football hooligans, together with a preoccupation that ticketless supporters required a public order policing approach rather than one based upon facilities and engagement. This was despite good information and intelligence from UEFA, UEFA Events SA, the Clubs, and Merseyside and Spanish national police, which indicated that there had been no significant issues of football-related violence involving supporters of either finalist club in recent years and that the phenomenon of supporters without tickets travelling to a host city for the atmosphere had become commonplace.

1.3.3.2. There were multiple consequences of this defective policing model. The police and other stakeholders were deflected from playing an effective role in ensuring safe mobility of supporters to the vicinity of the stadium, or within the last kilometre; they failed to plan or operate safe access arrangements through the additional and turnstile perimeters; they did not have any effective contingency plans once access arrangements failed; and they did not have any effective plan to deal with anti-social behaviour or violence perpetrated by locals.

1.3.3.3. Furthermore, although the Préfecture de Seine-Saint-Denis chaired planning meetings relating to mobility, and although the French State was represented in some planning meetings through the DIGES, together with UEFA, UEFA Events SA, FFF and other stakeholders, no one appears to have identified and dealt with, or escalated to higher political levels the acknowledged and evidently poor interoperability.

1.3.3.4. Ultimately the failures of this approach culminated in a policing operation that deployed tear gas and pepper spray: weaponry which has no place at a festival of football.

1.3.3.5. The monitoring and oversight lacuna in the UEFA model, and the dominance of the public order approach adopted by the police, combined

to aggravate the absence of joint working – or interoperability – between key stakeholders to an extent that the Panel found remarkable. The Panel has concluded that this was a major cause of the failure to prevent or deal with the problems arising in four key areas: changes in patterns of travel by supporters to the vicinity of the stadium, ‘last kilometre’ crowd management and routing, stadium access arrangements, and criminal attacks on supporters.

1.3.4. The failure of joint working, and the change of venue

1.3.4.1. There were in fact, multiple communication and interoperability failures between stakeholders. Important historical and real time information was not shared. Plans were not properly agreed, and there is the clearest evidence of an absence of stakeholders working together. Decisions were taken, without communication to other partners, in particular by the police.

1.3.4.2. The failures of joint working were compounded by a further factor. The UCLF22 was planned to take place in St Petersburg, however, following the invasion of Ukraine, UEFA moved the venue to the Stade de France, Paris. The late change of venue amplified the imperative for effective interoperability and communication between stakeholders, and the need to check all arrangements were robust and fit for purpose. Safety and security are binary. Hospitality and concessions can be compromised: safety and security cannot. The key stakeholders should have ensured all arrangements were joined-up and all agencies were working together, with UEFA at the centre, overseeing the whole project. The Panel has concluded that this simply did not happen.

1.3.4.3. Instead of applying a more vigilant approach as a result of the shorter timeframe, UEFA Events SA agreed with FFF to base its planning on the French Cup Final, which took place three weeks before the UCLF. Although there was some observation of the operation of the earlier match, problems were not identified, and relevant changes were not made. The Panel has concluded that the French Cup Final was not a proper comparator, and reliance on it constituted an inappropriate planning short cut, which contributed to the failures on match day.

1.3.4.4. In the above context - the failure of UEFA to have oversight of its own project, the misconceived policing model, and the multiple interoperability failures - the Panel has identified the following eight factors which almost led to disaster:

a. A disproportionately large number of Liverpool supporters were directed to

arrive via the 'Stade de France: Saint-Denis' station, on train line RER D, which was closest to the southwest of the stadium, compared to the volume of people attending other major events at the stadium.

b. Defective route planning between RER D and the stadium, resulted in too many people being directed by police toward the stadium via the south-west ASP3 entrance.

c. Defective access arrangements at the ASPs. The effect of this was particularly acute at ASP3 because of the increased pressure created by the flawed routing, and that it was positioned on a restricted access ramp: a bottleneck.

d. Ticketing: the use of two different forms of tickets, without extra measures to maintain throughput rates, exacerbated access problems at ASPs.

e. Defective turnstile arrangements, which failed to ensure a sufficient throughput rate to guarantee safe entry.

f. The activities of large groups of locals, some of whom were involved in attacks on supporters and attempts to breach the perimeters and turnstiles to gain entry to the stadium, and a failure to police them.

g. The use of tear gas and pepper spray in the confined space on the concourse.

h. A lack of contingency plans relating to both additional perimeter and turnstile access: there was no Plan B when things went wrong.

1.3.5. Ticketless supporters and counterfeits

1.3.5.1. Key stakeholders, including UEFA, FFF, the French authorities - including Ministers and the Préfecture – have asserted that large numbers of ticketless supporters or those with fake tickets caused or contributed to the problems. This is a highly controversial and sensitive topic.

1.3.5.2. The Panel has made substantial efforts to gather and examine the evidence to support or refute these allegations.

1.3.5.3. All major sporting events must be planned with the realisation that some people may turn up and try to gain entrance without a valid ticket, as historically has always been the case. A UCLF is no exception, and the Panel has no doubt that there were people trying to do so on 28th May 2022. Some had no ticket, and there is evidence that some had counterfeits. The issue is whether there was an abnormally high number of people without valid tickets, and whether they in fact caused or contributed to the problems.

1.3.5.4. Based upon the wealth of evidence we have obtained from eyewitnesses and footage, the Panel has concluded that there is no evidence of an abnormally large number of ‘ticketless supporters’ or supporters with invalid tickets, in the vicinity of the Stade de France on the evening of 28th May. This finding is not to be misunderstood with respect to the number of locals without tickets who were present, which was plainly substantial.

1.3.5.5. With respect to counterfeit tickets, the Panel notes there is some social media, police intelligence, and anecdotal evidence from stewards. It acknowledges there is turnstile data showing a total of 2,589 presentations of tickets with unknown QR codes. Of these, 1,644 were at the end of the stadium at which Liverpool supporters entered. We also note that the stated numbers incorporate attempted multiple presentations including those taking their chance at different turnstiles. The Panel sought evidence about counterfeit ticketing from previous UCLFs. UEFA was unable to provide any hard data, although its ticketing staff indicated that piles of counterfeit tickets had been recovered at the 2016 UCLF in Milan⁸. The external UEFA Security Officer observing the south side of the stadium, and who had been the safety officer at the 2017 Cardiff UCLF, indicated that the quantity of counterfeit and ticketless supporters did not appear to be any greater at UCLF22⁹. FSE concluded that there were fewer counterfeit tickets available at UCLF22 than in Madrid in 2019. On this basis, the Panel has concluded that the evidence does not support the assertion that there were more counterfeit tickets at UCLF22 than at other similar events.

1.3.5.6. The Panel further concludes that assertions concerning huge numbers of supporters trying to gain entry without valid tickets have been wrongly inflated and exaggerated. Such allegations should only be made on a proper evidential basis, and the Panel draws the inference that they have been made primarily to deflect from responsibility for planning and operational failures.

1.4. Recommendations

1.4.1. The final chapter contains 21 Recommendations (see Chapter 9). It is an unfortunate feature of many inquiries and reviews that when they report, the process comes to an end, and recommendations are soon forgotten and not actioned. We have addressed this in our recommendations. Public safety at major sporting events is too important to pass up the opportunity of learning lessons from Paris 2022 in order to ensure a safer future.

⁸ – Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1152-1157)

⁹ – Meeting with UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1500-1501)

2. The Review process

2. The Review process

2.1. In the hours and days following the events at the UCLF22, there was much finger pointing and conflict concerning what had happened and why. The official ‘narrative’ from French Ministers and authorities, UEFA and FFF was strongly disputed by Liverpool FC, its supporters, Real Madrid CF supporters, the media, and many others.

2.2. Consequently, UEFA set up this Review¹⁰, appointing Dr Tiago Brandão Rodrigues, Member of the Portuguese Parliament, President of the Parliamentary Committee of Environment and Energy and former Portuguese Minister of Education (in charge of Sports), to be its Chair and setting wide-ranging ‘terms of reference’¹¹. Dr Brandão Rodrigues appointed a Panel¹², which includes members with different experiences and expertise, and he promised to publish this Final Report within months of the events themselves, to set the record straight, and to make recommendations in time to make a difference before UCLF23 in Istanbul, Turkey.

2.3. It is important to emphasise that this Review is not a forensic exercise, conducted in a court room. No one is on trial, and it is not a formal legal process. Nevertheless, the Panel has been careful to conduct the Review and present its conclusions with fairness and rigour, and to make sure all its conclusions and recommendations are evidence-based, reached without fear or favour, and publicly referenced. Where the Panel has considered particularly important or contentious issues, it has endeavoured to express the strength of its conclusions: whether it is sure, or reached a position on the balance of probability, or whether it believes an occurrence was a possibility, rather than a probability.

2.4. Although established and funded by UEFA, the Review is independent. It has set its own process and has insisted on maximum openness and transparency. It agreed its own ‘Transparency Protocol and Confidentiality Undertaking’¹³ and at all stages it has been clear with stakeholders and witnesses about the procedure it has followed.

10 — [UEFA commissions independent report into events surrounding UEFA Champions League Final](#), UEFA – Appendix, II.1

11 — [Independent review into events surrounding the UEFA Champions League Final 2022 at Stade de France on Saturday, 28 May 2022 \(“Review”\) and production of an independent report of such Review \(“Report”\) - Terms of Reference](#), UEFA – Appendix, I

12 — [UEFA Champions League Final 2022 Independent Review sets final panel, list of experts and timeline](#), UEFA – Appendix, II.3

13 — Independent Review Panel’s Transparency Protocol and Confidentiality Undertaking – Appendix, III

2.5. Some sections of the media have, perfectly properly, questioned the independence of the Panel, given that some members have had a long and close relationship with UEFA. The Panel notes that independence cannot be declared: it must be demonstrated, and makes four points:

- a. The publication of all evidence received by the Panel (subject to very narrow exceptions), alongside the Report, allows the reader to judge for themselves whether the Panel has asked the right questions and drawn proper evidence-based conclusions.
- b. The inclusion of members who have had experience of the inner workings of UEFA has been invaluable to the Review.
- c. Two members of the Panel represent supporter associations (the FSA and FSE), and others have only minor historical or no kind of relationship with UEFA.
- d. The working of the Panel and its conclusions and recommendations are based on consensus, so far as has been possible. All members of the Panel have had equal access to the evidence.

2.6. At the outset of its work, the Panel drew up a list of stakeholders from whom it should seek evidence. Inevitably, as the process has progressed, other sources of information have come to light, and further individuals and organisations have been asked to assist.

2.7. Given that this is a voluntary process, no one has been required to provide documents or answer questions. However, with few exceptions, the response to the Review has been positive. Where people or organisations have declined to assist, we make that clear in the Report.

2.8. The Panel sent requests for 'position statements' to each stakeholder, where possible providing guidance as to issues the Panel wanted them to address. The requests sought an explanation from the organisation as to their role and responsibilities, and their involvement in the planning and operation of the UCLF22. The letters of request asked them to state what had been witnessed, and asked them to provide all relevant documents, and lists of witnesses who may have been able to assist the review further. The requests also asked stakeholders to identify failures and what went wrong, as well as good practice.

2.9. Importantly, the letters of request made clear the intentions of the Panel regarding transparency and the publication of evidence. The letters stated: “It is my intention to conduct this review with as much transparency as is possible, to ensure the credibility and integrity of the process. I intend to publish all statements, supporting material, and witness interviews, save to the extent that they include irrelevant personal details, sensitive material (for example, relating to counter terror measures), or commercially sensitive details (such as the value of contracts). It is therefore essential that you identify any material which should not be placed in the public domain.”

2.10. Almost all stakeholders responded positively, and a large volume of evidence was gathered through this part of the process. Responses also helped the Panel identify and obtain other evidence, and assisted in determining who the Panel should interview and what questions to ask. The only stakeholder which declined to assist was Real Madrid CF. The Mayor of Saint-Denis did not reply. The Public Prosecutor in Bobigny, and Paris did not respond to a specific request for sight of street CCTV relevant to the Review.

2.11. Once the Panel had gathered sufficient written evidence – contemporaneous documentation, narratives prepared by stakeholders, and eye-witness accounts – interviews were held with witnesses from the Consortium Stade de France, FFF, UEFA, Liverpool FC, the French authorities (the DIGES and Préfecture de Police (PP), and their staff), the CoE Standing Committee on Safety and Security at Sports Events, UEFA Sponsors and Partners, Richard Bouigue Deputy Mayor of the 12th Paris Arrondissement, and supporters from both Liverpool FC and Real Madrid CF.

2.12. The Panel thanks supporter groups, including the Spirit of Shankly and the Liverpool Disabled Supporters Association, Federación de Accionistas y Socios del Fútbol Español, and Football Supporters Europe for their assistance. In addition to interviews with supporters, the Panel was assisted by over 8,500 written statements and accounts which LFC had obtained from their supporters and supplied to the Panel, together with their analysis of them. These interviews and written accounts have enabled the Panel to consider a wealth of eye-witness evidence and also to understand the supporter experiences. The same approach to transparency has been taken to supporter evidence, except with respect to the written accounts provided by LFC, which have not been published for data protection and privacy reasons. Reference to this evidence has been anonymised, as has evidence from UEFA’s operational staff, UEFA Sponsors and Partners, FFF, and LFC staff, at their request.

2.13. Some factual issues have been hotly disputed by different stakeholders and witnesses. Many statements have been asserted by others as fact, without any basis. Although the Panel has considered all available sources, it has been careful to draw its own conclusions from the best available evidence, and as far as possible the Report is referenced, to properly ground and justify its conclusions.

2.14. As stated at paragraph 2.9 above, all letters of request for evidence sent to stakeholders set out that the review would be as open and transparent as possible, and it was intended that all evidence should be published alongside the final report subject to three narrow areas of exception. Late in the process, two key stakeholders raised objections to publication of some evidence. Initially UEFA agreed, in writing, to the process set out by the independent Panel, including the publication of all evidence as above. In a subsequent recorded discussion concerning the process, the General Secretary, confirmed this agreement, but asked that junior staff be anonymised. The Panel agreed. In December 2022, UEFA indicated that they were unhappy with publication of any of their witness interview transcripts, but reached a compromise with the Panel that the transcripts would be published subject to anonymisation of all their staff including senior management (despite the fact that they would be named in the report itself). Subsequently, UEFA has used this anonymisation to justify redaction of questions and answers regarding the evidence given to the French Senate by a senior executive. The Panel is very disappointed that UEFA has taken this approach, in order to redact obviously important evidence. At about the same time in December 2022, FFF made similar objections. As a result, the transcripts relating to FFF are anonymised, and significant redactions have been required, which go far beyond the narrow exceptions referred to above. The Panel is similarly disappointed at the approach taken by FFF.

2.15. The Panel is clear that only by publication of the evidence, and by detailed referencing of factual conclusions, can the Report gain the confidence of all stakeholders, and dispel some of the false narratives which have been peddled by others since the events.

2.16. The Panel believes that it has applied the highest standards of integrity, and international best practice, to ensure fairness to all, and to achieve an outcome which commands the confidence of all.

2.17. CCTV footage

2.17.1. Whereas the Panel has been pleased with the high level of cooperation with the Review by most stakeholders, there is one aspect of the evidence which is of significant concern: the unavailability of CCTV footage. The Stade de France and its surrounding area is well served by CCTV monitoring, and footage from both the private stadium system and public street CCTV cameras is recorded. Footage of the events the Panel has been investigating was monitored in real time in both the stadium control room and the adjoining police control room, and both sets of footage were recorded.

2.17.2. As the Panel has noted with concern, the recordings from all 260 Stade de France cameras were auto deleted about a week after the events. The Stade de France management did not take any measures to ensure retention, and no one else – including the French authorities, UEFA or FFF – asked them to retain the footage. After media reports emerged UEFA sent a letter to Ministry of Interior asking if the footage could be recovered¹⁴. The Operations Director of UEFA Events SA claimed in interview that they thought that UEFA had requested FFF to ask CSDF to retain the material, “three or four days after the final”¹⁵. FFF has not confirmed this, and the Panel has seen no email, letter or telephone note relating to what would be an important request, or any follow-up.

2.17.3. The Panel has been told that recordings of street CCTV footage is in the possession of the Public Prosecutor. As noted above, the Panel has written to both the Public Prosecutors in Bobigny and Paris. Requests to view relevant parts of that footage, in particular that relating to the access to ASP3 have not elicited a response. Furthermore, the Panel understands that neither the DIGES nor the Senate were permitted access to that footage during their own investigations.

2.17.4. Camera footage is often of great importance in understanding what did and did not happen at complex events such as UCLF22. It is well-documented that stadium CCTV and other footage was central to disproving false allegations that drunk, late, ticketless supporters had caused the Hillsborough disaster in 1989. The Panel has no doubt that the retention of the Stade de France footage, and the provision of street CCTV recordings would have materially assisted this Review and investigations by others.

¹⁴ — Letter of UEFA’s General Secretary to the French Minister of Interior (10 June 2022) – Appendix, VI.17

¹⁵ — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 849)

2.17.5. It should have been obvious to French State authorities, the Préfecture, the DIGES, the Public Prosecutors, the CSDF, UEFA, and FFF that such footage would be invaluable for multiple investigations which would follow the events of the night. The Panel finds that it was a remarkable and serious failure that none of those stakeholders ensured that the footage was retained. CSDF was the only stakeholder to accept this criticism in interview.

2.17.6. CSDF told the Panel that they could have legally retained the footage for 30 days without any judicial order. Obviously, that did not provide any impediment to retention, because it was plenty of time within which an appropriate body could seek such authority. CSDF indicated that they have ensured that deletion would not happen in the future.

2.17.7. The Panel has been advised that France has exacting privacy and data protection laws, and the retention and provision of footage is strictly controlled. The Panel does not doubt or comment on that position. However, the Panel does note that privacy and data protection laws are always qualified by the competing needs of other rights and obligations, most particularly relating to the protection of life and limb: security and public safety. The Panel notes that this is also a requirement of international law, which is binding upon France.

2.17.8. The Panel has therefore recommended that French authorities review the framework relating to the retention and provision of footage and other material, for the purposes of investigations which are likely to improve security and public safety. The Panel further recommends that this is a matter which should be addressed by UEFA in its requirements of host States.

3. The Organisation of a UEFA Men's Champions League Final (UCLF): Framework and regulation

3. The Organisation of a UEFA Men's Champions League Final (UCLF): Framework and regulation

3.1. Organisation

3.1.1. The organisation of major football matches is a complex but regular matter, and always involves safety and security considerations which are of paramount importance. However, the organisation of a UCLF is on a wholly different level. It is an annual flagship event and involves the organisation of an international football festival rather than just the match itself. Ordinarily, it involves a host city and two foreign teams, with spectators coming from across Europe, and indeed the world. No two UCLFs are the same, although there are similar issues which must be addressed each year.

3.1.2. In order to put on such a massive event, there needs to be maximum cooperation and planning between UEFA and local partners, including the host Federation (or Association) and stadium, and public authorities (the police and security forces), State and municipal authorities, and transport companies and networks.

3.1.3. Where major public safety and security issues have occurred in the past, causes or contributory factors have included regulatory shortcomings, planning failures, negligence by those in charge, technical faults, or a combination of those things. However, in almost all such cases, there have been failures of interoperability - communication and joint working - between organisations and agencies. If the lead agency - here UEFA - solves the interoperability problem at an early stage, most of the other issues will be identified and solved as the process evolves.

3.1.4. The normal process for hosting a UCLF commences about three to four years prior to match day with a bidding process. UEFA sets requirements and bidders complete a template. The successful host Federation then devises a concept, with advice and assistance from UEFA, and eventually staging agreements and an operational plan emerge following guarantees from the host State relating to various matters including travel and security, the formation of a local organising structure (LOS), and multi-agency planning meetings.

3.1.5. For UCLF22, the venue was to be St Petersburg, Russia, and much of the normal process had been undertaken before Russia invaded Ukraine.

Consequently, on 25th February 2022, the day following the invasion, UEFA took the decision to change the venue to Paris. As the Panel notes elsewhere in this report, there was little process involved with the change of venue, and it meant that all arrangements had to be revisited with a timeframe of three months.

3.1.6. Almost all stakeholders have referred to difficulties presented by the truncated planning period. None have suggested that a safe and secure event could not have been organised within that period. The Panel agrees. There are many features of a UCLF which could be compromised acceptably due to a truncated timescale or unforeseen circumstances – hospitality, concessions, comfort, for example – but safety and security are binary. Those responsible - here UEFA, FFF, the Préfecture de Police and the Consortium Stade de France - had to make a judgment. The event could be arranged safely and securely, or it could not go ahead, at least as planned.

3.1.7. If the UCLF could not be safely and securely arranged within three months, there were several options, including cancellation, postponement, or going ahead with restricted numbers.

3.1.8. By the time the event was switched to Paris, it was far too late for the host Federation to formulate a ‘safety and security concept’ for the arrangement of the event, a document which is normally supplied to UEFA a year in advance of the event. UEFA has told the Review that it produced a “hybrid template document (...) concentrating on strategic and operational arrangements”, and translated it into French, to assist FFF and other local partners¹⁶. In the Panel’s view, this was a sensible approach and the document, dated 9th March 2022, appears to have been produced quite swiftly after the venue change took place¹⁷. However, in interview, FFF indicated that it had not seen that document¹⁸.

3.1.9. As the Panel considers at Chapter 6, UEFA Events SA management subsequently agreed to arrangements for the UCLF22 to be based upon operational plans for the French Cup Final, which took place on 7th May 2022. This was an arrangement made without recourse to the UEFA Safety & Security Unit, and for reasons which we set out later in this report, this was an inappropriate shortcut without rigorous oversight. Most importantly, the UEFA S&S Unit never received any operational plan for the French Cup Final or the 28th May.

16 — UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p. 26)

17 — UEFA SSNS Concept & Operational Plan (9 March 2022) – Appendix, VI.3

18 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1611-1612)

3.1.10. Given the short timeframe, UEFA and all its partners, including FFF and the Préfecture de Police, should have realised the imperative of effective communication and joint working between planning and operational staff with responsibility for safety and security, and for ensuring that all plans and agreements were reduced to writing and signed-off by senior officers. The Panel is firmly of the conclusion that these imperatives are axiomatic on a normal timescale, but they were even more obvious and vital with such a truncated period.

3.1.11. The failures of interoperability and communications between stakeholders have already been recognised by the DIGES and the Senate in their reports. The Senate Report is headlined: “Champions League Final at the Stade de France: An inevitable fiasco”. The summary highlights failures to put appropriate arrangements in place, and poor communications between stakeholders. The Senate disagreed with the DIGES that the failures were only operational – the possibility of “crisis scenarios” was insufficiently considered, and the events should be seen as a “wake-up call” requiring the actors and the Government to learn the necessary lessons before the 2023 Rugby World Cup and 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games¹⁹.

3.2. Legal, policy and guidance framework

3.2.1. In July 2016 the Council of Europe Convention on an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports Events (CETS No 218)²⁰ was launched during the UEFA Euro 2016 tournament in France. The launch took place at the Stade de France in Saint-Denis.

3.2.2. This Saint-Denis Convention superseded and built upon the work done internationally since the adoption of the European Convention on Spectator Violence in 1985. The 1985 Convention had been introduced urgently following the Heysel Disaster, which resulted in 39 deaths at the UEFA European Cup Final in Brussels that year.

3.2.3. In 2013 there was a recognition within the Council of Europe of the need to move away from a violence-focussed orientation and towards an integrated approach based upon three interdependent pillars: safety, security and service. The changing demands of the sport resulted in a new approach and the new

19 — [L'Essentiel sur les incidents survenus au Stade de France le 28 mai 2022: Finale de la Ligue des Champions au Stade de France : un Fiasco Inévitable](#), French Senate – English translation at Appendix, VI.18 (p. 2820)

20 — [CETS 218 – Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Sports Events, 3.VII.2016](#), Council of Europe

Convention. The Saint-Denis Convention is an international treaty and binding on its State Parties.

3.2.4. France signed the Saint-Denis Convention on 3rd July 2016, and ratified it on 6th February 2017. The Saint-Denis Convention replaced the 1985 Convention and entered into force on 1st November 2017.

3.2.5. The aim of the Saint-Denis Convention is to provide a safe, secure, and welcoming environment at football matches and other sports events with an international dimension. In order to achieve this, Parties shall²¹:

- a. Adopt an integrated, multi-agency and balanced approach towards safety, security and service, based on an ethos of effective local, national and international partnerships and cooperation;
- b. Ensure that all public and private agencies, and other stakeholders, recognise that safety, security, and service provision cannot be considered in isolation and can have a direct influence on delivery of the other two components;
- c. Take account of good practices in developing an integrated approach to safety, security and service.

3.2.6. The Saint-Denis Convention has been complemented by formal Recommendations adopted by the Standing Committee on Safety and Security at Sports Events (T-S4) which incorporate three, extensive, inter-related Annexes providing a range of good practices on Safety, Security and Service along with a fourth Annexe containing a series of checklists intended to assist in monitoring the extent to which national arrangements are in compliance with that good practice.

3.2.7. With regard to implementation, the Standing Committee emphasised to governments of State Parties to both the 1985 and 2016 Conventions that they must ensure that the recommendations and good practices highlighted in the Saint-Denis Convention and their Annexes are taken into account in developing and refining an integrated approach to football safety, security and service²².

3.2.8. The Standing Committee further emphasised that the Convention: “centres on the established need to develop and implement an integrated multi-agency

21 – [CETS 218 – Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Sports Events, 3.VII.2016](#) (Article 2), Council of Europe

22 – [Recommendation Rec \(2021\) 1 of the Committee on Safety and Security at Sports Events](#), Council of Europe

approach to safety, security and service in connection with football and other sports events with an international dimension, based on comprehensive national and local coordination arrangements and effective, international, national and local partnerships.”²³

3.2.9. It is important to emphasise that, viewed together, the Saint-Denis Convention and the Rec (2021) 1 Annexes, provide a comprehensive framework against which a safety, security and service model must be developed for football events with an international dimension²⁴.

3.2.10. Articles 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the 2016 Convention require State Parties to ensure coordinated arrangements and a multi-agency approach to safety, security and service, and emergency contingency plans. State Parties are to ensure both event organisers and public authorities “provide a safe and secure environment for all participants and spectators”, and a “welcoming environment for all sections of society, including children, the elderly and those with disabilities”. Specific provision is made relating to travel and last kilometre mobility: “The Parties shall ensure that risk assessment and safety and security measures take account of the journey to and from the stadium” (A6(2))²⁵.

3.2.11. Article 8 of the 2016 Convention encourages engagement with supporters and local communities by all stakeholders. Article 9 asserts: “The Parties shall ensure that policing strategies are developed, regularly evaluated and refined” consistently with the integrated approach, and Article 9.2 requires specific approaches including “proportionate intervention to prevent the escalation of risk or disorder, [and] effective dialogue with supporters”. Article 9.3 states: “The Parties shall ensure that the police work in partnership with organisers, supporters, local communities and other stakeholders in making football matches and other sports events safe, secure and welcoming for all concerned.”

3.2.12. The Panel notes that the drafting of Article 8 is aspirational, whereas those of Articles 4-7, and particularly Article 9 are mandatory.

3.2.13. These principles are reflected more expansively in Recommendation Rec (2021) 1 under the heading “Role of Police” at paragraphs 33-40, and further

23 — [Recommendation Rec \(2021\) 1 of the Committee on Safety and Security at Sports Events](#) (Paragraph 2), Council of Europe

24 — [Recommendation Rec \(2021\) 1 of the Committee on Safety and Security at Sports Events](#), Council of Europe

25 — [Recommendation Rec \(2021\) 1 of the Committee on Safety and Security at Sports Events](#), Council of Europe

explained in the guidance set out in Annexe B on Security-Good Practices.

3.2.14. The Panel notes and emphasises that the provisions of the 2016 Convention are binding on France as a State Party, and should have underpinned the orientation of UEFA and all other stakeholders.

3.2.15. For its part, through its normal bidding process, UEFA requires applicants to: “Confirm that you adhere to the Council of Europe Convention on an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports Events (Council of Europe Treaty Series- No 218)”²⁶. Although there was no bidding process for Paris, there can have been no confusion concerning the applicability of the 2016 Convention.

3.2.16. The Panel notes that UEFA held a finalists’ meeting on Friday 6th May. As part of its presentation²⁷, despite the truncated process, UEFA asserted: “The LOS²⁸ should deliver a draft SSNS²⁹ Concept to UEFA; The safety and security concept developed by the LOS should meet the standards required by UEFA for delivery of the event. In this respect UEFA will assess and provide feedback on the concept delivered and thereafter advise and assist with the development of the concept into an operational plan, reflecting the event overlay required. The SSNS concept should be integrated with the medical and mobility concepts to ensure a holistic approach. The SSNS concept should reflect recognized best practice, as evidenced in the 2016 Council of Europe Convention on Safety, Security and Service at Football matches.”

3.3. Monitoring and implementation

3.3.1. State Parties appoint representatives to the Standing Committee on Safety and Security at Sports Events³⁰. The Convention states that this “Committee, with the prior agreement of the parties concerned, shall monitor compliance with this Convention through a programme of visits to the States Parties, in order to provide advice and support on the implementation of this Convention.”³¹

26 — UEFA Champions League Final 2022 or 2023 Bid Dossier Template (Sector 05 – 5 - Question 07) - Appendix, VI.13

27 — UEFA Champions League Finalists’ Meeting (6 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.8

28 — Local Organising Structure

29 — Acronym for ‘Safety, Security and Service’

30 — [CETS 218 – Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Sports Events, 3.VII.2016](#) (Article 13), Council of Europe

31 — [CETS 218 – Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Sports Events, 3.VII.2016](#) (Article 14.2), Council of Europe

3.3.2. Between 17th and 19th April 2015, such a delegation from the Standing Committee carried out a consultative visit to France in advance of the UEFA Euro 2016, to assess and make recommendations to enhance the safety and security arrangements for the tournament. The report of the visit contained 35 recommendations and an ‘action plan’ regarding timescale, responsibility and results of implementation of its recommendations.³²

3.3.3. Key recommendations of their report, which followed the consultative visit, were as follows:

a. Standing Committee (SC) Recommendation 1: The police and relevant authorities should review the potential risk of local communities clashing with visiting supporters during the tournament and take steps to simultaneously provide reassurance to both local communities and visiting supporters that the risk would be addressed by preventative action and, in parallel, by the adoption of a zero-tolerance policy towards any form of racism or other forms of discrimination.

b. SC Recommendation 2: Policing tactics, profile and uniform should be determined on the basis of: ongoing dynamic risk analyses; graded deployment, with protective equipment used only where necessary; and early targeted and proportionate interventions to prevent the escalation of risk.

c. SC Recommendation 3: Police units likely to be deployed during UEFA Euro 2016 should be encouraged to proactively interact with and adopt a welcoming and friendly manner towards supporters.

d. SC Recommendation 16: The relevant authorities should: review and determine the appropriate pre-entry searching regime to be applied during the tournament and the measures required to mitigate entry delays (for example, effective signage en-route to stadiums, explanatory communications to visiting supporters, pre-match entertainment); consider the response to be adopted should delays on entry generate safety risks; once the arrangements have been reviewed, the outcome should feature in contingency plans designating responsibility for determining whether or not to weaken security checks in the event of an emerging safety scenario; as with other contingency plans, the arrangements should be subject to a multiagency table-top exercise.

e. SC Recommendation 28: The French Government should consider extending the role and remit of DIGES, or establish an alternative government-led standing

³² — [European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sport Events and in particular at Football Matches Standing Committee Consultative visit to France \(17-19 April 2015\)](#), Council of Europe

national, multi-agency co-ordination committee (“National Committee”), to oversee the development and delivery of an integrated approach to safety, security and service in respect of football matches and other sports events where appropriate.

f. SC Recommendation 29: The French Government should provide the DIGES, or an alternative national co-ordination committee, with a clear remit and terms of reference which clarifies which Government Department has ultimate responsibility on any matters where there is not unanimity within the committee.

3.3.4. The Panel viewed the 2015 delegation report with such importance that it interviewed the Chair of the Council of Europe Standing Committee on Safety and Security at Sports Events (T-S4), Adrian Dinca, in order to understand whether the recommendations had led to meaningful changes. Mr Dinca had himself participated in the 2015 consultative visit and indicated that no follow-up report on implementation of the action plan had been provided by the French authorities. He says this failure to provide an update may be partially explained by the timing of the report, adopted by the Standing Committee on 26th May 2016, shortly before the new 2016 convention superseded its predecessor, the 1985 Convention.

3.3.5. In light of the Panel’s conclusions regarding the nature of the policing model used at the UCLF22 and its operation on the day, the Panel is disappointed that the recommendations of the delegation report appear to have been largely ignored by the French authorities. Furthermore, the Panel notes that recommendations made by the DIGES in his post-28th May report, prepared for the French Prime Minister, repeat a number of those made in the earlier report.

3.3.6. In the report³³ five recommendations are made. The first two are of particular note:

a. Recommendation No 1 proposes “Institutionalised national governance for certain Major International Sporting Events (GESIs) of major interest” and, amongst other things, states: “Given the scale and circumstances in which certain events take place, the establishment of national coordination should be considered more systematically to deal with the relationship between the international dimension and local management.” In terms of the coordination role this recommendation goes on to indicate that this could be placed under the authority and chaired jointly by the Minister of Interior and Minister of Sport with the DIGES providing

³³ — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7

administrative support. This reflects R28 and R29 of the 2016 Report, which has not been actioned.

b. Recommendation No 2 aims to “Optimise the management of access flows to the sites of major events to guarantee their safety, fluidity and the qualitative experience of visitors.” In this regard the report goes on to say that “The purpose of the flow management must be to promote optimal control of arrival flows, over time and with continuity.” This is similar to Recommendation 16 of the 2016 Report, again, not actioned.

3.4. Consequences of failure to discharge the obligations of the 2016 Convention, or action recommendations

3.4.1. If the provisions of the 2016 Convention and the recommendations of the Standing Committee, and the 2015 delegation report had been followed by the French authorities and Préfecture de Police on the one hand, and UEFA and Local Organising Structure on the other, there may have been a very different outcome at UCLF22.

3.4.2. Firstly, the problems of anti-social behaviour and attacks on supporters would have been properly addressed in the planning and operational stages. Secondly, had the police taken a proportionate approach to threats, and engaged and properly communicated with supporters, the dangerous congestion may not have occurred, and there would have been no deployment of tear gas and pepper spray weaponry which affected so many innocent and vulnerable supporters. Thirdly, had French authorities and UEFA ensured that there was proper interoperability across private and public partners, the serious mismanagement of supporters travelling to the stadium and access points would not have arisen, and the access points themselves would have been properly designed and operated to ensure safe and effective access for those entitled to entry to the match. Fourthly, there would have been proper contingency plans to deal with access problems and congestion before they became dangerous.

3.4.3. In his evidence to the Hearing of the French Senate into events surrounding the UEFA Champions League Final 2022, Julien Zylberstein, UEFA Director of European Affairs and Governance, referred to UEFA’s close cooperation with the Council of Europe saying that: “an important part of our joint work is the implementation of the Saint-Denis Convention, signed on the side-lines of Euro 2016 at the Stade de France. We have been a driving force in its development and

are now playing a leading role in its implementation. We are a historical member of its Monitoring Committee.”³⁴

3.4.4. He continued: “The Saint-Denis Convention is the culmination of decades of work with our European partners. Today, it is probably the most successful legally binding instrument at the international level for the security, safety and services of major sports events. In particular, it allows for a structured collaboration between the various competent players, public authorities, event organisers and fan organizations.”³⁵

3.4.5. The Panel has concluded that the 2016 Convention, and the subsequent complementary Recommendations of the Standing Committee, are fit for purpose, and set laudable, achievable aims. The problem was that those bound by them – the French authorities - and those who organised the event – UEFA and UEFA Events SA – failed to meet with the requirements or recommendations, or even to apply the principles.

3.4.6. Moreover, the Panel expresses its concern that a senior representative of UEFA was prepared to set out to the Senate the central role UEFA is said to play in the implementation of the Convention, yet fail to identify its own role in not challenging the policing model or ensuring effective interoperability between stakeholders at its annual flagship event.

34 — [Rapport d'Information fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de législation, du suffrage universel, du Règlement et d'administration générale et de la commission de la culture, de l'éducation et de la communication sur les incidents survenus au Stade de France le 28 mai 2022](#) (13 July 2022), French Senat (p. 194 – 206) - English translation at Appendix, VI.19 (p. 2835)

35 — [Rapport d'Information fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de législation, du suffrage universel, du Règlement et d'administration générale et de la commission de la culture, de l'éducation et de la communication sur les incidents survenus au Stade de France le 28 mai 2022](#) (13 July 2022), French Senat (p. 194 – 206) - English translation at Appendix, VI.19 (p. 2835)

4. An evidence-based account of planning and delivery of the UCLF safety, service and security operation

4. An evidence-based account of planning and delivery of the UCLF safety, service and security operation

4.1. Introduction

4.1.1. As we have already noted, the security situation in Europe led the UEFA Executive Committee to relocate the final of the 2021/22 UEFA Men's Champions League (UCLF) from the Russian city of Saint Petersburg to Stade de France in Saint-Denis, a northern suburb of Paris. It was President Macron that agreed that the Stade de France (SDF) could host the final on 24th February, a decision that was ratified by an extraordinary meeting of the UEFA Executive Committee on 25th February³⁶.

4.1.2. As noted, this left just over three months for all the preparations necessary to host the UCLF to be put in place. The Panel concluded that this shortened planning period was a key factor in the already accepted failures surrounding the event. As the DIGES report acknowledged, "Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022 prompted UEFA to take the decision, from 25th February, to relocate the final of the 2022 Champions League from the Krestovsky stadium in Saint Petersburg to the Stade de France in Saint-Denis, with the approval of the President of the Republic. This exceptional match was therefore prepared within a limited time of only 3 months, instead of 18 months typical under normal circumstances"³⁷.

4.1.3. As noted, a key outcome of this truncated time frame meant that instead of a bespoke safety and security concept being prepared as part of the bid for the UCLF, the plan for the event was modified from one already developed for the final of Coupe de France, between Nice and Nantes, scheduled to be played at the stadium on 7th May.

4.2. The context and design of the Stade de France

4.2.1. The SDF serves as the national stadium of France. It was constructed for the FIFA World Cup in 1998 and inaugurated in January that same year. It currently has an official seating capacity of 80,698 making it the seventh largest stadium

36 — [Guerre en Ukraine: comment Macron a obtenu la relocalisation de la finale de la Ligue des Champions au Stade de France](#), BFM avec RMC Sport

37 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7

in Europe and as such is listed as a Category 4 venue by UEFA. The stadium has previously hosted Champions League Finals in 2000 and 2006 and was a venue that hosted seven matches, including the Final, during the 2016 European Championships.

4.2.2. The SDF is in the City of Saint-Denis to north of Paris, several parts of which suffer from very high levels of socio-economic deprivation. It is an area of ethnic diversity and there are long-standing tensions between sections of the local community and police. For example, serious disturbances developed in Saint-Denis as part of a wave of rioting that spread across France in November 2005. Saint-Denis is a crime ‘hotspot’ with relatively high rates of robbery, drugs offences and murder. In 2010 the city had one of the highest rates of violence in Europe and was classified as a Priority Security Zone by the French Government in 2012. As well as social tensions in the surrounding area, the stadium itself was targeted on 13th November 2015 during a coordinated terrorist attack.

4.2.3. The stadium is located at the intersection of two major auto-routes, the A1 and A86. The stadium was designed with a very limited number of parking spaces, so public transportation is considered the primary means of getting to the venue, which is served by a metro station to the northwest and two RER stations, Line B to south and Line D to the southwest. For those arriving via RER B the stadium is accessed via Avenue du Stade de France which contains an expansive walkway designed to accommodate high-volume foot traffic. For those approaching from RER D the closest access point is via a relatively narrow slope from the Avenue du President Wilson which we refer to as the Wilson ramp. For those accessing the north of the stadium, the primary access route is through Metro Line 13 and the station Saint-Denis Port de Paris and via a narrow sidewalk to the northwest of the arena (see Annex Figure 1).

4.2.4. Squeezed into a narrow footprint between two roadways and a canal system, the stadium is effectively an ‘island site’ surrounded by a raised concourse which is only accessible via a relatively limited number of access points, particularly when approached from the rail or metro stations. The stadium bowl is surrounded by a high steel fence referred to as the Outer Security Perimeter (OSP) and is accessed via stairways that are accessible through eighteen alphabetically labelled gates (i.e., A through to Z). Each high steel gate can be locked but when opened has a series of waist high electronic turnstiles or tripods. People entering the stadium do so by placing their ticket onto a QR code reader which on recognizing the ticket automatically releases the mechanism allowing one

person to pass through. The turnstiles are not fenced in and can be relatively easily traversed (see Annex Figure 2).

4.2.5. Stadium safety and security operations operate from a joint stadium control room which is divided into two sections. The larger of the two areas is controlled by the police and the smaller by the event organizers and CSDF.

4.3. The outline planning phase

4.3.1. Having outlined the context and design of the stadium we turn now to the planning phases for the UCLF. The Panel has analysed the challenges of the late change of venue at Chapter 7. Here we deal with what occurred.

4.3.2. In his report to the Prime Minister, dated 10th June 2022, the DIGES noted, “The organisation of this final was the subject of collaborative and constructive work including the organisers (UEFA and FFF), the territorial authorities (the Cities of Paris and Saint-Denis), the Central Government (the DIGES, the CNSJ, the Préfecture de Police, the Préfecture de Seine-Saint-Denis, the DGAC) and the transport operators (the RATP, SNCF, ADP, Île de France Mobilités)”³⁸. Subsequently, the DIGES noted that “sixteen working meetings were held between 4th March and 28th May, either at the level of the Inter-ministerial Delegate for Major Sporting Events (DIGES), or at the level of the Préfet de Police or its chief of staff, or at the level of the Préfet de Seine-Saint-Denis”³⁹. A list of the meetings and organisations who attended during this planning phase was provided by FFF and can be consulted in the Appendix⁴⁰. In the following section we focus on those where the Panel judged that decisions were made, or information discussed that was relevant to our inquiry. We then go on to explore the implications of these decisions by outlining how the safety and security operation was delivered and the problems that flowed from that delivery.

4.3.3. The first step in the multistakeholder planning process involved the creation of a Liaison Group (LG), which met for the first time on 4th March, at the initiative of the DIGES. In its report the DIGES asserts that the LG “was created to promote

38 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p. 122)

39 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p. 122)

40 — FFF Position Statement – Appendix, IV.11 (p. 189)

relations between the organisers and the French institutions, facilitating the proper transmission of information and adapting arrangements to the requests of clubs and operators involved in the system"⁴¹. Beyond its role of ensuring good interoperability the LG terms of reference appear to have been to accelerate implementation and to act as a primary decision-making body regarding implementation.

4.3.4. At the LG meeting of 4th March UEFA Events SA was present and laid out an outline plan for the UCLF to senior representatives from various local stakeholder organisations including the DIGES, FFF, City of Paris, City of Saint-Denis, Direction Des Sports, and CNSJ. According to FFF it was at this meeting that UEFA Events SA detailed the requirements it needed to be satisfied for the successful hosting of the UCLF. Again, according to FFF, one of these was to create a secure zone around the outer perimeter of the stadium, to be achieved by implementing an Additional Security Perimeter (ASP) at various access points surrounding the stadium. The Panel could find no reference to confirm this decision in the minutes of the LG's first meeting, but they do record that the LG established a Security and Mobility Working Group that was to be Chaired by the Préfecture de Saint-Denis and included the police, and transport stakeholders (RATP, Préfecture de Paris et d'Île-de-France (regional Préfecture), Île-de-France Mobilités, ADP, SNCF, the CNSJ, DIGES, UEFA / FFF and the Cities of Saint-Denis and Paris)⁴².

4.3.5. These minutes also record that a security and mobility plan or concept (i.e., the plan for how supporters would move into and away from the event) had to be in place by 14th March. The meeting record also notes that the safety and security concept for the UCLF would be based on the one being developed for the 2023 Rugby World Cup and foreseeing issues with the rail network that "FFF and UEFA recalled that the proper functioning of the RER B on 28th May is an essential condition for the holding of the event". At the meeting the City of Paris requested clarification from UEFA about the need to provision "celebration zones" and the meeting concluded with a commitment from the stakeholders to ensure the event was delivered in the best possible way. The slides used by UEFA Events SA to support its presentation to this meeting also note an outline mobility plan which indicates that those travelling by public transport would use the three primary stations noted above and, of note, it indicates that those arriving on RER D would

41 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p. 122)

42 — Groupe de liaison Finale de la Ligue des Champions de l'UEFA du 28 mai 2022 - Compte-rendu synthétique (4 March 2022) - Appendix, VI.2

use the Wilson Ramp to access the stadium footprint: that is ASP3⁴³. The slides and minutes from the meeting therefore indicate an awareness at this early and outline stage of potential disruption to the RER network. At this time this was because of planned maintenance works scheduled for the weekend of the UCLF.

4.3.6. Slides presented by UEFA Events SA at the meeting also provided information about modal patterns of passenger flow for those travelling via the RER and Metro (see Annex Figure 3)⁴⁴. This is important because they indicate that the meeting discussed that it would be normal to expect around 81% of the foot traffic for the event to access from the south of the stadium and of these 37% would arrive on RER D. One of these slides indicate that as many as 15,000 people could be expected to enter via the stadium's southwest corner. These figures were later contradicted in written evidence provided to the Panel by SNCF who stated to the Panel that during Stade de France events on average RER B (the Northern part of which is managed by SNCF) conveys an average of 21,600 persons (45% of the spectators arriving on public transport) and RER D 9,600 (20%)⁴⁵. These figures and contradictions are important because they demonstrate (a) an early lack of clarity and shared understanding between stakeholders about the likely routes through which supporters would flow onto the stadium footprint and (b) that from the early planning stages stakeholders were aware that it might be the case that between 9,500 and 21,600 people might seek enter the stadium via the Wilson ramp.

4.3.7. Central to the plans for the event was the application of the ASP on the approaches to the stadium footprint. According to the plan there were 12 access points within the ASP, which spectators had to pass through to be able to then access their designated gate. Whilst it is not unusual to have an ASP at the SDF or UCLF, what is clear is that those responsible for the design and operation of such a facility must be satisfied in the planning phase that the number of entry points can sustain flow rates necessary to safely cope with the demands placed on it. In other words, there are crucial throughput calculations that must be undertaken to ensure that enough people can pass through the ASP in sufficient time.

4.3.8. It is important to note here that in the case of the ASPs on 28th May, the report of the DIGES stated "it had been decided by FFF, at the request of UEFA,

43 — Groupe de liaison UCLF – UCLF 22 // Stade de France // Saint-Denis (4 March 2022) - Appendix, VI.1

44 — Groupe de liaison UCLF – UCLF 22 // Stade de France // Saint-Denis (4 March 2022) - Appendix, VI.1

45 — SNCF reply to Additional Request – Appendix, IV.15

with the agreement of police authorities, to activate double screening⁴⁶. The Panel remains uncertain exactly when and how this decision was reached but FFF concurred with the DIGES that it was a requirement made by UEFA⁴⁷. The Panel is aware that security checks have been a feature of events at the SDF since the terrorist attack in 2015. But, as we consider in Chapter 6, according to CSDF, the decision to enact a ‘double system’ of checking at the ASPs is not usual, and in the view of the Panel was an important aspect of why problems began to develop at the UCLF.

4.3.9. The next meeting of note was between FFF and the Préfecture de Paris and took place on 18th March where planning timelines, the stadium environment, mobility as well as safety and security were again discussed. Slides presented at the meeting state that there was now “written confirmation that RER B will be back in service for the weekend of the Final” suggesting that the planned maintenance work was to be suspended⁴⁸. The slides also indicate that ticketing was discussed, and that some form of filtering was discussed. The concept at this time appeared to have been to place an additional ticket check after the person had progressed through the ASP and was to be in place immediately ahead of the gates through the OSP to allow for organized and efficient ticket activation and checking just prior to turnstiles. This is important because as we discuss later, queue management appears not to have been in place for the UCLF, but had it been so some of the problems encountered may have been avoided (see Annex Figure 4).

4.3.10. A week later FFF and CSDF met with the Préfecture de Saint-Denis on 25th March. The minutes from this meeting are the first evidence the Panel could obtain of emerging concerns about threats and risks posed by the qualification of an English club side⁴⁹. These minutes note that “thousands of English supporters could join Paris for the occasion. Most of these spectators would not have a ticket to attend the final”. This is interesting because it indicates that the stakeholders appear to have concluded at a very early stage that the influx of large numbers of supporters was not something to be welcomed and facilitated but was being viewed as a threat to public order. The proposed strategy to address this perceived threat was the provision of a fan gathering area. Thus, the meeting noted that “FFF

46 — Double screening involved both ticket and security checks, Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p. 129)

47 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p.1566)

48 — Réunion avec la Préfecture de Paris – UCLF 22 // Stade de France // Saint-Denis (18 March 2022) - Appendix, VI.4

49 — Compte-rendu de la réunion de présentation de la finale de la ligue des champions au Stade de France – 28 mai 2022 (25 March 2022) - Appendix, VI.5

therefore supports the idea of creating a Fan Zone in Paris to limit the saturation of public transport and disturbances to public order around the Stade de France”.

4.3.11. It was also noted at the meeting that “English supporters travel mainly by train and then metro”. On this basis a strategy was developed to use the transport network as a filtering system to separate those fans with and without tickets. The meeting noted it “is therefore important to provide a flow management system upstream, from their arrival at the Gare du Nord with an orientation of the fans with tickets to the Stade de France and those without a ticket to the Fan Zone”. Moreover, while RER B was at that time expected to be working normally the “FFF could formulate a request to extend the train offer with the SNCF”, who fully operate RER D. While it appears no decision to implement this plan was made, it was agreed that these issues would be taken forward to the next meeting between the DIGES and the Préfecture de Police scheduled on 4th April. These meeting notes are important because they (a) indicate a shared mobility plan was emerging based on the idea that a large influx of English fans without tickets was a public order problem and (b) a strategy was emerging to route supporters to the stadium via RER Line D.

4.3.12. While the next significant meeting is mentioned in the Senate report, the Panel was not provided with the record of the meeting on 4th April. Nonetheless, on the following day Football Supporters Europe (FSE) conducted a preparatory site visit to the SDF during which they were presented with the UCLF outline plan. Contrary to the usual procedure, only UEFA and UEFA Events SA were present. These meetings are usually attended by the host FA, local police, the National Police Information Point and stadium management. According to FSE, UEFA was unable at that stage to answer most of the questions related to policing and mobility despite the fact they raised several relevant concerns⁵⁰. Specifically, the FSE report notes how they had emphasised “the high risk of congestions around pre-OSP police checks” and that they were “highly concerned with police operations around the stadium, especially with regards to the high risk of congestion/stomping around the exit/entrance of the metro station Saint-Denis Porte de Paris and on the way between the RER D station and the stadium”. Their report also notes that “the small distance between police checks pre-OSP and OSP is likely to cause congestions and crowd movements, as police usually tends to disperse the crowd from behind”. We could find no acknowledgement of the FSE report or the concerns they raised in the records of any subsequent planning

⁵⁰ — FSE Position Statement - Appendix, IV.31 (p.614)

meetings, suggesting that despite their ultimate validity these concerns were largely, if not entirely, ignored.

4.3.13. As the Champions League knockout competition progressed, a questionnaire was distributed by UEFA to the eight clubs who had reached the quarter finals stage. This questionnaire is part of the UEFA's routine planning and risk assessment processes for the UCLF and enables them to gather information including each clubs' expectations about the movement and risks posed by their own supporters.

4.3.14. This data fed into UEFA's ongoing planning process and was discussed at a subsequent meeting with representatives from the four semi-finalist clubs that was held in Paris between the 20th and 22nd April. During the meeting UEFA's outline plan was presented to the clubs and records indicate that initial risk assessments were discussed. According to Liverpool FC there was some disparity even at this stage between their own assessments of the risk posed by their supporters and that of UEFA Events SA. As the club noted to the Panel, "we will always provide the information, from the quarter-final's questionnaire. We [LFC] explained we would have huge demand for tickets, [that] there would be 50,000 persons traveling without tickets. We kind of knew that straight away. It's a very easy place to go to, Paris... Like, you can identify those risks in the questionnaire, what UEFA then or the local authorities then do with that information, once we provide it at the quarter-final stage, I'm not too sure. To go to the semi-final finalist stage, the risk assessment that's presented to us, I'm not sure was accurate, from what we believe the risks would be"⁵¹.

4.4. The detailed planning phase

4.4.1. On the 3rd and 4th May Real Madrid and Liverpool qualified as the two finalists and on 5th May the LG was convened, once again organised by the DIGES⁵². At this meeting UEFA and UEFA Events SA presented a more detailed safety and security concept that covered ticket allocations, the security perimeter, parking, VIP entry, mobility, and the general issue of public screening of the match⁵³. The plan located Real Madrid supporters in the north of the stadium and Liverpool supporters in the south. In turn, this would then mean that Real Madrid supporters travelling by rail

51 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5

52 — Préparation de la finale de la ligue des champions de l'UEFA (28/05/22) – Relevé de conclusions de la réunion du jeudi 5 mai 2022 (5 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.7

53 — UEFA Presentation UCLF 22 // Stade de France // Saint-Denis (5 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.6

would be encouraged to utilise Metro line 13 and Liverpool fans RER B & D. It is evident that the segregation of fans to the north and south of the stadium was a key priority during the rest of the planning phase.

4.4.2. The minutes of the LG meeting on the 5th record that the Préfet de Seine-Saint-Denis proposed that the sale of alcohol should be prohibited inside the ASP and that such restrictions should extend as far as the RER stations. Such restrictions would undoubtedly have had a dramatic impact on the capability of local traders in Saint-Denis from profiting from the UCLF. This suggestion was resisted by UEFA, FFF and the City of Saint-Denis on the grounds that it would increase rather than decrease the likelihood of crowd problems. The meeting notes record that the contrary view was that it would be better to licence the sale of alcohol. However, the primary rationale was to do so only inside the stadium to limit a late influx of supporters. The Préfet agreed to wait until after a trial evaluation of the plan at the Domestic Cup final on 7th May before making their final position on the issue clear to the DIGES on the 9th⁵⁴.

4.4.3. The minutes of the meeting on the 5th once again noted the perceived threat in hosting up to 50,000 Liverpool supporters without tickets and that the fan zone was seen less as a way of facilitating them and more as a means for the authorities “to concentrate and contain this public while limiting its movements”. Consequently, that “the organization of a zone of viewing is deemed necessary for reasons of public order”. The minutes note that a proposal was put forward at this meeting by the Préfet de Police to use the 36,000 m² Cours de Vincennes given its capacity to host up to 60,000 people. FFF and UEFA agreed to fund the zone, but the proposal was resisted by the Mayor of Paris because of concerns about the risk of “fights between English supporters and possible groups of ultras from Paris Saint-Germain”. The Panel notes how evidence from this meeting further confirms the idea that planning was based upon a securitized approach to public order rather than based upon a facilitation and public safety perspective, something that is contrary to the policing guidance set out in the Saint-Denis Convention.

4.4.4. According to the Deputy Mayor of the 12th Arrondissement, Richard Bouigue, the decision to locate the fan park at Cours de Vincennes was taken by the Préfecture and consultation with the local authority was extremely limited. He noted to the Panel: “we found it difficult to get concrete answers to our questions about the organisation of this fan zone. That is to say: where it would be located,

⁵⁴ — Préparation de la finale de la ligue des champions de l'UEFA (28/05/22) – Relevé de conclusions de la réunion du jeudi 5 mai 2022 (5 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.7

the opening hours, the link that there would be between this fan zone and the shops, the neighbours, the residents, and in particular the presence of a weekly food market which is held on the Cours de Vincennes, on the side of the 12th arrondissement, and which we didn't know whether it could be maintained or not... In the same way, it is regrettable that at no time were we put in touch with the service provider who set up the fan zone, although we could easily have imagined possible synergies with actors from the arrondissement. I'm thinking in particular of the food trucks, I'm thinking of the entertainment in general, where we could perhaps have had another type of relationship. And lately, we haven't had any precise information, except belatedly, concerning the barricading of the fan zone. What we had seen when we asked about previous fan zones, notably those that had existed in Madrid for the match between Tottenham and Liverpool, was a fan zone that didn't have these barriers all around it, and which therefore allowed a link between supporters and the life of the arrondissement. Here, there was a kind of gap that gave the impression of being a car park, something that broke up the relationship between those who were in the fan zone and the inhabitants and shopkeepers of the arrondissement"⁵⁵.

4.4.5. In his evidence to the Panel the Deputy Mayor was not only critical of the use of barriers to fence the supporters in as it cut off the gathering from the local community. His position was that a lack of communication also undermined his ability to facilitate the fans with guidance about how they could move from the park to the various transport hubs. This evidence suggests a lack of communication between key stakeholders and Mr Bouigue commented on a tendency of the Préfecture to act unilaterally, rather than to communicate and consult, and seek collaboration with other partners.

4.4.6. He noted to the Panel: "Well, typically, I think it is perhaps an unfortunate habit of the Préfecture of Police, but it is all the more regrettable that we had for this event, both. I am talking about the fan zone, but even further, about what was happening at the Stade de France. We had possible interlocutors. In France, we have set up National Committee on Supporters⁵⁶, which would have been very useful to us if we had been able to mobilise it for an event like this one. We have Football Supporters Europe, which would have been very useful if they had been more involved. We have relations with all the stakeholders. We have a lot of sports

⁵⁵ — Meeting with Richard Bouigue – Appendix, V.13

⁵⁶ — This is a consultative body coordinated by the Ministry of Sport and for the Olympic and Paralympic Games, introduced by the 10/05/2016 law "reinforcing supporters dialogue and the fight against hooliganism", see [Dialogue avec les supporters](#).

clubs in this arrondissement. I think that they would have been useful actors to mobilise. So, I think that there is a problem with these events, which is that, alongside a security approach which is perhaps normal... there should not just be a security approach. There must also be other elements, and these elements are the welcome, the entertainment, the fact of understanding that people have come to have a good time, to celebrate. And this is something which is not exactly in the usual specifications of the Préfecture de Police, and it is regrettable. And this is a point on which we must improve greatly. I regret that we didn't have a relationship, for example, with Liverpool City Council. I had a relationship with the supporters' associations, but that will simply because [FSE] allowed me to have it, but otherwise I would not have had it. So, I find that, in the end, regrettable because we have the means to do better, but there is a culture, perhaps, of supervision from a "public order" perspective on events, which does not allow us to develop anything else".

4.4.7. At the LG meeting on the 5th a proposal was also put forward to create a similar but much smaller fan gathering point for Real Madrid supporters in the Parc de la Légion d'Honneur in Saint-Denis. Given that Real Madrid fans were not expected to travel without tickets it was proposed that this zone would be scheduled to close at 18:00. The City of Saint-Denis proposed that consequently it could be used as a viewing area for Saint-Denis residents. The Préfecture resisted the latter proposal because they saw problems would be posed by a gathering of locals in the vicinity of the stadium. The minutes note that "the police and Préfecture de Seine-Saint-Denis point to several problems of security. The Préfecture reserves its position and will communicate it to DIGES at the beginning of the week of 9th May after carefully assessing its law enforcement needs and capabilities to the whole day of May 28".

4.4.8. Importantly, in terms of transport, the rail operating companies are noted at this meeting to have reversed earlier assurances by informing other stakeholders that the planned closures of RER B over the weekend of 28th May would now be going ahead, at least in part. The minutes state that "SNCF recalls that major work on the northern rail network on Saturday night in Sunday will lead to the closure of line B of the RER on Sunday". Consequently, a plan would be required that would lead to "improved communication with the attention of the supporters... so that those who will remain in Paris on Saturday evening can anticipate their movements the next day". Accordingly, it was noted that "RATP will study measures to adapt metro traffic in the event of activation of the transit zone viewing at the Cours de Vincennes". The DIGES requested position statements on these issues by 9th May

and scheduled the next meeting on 19th May. This is significant evidence because it suggests that circulation on RER B might not be optimal on the day and night of the match and, therefore, planning to divert supporters away from RER B was in place much earlier instead of being merely a late reaction to unexpected strike action.

4.4.9. The following day, on 6th May UEFA hosted a joint finalist meeting where a detailed safety and security presentation was delivered to representatives from both clubs. The records indicate that the meeting discussed that the “latest estimated number of ticketless fans in Paris / Saint-Denis on [match day] MD-1, MD, MD+1 is approximately 50,000 mixed in with around 10-15,000 with tickets who will also come to the same areas”⁵⁷. These records note that as a result the UCLF was confirmed as high risk and that “confirmation of the fan meeting point will be crucial in mitigating the risk of ticketless fans going to the stadium”. The meeting also foresaw the importance of “the nature of the search regime process and OSP [which] will be imperative to guarantee the success of the event”. In other words, from early May UEFA and other stakeholders were aware that a large movement of supporters with tickets would take place from the Cours de Vincennes into Saint-Denis and that it would be necessary to adapt mobility plans – particularly at the ASPs to the south of the stadium - to mitigate accordingly.

4.4.10. The LG sat again on 19th May, a meeting that the Panel judged was particularly important because it considered the suitability of current security and mobility planning following the apparent piloting of the plan at the Coupe de France final on 7th May⁵⁸. The meeting noted that once again the City of Saint-Denis lobbied against the ban on alcohol consumption but importantly did so because “during the final of the Coupe de France [the ban] generated unrest that risked being reproduced on Saturday May 28”. Considering this evidence, FFF expressed its preference for an authorization to sell alcohol inside the stadium to facilitate the entry of supporters, a view that was supported by UEFA and the CSDF. The minutes record that “in view of these issues and the type of supporters expected, deemed less at risk than at the occasion of the final of the Coupe de France, the DIGES arbitrated in favour of an authorization to sell of alcohol by merchants until 18:00 within the security perimeter and an authorization for the sale of alcohol inside the Stade de France from 18:00”.

57 — UEFA Champions League Finalists’ Meeting (6 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.8

58 — Préparation de la finale de la ligue des champions de l’UEFA (28/05/22) – Relevé de conclusions de la réunion du jeudi 19 mai 2022 (19 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.10

4.4.11. What is apparent is that these decisions were less about facilitating a festival of football and more about how alcohol could be used as a tool to manage public order. Thus, at the same meeting the City of Saint-Denis was refused an authorization to sell alcohol for businesses serving meals to seated consumers because the “proposal is not very applicable and potentially generates risks of public order disturbances”. Again, the Panel holds the view that such decisions may have contributed to a negative view of the UCLF within the City of Saint-Denis because of the way they disadvantaged local businesses. The meeting notes also confirmed that a decision was made that the fan gathering areas for Real Madrid and Liverpool would go ahead at the specified locations but record an intention to delay the opening of the Cours de Vincennes to avoid interfering with a local market in the same area. It was also recorded that Liverpool supporters would only be notified of the intention to screen the match at the end of the afternoon of 28th May. Finally, the meeting records note that “RATP will have to mobilize information staff to support the organizer’s efforts to guide supporters in their pathways”.

4.4.12. The Panel concludes that the decision not to communicate to supporters that the public screening of the match at the fan zone was confirmed is further evidence that stakeholders were oriented toward the influx of ticketless supporters as a threat to public order. The Panel does not understand how delaying communication of the screening of the match until the late afternoon, minimised ticketless supporters attending at SDF. Indeed, the opposite is the case. The Panel also notes that it was recognised from early May onwards that managing the route taken by thousands of Liverpool supporters with tickets through the rail network to Saint-Denis would be an important challenge that needed to be managed.

4.4.13. The LG meeting was then followed by what appears to have been a particularly significant meeting of the Mobility Working Group on 23rd May. The meeting was chaired by the Préfecture de Police and attended by FFF, CSDF, the police Public Order and Traffic Control Division (DOPC) as well as other local stakeholders. The meeting was subsequently controversial because, as the DIGES noted in his report, as part of their mobility concept, FFF had prepared signage to guide supporters arriving on RER D towards ASP4. It appears they had done this because of an “error in the routing of Nice supporters observed during the French Cup Final on 7th May”⁵⁹. In other words, during the apparent trialling of the UCLF safety and security concept, a problem had been identified that led FFF to adapt the plan to divert supporters away from the Wilson ramp. However, according

59 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p. 129)

to the DIGES the “Préfecture de Police asked to remove the signs directing passengers from the RER D to the exit route from RER B”⁶⁰.

4.4.14. The minutes from the meeting on the 23rd show no record of this discussion but note that “DOPC stated that routing the supporters arriving from RER D into the A1 underpass was preferable in order to avoid a great influx of people into avenue du Pressensé and Avenue du Stade de France that would be full by supporters arriving from RER B”⁶¹. Nevertheless, the fact that the signs were not in place was acknowledged to the Panel as an issue by FFF and the Préfecture de Police took responsibility for this outcome during their interview with us.

4.4.15. As David Clavière from the Préfecture de Police stated: “First of all, during this meeting on the [23rd May] it took place before the strike was known. So, this alternative route, this signage that was set up by FFF was not intended, was not an anticipation of what was to happen later, to redirect the flow of passengers. This is extremely important. So, when the Préfecture de Police replied that it was asking that this alternate route, that this signage be removed, it was simply for reasons of simplicity and so that there would be only one route. But this was before the knowledge of the strike. We must be very clear... in no way did the French Football Federation put up this signage because it expected a problem with traveller volume. And for good reason, since we didn’t know that at the time this decision [to strike] was made... This signage corresponded to an objective of the French Football Federation, that people leaving the RER D should not cross the VIP buses of FFF. We did not share this objective, we thought that it was a source of complication, that it did not correspond to an objective of public interest, and that it would be better, for reasons of simplicity, to stick with the system that had always existed”⁶².

4.4.16. In other words, the Préfecture asserted that their intention was to deliberately direct supporters arriving via RER D toward the Wilson ramp despite the problems that had emerged at the cup final on 7th May. Indeed, FFF asserted in their interview with the Panel that the removal of the signage was part of a flawed plan by the Préfecture de Police to direct supporters toward the Wilson ramp. FFF claim to the Panel that they made repeated attempts to get this decision changed, precisely because they were aware that the double checks planned for the ASP would slow progress sufficiently to cause major disruption.

60 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p. 129)

61 — Groupe de travail «mobilités» finale de la ligue des champions du lundi 23 mai 2022 (23 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.11

62 — Meeting with French Authorities - Appendix, V.2

4.4.17. They stated to the Panel: “[From] the beginning, as request by [FFF] to the Préfecture de Police... if people from the normal way, from the RER D used ASP3, it works for only body check. It never works with ticket check”. FFF later assert that because of their concerns about ASP3 “we ask [the police] to block the route Avenue Francis de Pressensé to change the normal flow of the, of the pedestrian to go to the access of the ASP of RER B. We request to UEFA to create the signage, to put in place the signage and it was done, and, on match day minus one, Préfecture de Police, and we never know why say: no, we, we will not do that”⁶³.

4.4.18. The importance of evidence regarding the dispute between FFF on the one hand, and the Préfecture de Police on the other, regarding the route from RER D to the SDF is obvious, and the Panel analyses it in the following chapters.

4.4.19. What the minutes of the meeting on the 23rd do record is that RATP agreed to make public service announcements in English, Spanish and French⁶⁴. Importantly, these messages were not about the routes supporters should take through the network but discouraging those without tickets to travel at all: “inviting supporters who have a ticket to go to the Stade de France and those who do not to join the fan meeting”. It was to be specified that this message would be reinforced by operatives deployed between 09:00 to 19:00 at the stations of Châtelet, Antony – Orlyval (ORY airport), Porte Maillot, Nation and Denfert-Rochereau. The minutes also record that SNCF planned to set up a reinforcement of its communications from 09:00 to 19:00 at CDG airport, Gare du Nord and Gare de l’Est. No mention appears to have been made of the important interchange station of Gare de Lyon and the Panel notes that the emphasis in the content of these planned communications was to prevent ticketless fans moving toward the stadium rather than clarifying routes of travel for ticketed fans moving legitimately toward Saint-Denis.

4.4.20. Perhaps most relevant to the events that subsequently materialised is that the record of the meeting confirms that “the DOPC [i.e., the police] specified that it is desirable to route spectators arriving from the RER D via the A1 underground in order to avoid an excessive flow on Avenue de Pressensé and on Avenue du Stade de France, which is lined by spectators arriving from RER B”. As noted above, this decision led to some reflection by the other stakeholders as a “question was raised by the CANIF concerning possible removals of pedestrians on ramp no. 9 of the

63 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (Section redacted by FFF)

64 — Groupe de travail «mobilités» finale de la ligue des champions du lundi 23 mai 2022 (23 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.11

A86 in the direction of Nanterre since it allows direct access to the car park of the Stade de France. CANIF would like the presence of stewards at this location". CANIF also requested that the DOPC place forces at the pedestrian tunnel under the A1 roadway which it was acknowledged posed considerable risk of flooding should it rain on the 28th. FFF and the CSDF appear to have been, if not in full disagreement, then at the very least uncertain with the proposal as they agreed to "study this request and return to the police as soon as possible".

4.4.21. The meeting records that while rail staff were to be deployed at the exits of the rail stations to direct people, once again this was intended at this stage merely to segregate out fans without tickets, such that "22 agents are planned... in order to direct supporters with tickets either to the fan meeting point or to the Stade de France". In other words, the minutes of the meeting on 23rd do not record any decision to remove signage but they do make clear a public order focused strategic concern of preventing those without tickets from approaching Saint-Denis and the intention by the Préfet de Police to direct passengers arriving via RER D toward the Wilson ramp despite problems that this route was already known to pose for mobility and public safety.

4.4.22. The evidence suggests that an awareness of planned strike action by workers on the RATP operated sections of RER B emerged late on 23rd or early on 24th May. Regardless of precisely when it was understood, the rail operators began developing revised scenarios to ensure that the thousands of fans expected to access Saint-Denis by rail could still do so. On 24th May FFF, RATP and SNCF held a meeting to exchange information and discuss any impact the strike would have on the management of the flow of Liverpool and Real Madrid fans⁶⁵. According to written evidence submitted to the Panel by RATP, FFF's main concerns at that meeting revolved around public order and that a key priority was to ensure that the rail operators revised plans ensured that "English and Spanish supporters do not cross paths"⁶⁶.

4.4.23. The revised mobility plan was then presented at a Mobility Working Group meeting chaired by the Préfecture on 25th May. According to written evidence from SNCF, this adapted plan would revolve around "a reinforcement on the sides of lines D, 13 and 12" and the suspension of the connection to RER B from Gare du Nord. The Panel assumes this will have meant that the thousands of fans expected to arrive into Gare du Nord would have been required to utilise RER D to

65 — SNCF reply to Additional Request – Appendix, IV.15

66 — RATP reply to Additional Request – Appendix, IV.15

access Saint-Denis. Correspondingly, the rail operators began preparing to provide “passenger information of a suspended interconnection on B, with the maintenance of the transport plan on B North and the recommended RER D on all media (social networks, e-mail, audio announcements, etc.) and relayed by agents at the station”. Thus, “the strike on the Southern part of Line B has led [SNCF] to adapt, along with the RATP, our transport offering by proposing to direct travellers to Line D. This choice is also motivated by considering the location of the Cours de Vincennes fan zone which led us to reinforce Line D”. SNCF also confirmed that information provided “for travellers inviting them to preferably use Line D, was indeed issued, and reinforced, on all platforms (social networks, sound announcements in the station) starting Thursday 26th May. Throughout the day on 28th May, we put in place an information device reinforced with over one hundred additional employees, to guide flows in the major stations concerned, on platforms and enclosed areas”⁶⁷.

4.4.24. RATP’s written evidence also notes other decisions taken at the meeting on the 25th include the Préfecture de Police agreeing to place a “mobile force unit at Nation, a unit at Châtelet and half a unit at the Gare du Nord, both underground, in addition to the CRS/Mobile Gendarmes located on the surface at Nation”. These forces would manage flow into the station at Nation by filtering travellers and distributing flyers⁶⁸. In email correspondence on 25th May, operatives from RATP and SNCF also discussed the management of passengers at Châtelet on the evening of the 28th. RATP operatives confirmed with SNCF “the need for a system at Châtelet which would allow a better balance of the B/D flows for the routing of the spectators for the Champions League. In view of the risks on the B line, we are putting additional shuttles on the D line, in addition to the nominal transport plan (3 shuttles for the transport before the match, 10 shuttles for the return)”. Importantly, the communication notes that “line D is chronically less used for the Stade de France service”. RATP continue by asking if SNCF could “envisage a system that would balance the flows of line B and line D at Châtelet? We can imagine that many spectators will come from the Vincennes fan zone”. SNCF replied shortly afterwards stating that “we take note of the reinforcement of the D line before, but especially after the game”. SNCF note that they were already in communication with another operative at RATP “to look at how we can set up an Interception Point to manage the flow of people, especially after the game, including from Vincennes”. SNCF requested for RATP to “channel resource to send the fans back to the D”. They concluded, “finally, if you have the schedules of the D (in both directions), we are interested!”⁶⁹.

67 — SNCF reply to Additional Request – Appendix, IV.15

68 — RATP reply to Additional Request – Appendix, IV.15

69 — RATP reply to Additional Request – Appendix, IV.15

4.4.25. In other words, taken together the Panel notes that evidence suggests that by 26th May the police and rail operators were working in tandem to actively direct the bulk of passengers moving from the Cours de Vincennes toward Saint-Denis via RER D and on arrival the plan by the police was to filter these passengers towards the Wilson ramp. Other stakeholders such as FFF and UEFA claimed to the Panel that they were unaware of the rail operators plans to shift passenger movement toward the SNCF operated RER Line D. The Panel concludes that such lack of awareness reflects perhaps one of the most serious failures of communication and interoperability we have detected.

4.4.26. The DIGES report states “the Préfecture de Police’s security service plan is explicit by tracing a route from the RER D station down avenue François Mitterrand and avenue des Fruitiers in the direction of the underpass, which runs under the A1 to the pre-screening point located under the A86”⁷⁰. The evidence suggests this plan had already been shared with FFF who acknowledge that they were aware that the Wilson ramp and ASP3 would not have the capacity to manage required through flow. The evidence also suggests that not only did FFF do little to make other stakeholders aware of their concern, but the rail operators also then subsequently developed a contingency plan that amplified the problem. The failures of interoperability then appear to have continued because there is no record or evidence of any concerns about the Wilson ramp and ASP3 being discussed at the next major meeting of stakeholders on 26th chaired by UEFA⁷¹. This is surprising because the meeting on the 26th is a crucial gathering of all key stakeholders colloquially referred to as ‘Match Day minus Two’ (MD -2), referring to the fact it is always held two days before UCLF. The meeting covers all aspects of the organisation including safety, security and the mobility plan and it is attended by UEFA safety and security officers charged with responsibility for scrutinising the delivery of the plan. We do not have access to the minutes from the MD-2 meeting, but the PowerPoint slides clearly indicate that the mobility plan was discussed, and it was acknowledged by UEFA that the plan was to direct all supporters arriving from RER D toward the Wilson ramp toward ASP3 (see Annex Figure 5). The Panel understands that SNCF - the operator of RER D - was not invited to attend this meeting or its subsequent site visit to scrutinise the proposed implementation.

70 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p. 129)

71 — UEFA Presentation Liverpool FC VS Real Madrid CF (26 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.12

4.4.27. Thus, RATP and SNCF intended to direct Liverpool supporters toward RER D. In addition, the Panel notes that during the latter stages of the planning phase the Police decided to direct all supporters arriving by RER D toward ASP3. Importantly, the Préfecture de Police was aware of both decisions but did not adjust their plans to create mitigation. It is evident that FFF and UEFA were aware of the decision to direct supporters toward ASP3, but were perhaps unaware of the decision to disproportionately utilise RER D. The Panel concludes that the Préfecture de Police were in effect acting unilaterally to direct supporters toward an entry point that would be unable to cope with the level of demand placed upon it. This therefore represents a severe failure of interoperability between key stakeholders at a critical juncture.

4.5. Match Day

4.5.1. In this section we provide a chronological analysis of incidents that took place on 28th May. We offer an objective account of events based upon multiple sources of evidence. First, the Panel drew from existing reports and evidence produced from prior inquiries including those conducted by UEFA, the DIGES and the Senate. From this we produced an initial timeline. Second, the Panel cross referenced these with three detailed analyses produced by three teams of investigative journalists including those published by the Guardian newspaper, a video analysis produced by Le Monde and a third published by the Daily Mail. Third, the Panel drew evidence from multiple eyewitness accounts which we obtained primarily from our own interviews with representatives of supporters' organisations and individual supporters of Liverpool and Real Madrid. We supplemented these by drawing upon the extensive and detailed evidence published by Scraton, Haydon, Easthope, Canning and Marshall (2022) whose Independent Panel Report drew upon inputs from 485 detailed statements. We were also provided with further written testimonies of supporters and employees of UEFA who had been present at the UCLF who written to the organisation in the wake of events.⁷² Fourth, we drew upon the extensive testimonies and other data made available to the Panel both in writing and verbally by the multiple stakeholders listed in the Executive Summary and where possible published alongside this report. Finally, we obtained video data directly from social and mainstream media and conducted our own site visit to the SDF in mid-September. We triangulated all this data to provide the following account of how the events on 28th May materialised chronologically. We do not seek to describe every detail of what happened in every location and focus only on key aspects of the event as we judged them to be relevant to our inquiry. Throughout we draw upon this evidence to reach specific conclusions based upon

⁷² — While Liverpool FC offered access to the thousands of supporter accounts provided to them, we did not have the resources to draw these in to our analysis.

our understandings of what we judge to have occurred. We recognise the various limitations of our approach but believe we have achieved a good standard of objectivity and are confident our account broadly reflects what took place.

4.5.2. The two fan zones were both initially scheduled to open at noon. As noted above, the zone dedicated to Real Madrid fans was located at the Parc de la Légion d’Honneur, in Saint-Denis, just a short 20-minute walk to the north of the Stadium. This location was able to accommodate around five to six thousand people but was initially scheduled to close and reopen at 18:00 to provide a viewing location for residents. The Panel remains unclear if this reopening took place but, in any case, understands that it opened on schedule at midday. There were no incidents of note that occurred there throughout the afternoon or later that evening.

4.5.3. As noted, the second fan zone was located within the city of Paris, in the Cours de Vincennes, which was an area of linear roadway close to the Place de la Nation. The zone was enclosed by high security fencing. It was designed to accommodate around forty-five thousand people, had controlled entry, a large stage and four screens that were ultimately used to display the match. The Cours de Vincennes opened later than scheduled at approximately 13:15 and substantial numbers of Liverpool fans gathered there throughout the afternoon.

4.5.4. The evidence suggests that the operation of the Cours de Vincennes was generally very successful. For example, the DIGES report states that it “was open from 14:00 to 00:30 and welcomed up to 45,000 people, without any significant disturbance to public order and in a festive atmosphere. Variations in attendance were observed from time to time as inflows and outflows occurred, without this causing access difficulties or overcrowding”⁷³.

4.5.5. While it is evident the fan zone was experienced very positively by most supporters, eyewitness accounts indicate that problems did develop at various times both inside and outside throughout the afternoon and post-match. These included issues with over vigorous policing, some difficulties with organisers accessing the staging area, problems with crowd management entering the zone, significant overcrowding in front of the first screen (the one located the closest to the main entrance) and instances of petty crime against supporters.⁷⁴

73 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p.123)

74 — [“Treated With Contempt”: An Independent Panel Report into Fans’ Experiences Before, During and After the 2022 Champions League Final in Paris](#), Phil Scraton et al. (2022) (p. 21-25)

4.5.6. As Ian Byrne, a UK Member of Parliament, described to the Panel: “I think we got there around 12:00 with my sons and other supporters and it was horrific. You know, terrible, hostile policing. All standing there, grim faced, security fences around the actual venue, so, I got there, I looked at the event, this is as far as a festival of football that I’ve ever seen, it’s like a prison camp. And you were treated like a prisoner. You were treated in a hostile manner. It was really, really horrible”⁷⁵.

4.5.7. We understand from event organisers that the performance schedule on the stage of the Cours de Vincennes had a hard stop at 17:30. During the final performance video evidence shows that the artist on stage advised fans planning to attend the match that it would soon be time for them to depart. He also announced that those not attending could remain to watch the match on the various large screens. As far as the Panel understands, it was during the afternoon that the first confirmations were made to supporters that the match would be shown in the Cours de Vincennes.

4.5.8. As the Liverpool supporter Daniel Nicolson described to the Panel: “It was only announced shortly before the fan park was due to close, that the match would actually be broadcast there. Now, again, from a safety security point of view, makes loads of sense if you got people already gathered in one place and the event is taking place safely, show the match there, let’s stay there, you’ve got everyone contained in one area, it would go off without a hitch. But they only announced around 16:00, I believe it was, oh, we will actually show the match. Because it seemed like they just wanted everyone to go off and do their own thing, go to bars so that they were no longer the police’s problem”⁷⁶.

4.5.9. While Liverpool and Real Madrid fans were spread throughout the city centre, by 16:00 the Cours de Vincennes was crowded. We could find no evidence of the actual figures but estimates by various stakeholders combined with video footage suggest the numbers gathered there were anywhere between thirty and fifty-five thousand people, almost all of whom were supporters of Liverpool FC. A significant number of these supporters were also gathered in the Place de la Nation, outside the metro station and around a nearby statue. According to the FSE policing outside the fan zone was generally low key and supporters were not prevented from assembling or drinking publicly in that location.

4.5.10. At 17:26 the first message was issued via the UEFA App advising supporters

⁷⁵ — Meeting with Spirit of Shankly – Appendix, V.6

⁷⁶ — Meeting with LFC Supporters 3 – Appendix, V.8

with tickets that it was now time for them to begin to move from their current locations toward Saint-Denis. The message stated that it was “time to head to the stadium from the Liverpool fan meeting point” using the station at Nation from where they should “hop on the metro line 1 to Gare de Lyon, then on to the RER D to Stade de France Saint-Denis” or alternatively to “take the RER A, change at Châtelet – Les Halles and take RER B to La Plaine – Stade de France”⁷⁷. The message did not prioritise one route over the other, but supporter testimonies suggest the App was not a significant source of information for Liverpool fans.

4.5.11. In any case, it appears that from approximately 17:30 onwards significant numbers of supporters complied with this advice and began to migrate on schedule from both the fan zone and other areas in the city toward the stadium, predominantly via the rail network. Again, while it has not been possible for the Panel to verify exact numbers, the DIGES report suggests that at least 12,000 people left the Cours de Vincennes heading toward the stadium at around this time and the Panel has no reason to dispute this figure. The Panel notes that this migration was not in any way late as it was consistent with messaging provided by UEFA and some three and a half hours before the match was scheduled to begin.

4.5.12. As Liverpool supporter Tom Whitehurst provided a description of his experience of leaving the fan zone in written evidence to the Panel. “We were walking to Gare de Lyon to get the train as Nation was already getting busy with queues to get into the station. I should stress that everyone who travelled to the Stadium had tickets, most from the club but also some UEFA ballot digital tickets - those who didn’t have tickets stayed to watch the match in the fan park. There was plenty of space on the train - we went upstairs, and there were both locals and Madrid fans in addition to mainly Liverpool supporters. There were loads of singing, but there was no problem - the Madrid fans and locals were enjoying it and fist bumping us as we got off the train”⁷⁸.

4.5.13. Whilst supporters travelled to the stadium by other means, it is evident a large proportion of those seeking to attend the match accessed Saint-Denis from the centre of Paris via all three rail available routes: Metro line 13, RER B, and RER D. Various stakeholders have asserted different totals for passengers who travelled to the stadium by rail on that day, some of which represent almost the

⁷⁷ — UEFA Analysis and initial findings related to the matchday events at Stade de France (8 June 2022) - Appendix, VI.16

⁷⁸ — Meeting with Liverpool Disabled Supporters Association – Appendix, V.7

entire stadium capacity. The figures are the source of considerable controversy because when combined with the figures for those arriving by road, these figures have been used to support the contention that unprecedentedly large numbers of ticketless supporters tried to access the stadium and that this was a primary cause of the problems that emerged.

4.5.14. As outlined in the Executive Summary, the Panel has no confidence in these figures and as such we devote a section to analysing the evidence on this issue in the following chapters. Here it is sufficient for us to say that the route for supporters from the RER station at Nation would mean that those travelling from Cours de Vincennes would change either at Châtelet – Les Halles or Gare de Lyon. Travelling north, trains would arrive at Châtelet first, from where passengers could normally transfer onto either RER B or D. It has not been possible for the Panel to gather data on precisely how passengers moved through the rail networks because both SNCF and RATP have no technology that allows for automated counting. What is immediately evident to the Panel is that the only available figures are those supplied by the rail operators, and those are merely estimates.

4.5.15. The Panel has been able to determine that these estimates are based on field operatives at specific locations judging the number of trains and passengers, for the purposes of avoiding overcrowding. The rail operators also acknowledge that these figures are for the entire day and do not distinguish between those attending the stadium and other passengers. The operators accept their figures include supporters who arrived at the stadium in the morning by road transport and travelled into the City of Paris (e.g., to the Cours de Vincennes) before returning to Saint-Denis later that day to watch the match and are therefore ‘double counted’ in terms of the overall estimates of the numbers that attended the event. The Panel notes the fact that this is a problematic way of assessing the overall numbers of people attending any event at the SDF. As the DIGES report points out it is therefore important to understand that these figures are merely “indicative but not corroborated by technical sensors allowing objective results to be obtained. The capacity of a train on RER line B is 1,600 passengers when a line D train can transport up to 2,400 people; the trains on lines B and D also transport everyday passengers in addition to spectators”⁷⁹.

4.5.16. Despite the lack of evidence quantifying the number of supporters utilising each part of the rail network, the Panel does conclude with some confidence

⁷⁹ — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p. 127)

that the evidence indicates that most of the supporters traveling from the Cours de Vincennes and other parts of central Paris by rail utilised RER D, rather than RER B, to access Saint-Denis. This is not surprising to the Panel given that the rail operators had reconfigured their capacities and developed a communication plan designed to encourage passengers away from RER B toward the SNCF operated RER D. There is also evidence to suggest that police officers were indeed present at the entrances to Nation as planned, monitoring, and potentially actively directing fans onto RER D as they entered the subway.

4.5.17. Supporters travelling via the network were required to purchase a ticket and stewards were in place advising supporters at the various interchanges. Multiple eyewitnesses report that there were announcements in several languages at Châtelet – Les Halles directing supporters toward RER D. Photographic evidence and eyewitness accounts suggest that police officers were also distributing flyers at Châtelet – Les Halles and some travelling on the network describe being unable to access RER B when seeking to do so.

4.5.18. As the LFC supporter and journalist Daniel Austin⁸⁰ recalled on entering the network at Gare de Lyon: “I knew that there were two options to go north. You can take the RER D, you can take the RER B. The RER B had strike action on it, which is, you know, normal in France. They, they deal with the disruption caused by that on a daily basis in different areas. So, I asked one of the station workers which one is best for us to take here. She told me definitely take the RER D, we are telling everyone to take that one, the other one is severely disrupted”

4.5.19. As Liverpool supporter Sheila Reeson also described: “When we left the fan zone at 17:30, we knew which train we needed to get, but we weren’t allowed. They had taped off a lot of the entrances and the police herded us all down one stairway, down onto one platform, down onto one train and we had... I do speak a bit of French and I had spoken to a French lady, and she was telling us which way to go and the police would not let us go that way. They were determined that we were all going to get on this train. And it was the same when we got off the train. We’d put up the street map and they wouldn’t let us go that way. They made us go a certain way. All of us”⁸¹.

80 — Meeting with Spirit of Shankly – Appendix, V.6

81 — Meeting with LFC Supporters 1 – Appendix, V.8

4.5.20. Liverpool supporter Tony Fitzgerald also described his experiences to the Panel: “Well, what I should have said was, when we got to the train station, we’d been told to get the RER B. Now, when we got there, we went to go on the platform and the woman said you can’t go RER B. So, we said, “we’ve been told to do RER B.” So, she said, well what you’re going to have to do is get the RER D. There are issues on the line.” So, we said, “are you sure? Cos that’s what we’ve been told – RER B?” “No, no, you must get RER D.” So, we got RER D”⁸².

4.5.21. This evidence does suggest that the plan to route supporters through the network by directing them toward the SNCF operated RER D did materialise on match day, even though strike affected RER B was running at 80% capacity. As a result, what is also evident is that it produced a pattern of passenger flow that was very different to that normally experienced for events at the SDF and therefore should have been a warning sign that problems were beginning to emerge. The Panel concludes that a lack of capacity to adequately monitor passenger flow through the network is an issue that needs to be addressed given the importance of the rail system for accessing SDF and for passenger flows through the system to impact upon ingress into the stadium.

4.5.22. As the Panel analyses in subsequent chapters, there is no evidence of overcrowding or other significant problems on the rail networks: evidence which does not support assertions of a substantial increase in passengers over the numbers expected. The networks successfully conveyed supporters to the vicinity of the stadium. The problem was what then happened.

4.5.23. As noted above, the area immediately surrounding the stadium was a ‘secure zone’ accessible via an array of Additional Security Perimeters or ASPs. The Panel notes these are spread unevenly around the stadium footprint (see Annex Figure 6). As also noted above, a large majority of people attending events at SDF arrive by public transport through RER B and D, and Line 13. The natural entry points for those arriving from those hubs are ASP1, 3 and 4. This means that nine of the ASP entrances are likely to be under-utilised whilst there will be a risk of congestion at these three.

4.5.24. The zone was activated around mid-day by police conducting a sweep through the area, requiring those without appropriate accreditation to disperse beyond the perimeter. However, the evidence indicates that significant breaches of the perimeter began to occur from the early afternoon onward.

⁸² — Meeting with LFC Supporters 1 – Appendix, V.8

4.5.25. According to FFF, people began to circumvent the secure zone from as early as 13:00. By approximately 14:00, again according to FFF, the stadium control noted concerns about a gathering of between two and three thousand people causing blockages of the Avenue du Général de Gaulle which is a thoroughfare outside the secure zone running adjacent to the Champions League Village. As a FFF official stated to the Panel “with the help of the police and the private security... We protect[ed] the Champions Village”. However, following this authority intervention “part of them go through the VIP parking with broken the door. I don’t know if you have the picture of the door.... It’s the fire door, so we can only open from inside to outside. And they broke and not only the door but all the material around the door, so they [went] through and after that, during all the night, all the match, they were around Stade de France, around the ASP and try to go inside of the stadium”⁸³.

4.5.26. Whilst the Panel remains unclear about precise timings, as the afternoon progressed, FFF noted that significant numbers of locals continued to circumvent the ASP through retail outlets, bars, and restaurants as well as a school and a building site that traversed the perimeter. The evidence suggests that in parallel, from early afternoon onwards people, again assumed to be locals, began to commit assaults and robberies against Real Madrid and Liverpool supporters, both inside and outside the ASP.

4.5.27. From 17:00 a post event report by one of the event sponsors referred directly to the situation immediately to the north of what was an apparently poorly guarded perimeter. As the sponsored described: “Avenue du Général de Gaulle was not closed on Match Day, which should be the case as this area was part of the ‘commercial perimeter’. As a result, many locals, including local youth, but no police were on the spot, which caused an unclear, chaotic, insecure, and unsafe situation which was dangerous to our guests. This information was immediately reported... as in the opinion of the [our] event security manager the situation could deteriorate easily resulting in a most likely unsafe, insecure, and thus dangerous situation to our guests and crew”⁸⁴.

4.5.28. Toward late afternoon and early evening those supporters utilising Metro line 13 began alighting at the station Saint-Denis Porte de Paris to the northwest of the stadium. From there, most flowed toward the stadium concourse under the A1 roadway to access the secure zone via ASP1. Both video and eyewitness evidence

83 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3

84 — UCLF22 Testimonies compiled by UEFA (publication not authorised)

indicate that significant congestion developed in this area around this time. At around this time, video evidence suggests that minor conflicts with police developed, and eyewitnesses describe sporadic robberies and assaults upon supporters initiated by locals. Once through the security check at ASP1, people crossed the narrow Passerelle de l'Écluse to access the stadium concourse, from where they could enter the stadium via their respective gates, wherever these may have been.

4.5.29. As discussed above, for those approaching from the south, the primary access route was via RER B, the station La Plaine - Stade de France and then into the Avenue du Stade de France which contains a 20-meter-wide walkway to accommodate high-volume foot traffic. According to an eyewitness, the access point to the secure zone also accommodated 12 entry channels within ASP4.

4.5.30. In contrast, from late afternoon and early evening onwards passenger flow into Stade de France Saint-Denis via RER D began to increase as supporters who had migrated from the Cours de Vincennes and other parts of Paris began to arrive. On leaving the SNCF controlled station supporters initially walked toward the stadium via the Avenue François Mitterrand. However, rather than continuing northeast to connect with the Avenue Stade du France and enter via ASP4, most people turned or were turned directly north into Avenue des Fruitiers, then east into Rue Jean-Philippe Rameau where they crossed under the A1 roadway via a narrow pedestrian foot tunnel or underpass onto the Avenue du President Wilson to enter the secure zone via ASP3.

4.5.31. It is unsurprising supporters took this route. The Panel understands it is a very usual direction and gathering point for people with tickets when entering to the south of the stadium, partly because it is close to bars and restaurants located on the west side of the A1 and there is a small park adjacent to Rue Jean-Philippe Rameau where supporters can gather. Additionally, a video investigation published by French newspaper Le Monde showed that local business owners had installed signs showing the direction of the stadium through to the underpass, to ensure maximum footfall in front of their businesses.

4.5.32. As Liverpool supporter Sheila Reeson described in her evidence to the Panel. "When we got off there were hand-written, like, A4 pieces of paper with an arrow and Stade de France on it, written and pointing in the direction that the police were taking us".

4.5.33. As the above account also notes, corroborated by UEFA and other eyewitnesses, spectators arriving via RER D and by coach were actively directed towards ASP3 by police, who blocked off the Avenue connecting to ASP4.

4.5.34. As one anonymous Liverpool supporter stated in written evidence to UEFA. “After leaving the train station, police were directing fans to turn left to Avenue des Fruitiers, funnelling everyone towards the underpass. We were held on the station side of the underpass for about 30 mins – all very orderly with adequate space to hold spectators. Only when we were released it became clear that the police were pulsing people through the underpass – a common tactic in crowd control. At 19:00 once through the underpass we moved forward slowly under the bridge via the narrowed route created by the police vehicles until we reached the foot of a pedway/ramp. We remained here for circa 45 mins. Again - zero communication or UCLF specific signage”⁸⁵.

4.5.35. However, other supporters describe a lack of stewarding, signage, and communication such that in a context of uncertainty people arriving via RER D merely followed those in front of them assuming this must have been the correct route.

4.5.36. As Liverpool supporter and journalist Daniel Austin stated to the Panel: “So, we got in the RER D. Anyway. 18:25. At 18:37 we arrived at the station of Saint-Denis and began to walk towards the stadium. Now, not only was there no presence of anybody to instruct you where to go — which there definitely was at both Madrid and Kiev Finals —, but there was also zero signage, you know, not a single lamppost with a sign saying “Stade de France” or “Champions League Final this way”. So, again, I knew the rough directions to the stadium from my own knowledge of the area, and could see the way that people were moving, so, we just moved in the same direction as everybody”.

4.5.37. Similarly, a Liverpool supporter quoted by Scratton et al (2022) stated that “you just kind of had to guess where you were headed. I think a lot of people, myself included, just followed the crowd. We went under a bridge before arriving at a ramp that was meant to lead us to gates Y and Z”⁸⁶.

4.5.38. Despite these partly contrasting experiences, what is evident to the Panel

85 — UCLF22 Testimonies compiled by UEFA (publication not authorised)

86 — [“Treated With Contempt”: An Independent Panel Report into Fans’ Experiences Before, During and After the 2022 Champions League Final in Paris](#), Phil Scratton et al. (2022) (p. 26)

is that the police plan identified above to deliberately flow supporters arriving via RER D toward ASP3 was being realised from approximately 17:00 onwards. This was even though abnormally large numbers of passengers were flowing into and from the station. It is also evident that police were present along this route and took little to no action to identify, communicate or manage the emerging risks. The Panel has concluded that for at least significant periods, the police were directing the flow of supporters toward the Wilson ramp.

4.5.39. As outlined above, entry into the secure zone from Avenue du Président Wilson is via the relatively narrow Wilson ramp which is also adjacent to the A1 dual carriageway. The ramp is accessed via an underpass created by the bridge allowing the A86 to pass over the Avenue du Président Wilson. The Panel notes that on the bridge is a CCTV camera that overlooks the Avenue du Président Wilson which feeds directly into the police section of the stadium control room. ASP3 was positioned at the entrance to the Wilson ramp. Given the space limitations, it was only possible to accommodate a small number of lanes for the security or Vigipirate⁸⁷ checks, ticket checks and electronic ticket activation. Eyewitness and video evidence suggest that across the period it was operating there were as few as four and no more than seven lanes in operation. As we consider in the following analysis chapters, UEFA calculated the flow rates for ASP3 on the basis that it would have fifteen lanes: a material and substantial error.

4.5.40. The Senate report notes that as early as 17:00 stewards at ASP3 began reporting concerns that the chemical pens used by stewards to test if tickets were genuine were not functioning appropriately. Accordingly, the report notes that these stewards were reassured by stadium control that they were dealing with counterfeit tickets. This was confirmed by a UEFA representative in our interviews. However, the Panel could find no evidence to establish on what basis this affirmation was made. In contrast, multiple eyewitnesses at several ASPs around the stadium described stewards claiming their legitimate tickets were forgeries but then subsequently accepting their validity.

4.5.41. As Liverpool supporter Liam Flanagan described regarding the activation of his electronic ticket in the vicinity of ASP3. “When I got to the underpass, there were three stewards as far as I can remember, but the one I went to, I said, look, — I knew what I had to do — so, look, I need to get the ticket activated and stuff like that. He looked at the phone and he goes, no, no, no, no, no. And it was just one

⁸⁷ — Vigipirate is a counter terrorism plan which has operated in France at various alert levels since its creation in 1978.

of the other stewards that was close by, saw it, came over and he knew, and he activated it. And then the ticket became active”⁸⁸.

4.5.42. Correspondingly, Real Madrid supporter Armando Sánchez Falcón described similar experiences with a paper ticket to the north of the stadium. “One thing that was amazing was that someone was checking the tickets with a pen marker. I don’t know if you could see, here there was, well, that seemed to me like technology from at least the last century. We got there, the initial pen marker didn’t go through and the security personnel there was calling, fake ticket, fake ticket. They were clearly nervous; I mean they were. And again, I don’t blame them for that. They were surpassed and we said, “well, wait a minute, I’m here with my father, he’s 87. My brother got this ticket from the Real Madrid offices yesterday. There’s no chance this ticket is fake. So, they checked it again and say, Ok, Ok, this is an original ticket. The first time they run the marker through this spot it didn’t seem, probably I had the ticket in my pocket or whatever, but he said, “this is not original, fake, fake” and he even started to shout, “fake ticket, fake ticket.” So, I say, “calm down, calm down, take your marker again, this is not a fake ticket.” Again, we, there was probably 15 seconds before the 1st and the 2nd time the ticket was checked, but I think it gives you a sense of how poor the organization was in general”⁸⁹.

4.5.43. The Panel’s interviews with UEFA security officials confirmed that the flow rates through all ASPs had been calculated on the assumption that the Vigipirate, conducted by police, would not disrupt flow rates. We discuss this issue in more detail later in the report, suffice to say here that this judgement assumed that these security checks would be random and that around 10% of people would be searched. However, observations by UEFA officials at ASP3 during the event identified that police were imposing a far more rigorous search regime which considerably slowed through flow.

4.5.44. As one UEFA official described to the Panel: “At one point when I arrived at entrance [ASP] 3, I saw the police doing the body search, which wasn’t part of the plan, and they were basically checking pretty much everyone and every so often stopping the entrance flow.” As a result, the official concluded that this full searching “was part of the problem, because then all of this calculation was thrown out the window”⁹⁰.

88 — Meeting with Spirit of Shankly – Appendix, V.6

89 — Meeting with RM Supporters - Appendix, V.10

90 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1

4.5.45. In other words, UEFA officials acknowledged to the Panel that the calculations of flow rates were made on the wrong basis. We analyse this further in subsequent chapters, where the Panel concludes that the errors were even more fundamental. These miscalculations were very important because they should have alerted everyone to a serious problem. They are further evidence of serious failures of interoperability because key stakeholders had evidently not communicated with one another about basic but fundamental aspects of planning and delivery. Indeed, the evidence indicates that the problems of restricted flow rates were experienced at various ASPs, particularly those experiencing heavy demand to the north and the south of the stadium.

4.5.46. As Real Madrid supporter Pablo Sanz described as he arrived via Metro line 13: “We went very early to the stadium. I don’t remember the exact timing, but I think we arrived at 18:15. We went by subway. I don’t remember the line, but it was the line that was specifically reserved for Real Madrid fans. The 1st and, in my view the main failure of organization was right when we went out from the subway. We were caught in a trap... We went out from the subway. We could see the stadium, I don’t know 200, 300 meters away. There were fences to both sides and we were just caught, I mean like this, with zero room to move. It was, I mean if anything would have happened there, I guess that dozens of hundreds of people might have died because we couldn’t move... I saw women of 70 years old, child[ren] of 10 years old really frightened. Yeah, and it was like 45 minutes like that. Uhm, the reason, uh, I guess that the first it was the fences, I mean, I guess that the intention was to separate Liverpool and Real Madrid fans but if you, if you put the fans in a trap, they are separated, but they are in danger. It took like a couple of minutes every time they were checking a ticket. It was, I mean, obviously you have to verify the tickets, but it was. I have never seen this, not in a football match, not in a in a concert, not ever! It was like a couple of minutes to check every ticket. I saw the pen marker and they were I mean, it has to be 5/10 seconds I guess, but it was two minutes. So, the people kept on arriving by the subway at a higher speed than they were exiting to the stadium, ok. That was really frightening and, in that case, thieves, uh, started to act and it was really dangerous because when the thieves act, people reacted and there was no room for the reaction, so it was a couple of moments where people reacting, they were stealing cell phones with the tickets. I have my e-ticket here so, I saw people being stolen their cell phones with their tickets, they were reacting and there was no room, so it was really, really

dangerous”⁹¹.

4.5.47. The Panel concludes that the observed congestion at various ASPs both to the north and south of stadium was inevitable because there was not sufficient capacity to move the expected number of ticketed fans through the limited number of available channels in sufficient time. Consequently, between 17:00 and 18:00 to the south of the stadium, a combination of increased passenger flow into RER D, the subsequent footfall into the Avenue du Président Wilson, the double checks, limited number of channels, apparently inexperienced stewarding, and absence of rejection channels, all led to rapidly growing and increasingly dangerous congestion at ASP3. Despite the escalating dangers no immediate contingency action appears to have been taken by the stadium control room, even though the Senate report claims that RATP and SNCF were providing regular reports regarding passenger flow to the stadium control room which itself also had direct line of sight of ASP via SDF and Avenue de Président Wilson via street CCTV.

4.5.48. The Senate report notes that the congestion at ASP3 only became an acknowledged concern to stadium control from approximately 18:00 onwards. With limited crowd management in place between RER D and ASP3, increasingly large numbers of supporters were flowing toward the entry point so by 18:45 the Avenue du Président Wilson had become densely and dangerously crowded. Consequently, at 18:50 stadium control finally issued a request to the police to divert people arriving at Stade de France-Saint-Denis toward ASP4. According to the Senate report it then took a further twenty-eight minutes for a cordon to be put in place and as such the congestion continued to intensify.

4.5.49. An anonymous Liverpool supporter described their experience of the situation in a written submission to UEFA: “With the entry point [ASP3] effectively closed (a trickle of entrants at best) and the volume continuing to build behind it quickly got pretty scary. A crush began to ensue. A lady and her 8-year-old son were beside us and we ended up taking them under our wing for probably 30 mins to provide them with added protection. I witnessed another woman being ushered outward towards the motorway in tears as understandably she felt uncomfortable – as we all did. All things considered in this circumstance the fans were unbelievably compliant and patient”⁹².

4.5.50. Liverpool supporter Jim Galvin described to the Panel how the dangerous

91 — Meeting with RM Supporters - Appendix, V.10

92 — UCLF22 Testimonies compiled by UEFA (publication not authorised)

crushing reminded him of earlier stadium disasters. “We must have arrived at about half 5, quarter to 6. And by the time we got to the underpass, uhm, there was obviously just no way, you know, you were going anywhere. And then it just started getting more and more and more congested, more and more and more packed. And you know, after coming through Heysel and through Hillsborough, I said to my daughter, “we’ve got to get out of here.” I said, “we’re just, we’re going to have to get out of here because it’s just getting worse and worse”⁹³.

4.5.51. The Panel therefore concurs with the Senate in its judgement of the inadequacy of the stadium and police authorities’ responses to the emerging situation in the vicinity of ASP3. The late timing of the implementation is confirmed by eyewitness and photo evidence that indicate the first people redirected away from ASP3 began arriving at the Avenue du Stade de France at 19:52. As the Senate committee stated in their report: “Passenger flows from each of the RER lines were communicated to the stadium command post every half hour by the SNCF from 18:05. From the outset, and especially from 18:30, the significant difference in passenger numbers between line D and line B was known. However, this situation did not prompt a rapid reaction to redirect flows, neither on the part of the transport operators, who indicated that they had not been asked to do so, nor the organizers, nor even the Préfecture de Police, which implemented the redirection only at 19:18, which was too late”⁹⁴.

4.5.52. As noted above, the limited capacity of the roadway in the Avenue du Président Wilson had been further restricted because several large police carrier vehicles had been parked alongside the east side of the underpass. Although sequence and timings are not clear, photographic, video and eyewitness evidence indicate that police manoeuvred two of these carrier vehicles to create an impromptu cordon restricting flow into and under the A86 bridge. The police claim that this was a tactic for preventing a vehicle-based terrorist attack. Whatever the rationale for this manoeuvre it had the effect of slowing throughput flow considerably and over time further increasing the density of the crowd. FFF and UEFA both indicated that this tactic had not been part of the planning: again, evidence of a lack of joint working.

4.5.53. During the early evening photographic evidence shows people in front of this vehicle cordon spilling over into, and ultimately blocking, the adjacent and

93 — Meeting with LFC Supporters 1 – Appendix, V.8

94 — [L’Essentiel sur les incidents survenus au Stade de France le 28 mai 2022: Finale de la Ligue des Champions au Stade de France : un Fiasco Inévitable](#), French Senate - English translation at Appendix, VI.18 (p. 2827)

busy N1 dual carriageway bringing its north bound carriageway to a standstill. This added considerably to the already heavy road traffic congestion and blocked vehicle access to the VIP entrance just north of ASP3. According to eyewitnesses, by 19:30, it was taking people between ninety minutes and two hours to progress through ASP3, and the crowd now stretched back beyond the underpass and the Panel concludes that crowd pressures were becoming life threatening.

4.5.54. As one supporter quoted in Scraton et al (2022) described: “We had parked in Saint-Denis, so I decided to go to that side of the ground to see if the access was any easier. At that entrance the police were using the same tactic of blocking off the entrance with riot vans with the riot police marshalling the small entrance gap left between the vans. I joined the mass of people waiting as this was the only means of access. As I got closer to the entrance gap, the squash was becoming more like a crush. A young man next to me was having a panic attack and a Spanish child on the other side was very scared. I was starting to breath a bit faster myself at this stage. By the time I got to the front I had no control over myself, with my arms pinned to the side of my body”⁹⁵.

4.5.55. By this time, the area both behind and between the two police vehicles and the Wilson ramp was densely crowded. Access past the ramp north toward ASP2 was by then also entirely restricted and as noted above eyewitnesses describe experiencing locals within the crowd robbing supporters and trying to illegitimately access the secure zone. By 19:30, estimates place upward of fifteen thousand people in this location and because of the severity of the situation at some point, between 19:39 and 19:54, ASP3 was withdrawn. According to the Préfecture de Police the decision to remove ASP3 was taken by them at 19:45 and was a decision based on their judgment that the situation had become life threatening. Through this entire sequence there appears to have been little to no verbal communication from the authorities to those gathered in the crowd, although eyewitnesses describe police officers without megaphones shouting instructions to very little effect.

4.5.56. As a Liverpool supporter described in a written submission to UEFA. “I will never forget the next traumatic 90 minutes. We were initially held back around the corner from the bar we had been at until we were released and allowed towards and into a subway, which passed under a busy main road [the A1]. As we emerged, we were channelled between two police vans and into an area under an underpass which had been significantly narrowed by a long line of police vans. As the crowd

⁹⁵ — [“Treated With Contempt”: An Independent Panel Report into Fans’ Experiences Before, During and After the 2022 Champions League Final in Paris](#), Phil Scraton et al. (2022) (p. 27)

built behind us and compressed in front of us, I was convinced that people would be crushed to death. It was clear that we were being funnelled into as significant pinch point. I could see that women and children were becoming very uncomfortable and there was no real way out.”⁹⁶.

4.5.57. Also, as Tony Fitzgerald described to the Panel, it was not just the danger of crushing but the reactions of those in authority to the dangers of the situation that were disturbing to supporters: “So, all I kept saying to my wife was – and she’s only 5 foot 2 – is keep on to the right. Don’t go left under any circumstances. And by this stage you could just feel the vibe where people like, we’ve been here before. This isn’t right, this is not getting better by the second. This could really end up badly. And you could hear voices going, “keep calm, keep it together.” And then you could hear kids crying. You could hear women sort of getting scared in it all. You’re trying to keep calm and yourself you’re thinking, “this isn’t right. This could end up back like Hillsborough again.” And literally, I think we’ve got to where the point was, and it was just sheer force and weight. We went through the ticket points. And as you went through the ticket points, I still didn’t show my ticket. They’d stopped checking by the looks of it, so we just went through so my wife went over to... there was a young French gendarme there, and she said, “there are women and children really struggling in there. It’s getting bad now. Something serious could happen. Somebody could die.” And she actually went, “yes, I know.” That was all she said. So, she then went over to a big UEFA chap who was standing there, and she said, “are you going to do anything about this?” And he just turned his back on her. That was it. So, I then went over to a gendarme who was standing there, and I’ve got to be honest, I’ve lost it a bit at that point, and I used a bit of Anglo-Saxon on him. And he just stood there. I said “just do your job. There are people are going to die in there. You’ve got to do something.” And they just blanked you. That was it. They just blanked. They didn’t respond in any way, shape, or form. It was like, well, you’re on your own here”.

4.5.58. After abandoning of the Vigipirate and ticket checks and activations at ASP3, thousands of people began flowing slowly up the Wilson ramp onto the concourse surrounding the stadium, with a significant number of these people moving to the area adjacent to the turnstiles at gates X, Y & Z. The stadium was now exposed to a multitude of safety and security threats. According to eyewitnesses, the density of the crowd as it moved up the ramp created further dangers of crushing and there was now no capability for the stewards to check for the possession of valid tickets, other than at the turnstiles themselves.

⁹⁶ — UCLF22 Testimonies compiled by UEFA (publication not authorised)

4.5.59. Eyewitnesses describe significant numbers of locals also utilising the ramp to access the concourse. While some of these continued to assault and rob supporters, the larger groups mounted several attempts to gain access to the stadium either by individually climbing the outer perimeter fence or collectively trying to force entry. Video footage suggests that there were particularly concentrated efforts at Gate Z.

4.5.60. However, an event sponsor also detailed in written evidence, their experiences of locals trying to force entry through the Champions Village to the north of the stadium from as early as 17:00, “Local youth tried to force themselves entry in the direction of Champions Village via the stairs. Despite large groups of locals, incl. local youth, were at the spot from 17:00 onwards, there was no other police - than traffic wardens - at the scene. The barriers on top of the stairs consisted of low crush barriers which were not connected to each other and not suitable for managing large crowds”.

4.5.61. As acknowledged in the DIGES report, there were also “numerous acts of robbery with violence observed by police officers on site, in unprecedented proportions, by 300 to 400 very mobile individuals according to their estimates and by images circulating in the media, demonstrate the presence of a large number of offenders coming in gangs to commit acts of predation against supporters identified as vulnerable foreign tourists”⁹⁷.

4.5.62. While it has not been possible to identify exact timings, both the Senate and UEFA note that attempts to breach turnstiles at the south of the stadium by locals began at Gate Y at 18:52, approximately fifty minutes before the withdrawing of ASP3. The evidence presented to the Panel indicates that breaches into the ASP had been occurring in multiple locations from early afternoon onwards but do appear to have intensified toward late afternoon. Indeed, these gatherings and attempted incursions escalated into a relatively large-scale episode of collective violence between locals and police that occurred at approximately 18:45 on and around the Passerelle de l’Écluse, the narrow footbridge that crosses a canal and through which people access the stadium via ASP1 in its northwest corner. A representative of FFF described how the police sought to forcefully disperse these locals toward the Saint-Denis - Porte de Paris Metro station, but that the group had resisted as they were “ready to fight”. Supporters in the area at this time describe experiencing the effects of tear gas and the Panel is confident that a relatively

⁹⁷ — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p. 132)

serious confrontation between locals and police took place in this location at this time.

4.5.63. Regardless of the ambiguity about when they first began, the impact of these various collective conflicts and incursions by, at least, one large group of locals was that stadium control enacted multiple gate closures as a direct attempt to try to prevent them entering the venue. Head stewards at each gate had been instructed and empowered to enact closures autonomously in such circumstances.

4.5.64. As UEFA state in their initial post-match inquiry: “The head steward at each gate was briefed, with a standard operating procedure, to close the gates in case of a breach”⁹⁸.

4.5.65. These gate closures severely restricted the through flows through various gates which led directly to long queues developing at multiple locations around the stadium concourse, and seriously exacerbated the dangerous congestion which had already arisen. Moreover, as gates were periodically reopened multiple eyewitnesses describe being unable to get through the turnstiles as the QR code scanners initially rejected the validity of their paper and electronic tickets.

4.5.66. As Joe Blott and Liam Flanagan of the Liverpool supporter Association Spirit of Shankly described: “JB: I went through one and two, think I’ve said before, three or four times my ticket didn’t work. As my ticket turned green, two or three stewards were coming over to me to clearly eject me, because my ticket was fake. LF: Yeah. But it comes back to the point before, that now my ticket’s been registered as fake two or three or four times, because it’s been red flagged. But it was a genuine ticket”⁹⁹.

4.5.67. An event sponsor also reported, after the event, how they had similar experiences: “Some digital tickets did not work (including the event security manager’s ticket; however, after he showed his passport, he was able to enter).”

4.5.68. Supporters seeking to access through disabled entrances described to the Panel similar experiences, as Ted Morris, Chair of the Liverpool Disabled Supporters Association (LDSA) noted. “Some friends of mine – Liverpool supporters, wheelchair

98 — UEFA Analysis and initial findings related to the matchday events at Stade de France (8 June 2022) - Appendix, VI.16 (p. 2724)

99 — Meeting with Spirit of Shankly – Appendix, V.6

users – had passed around about 18:00. So, when we went around the gate, the accessible gate at 19:00, those 3 wheelchair users were still sitting outside that gate. There was a commotion going on next to them at the non-disabled turnstiles, because his support had gone through, but his PA's ticket would not scan. He's trying, he's trying, he's trying it. This guy was getting understandably upset".

4.5.69. Significant queues became dangerous congestion at multiple gates, especially those to the south and north of the stadium, with the rapid influx of supporters onto the concourse in the southwest corner of the stadium, after the abandoning of ASP3 making the situation increasingly acute.

4.5.70. Sheila Reeson described her experiences around gates X, Y & Z to the Panel: "There was a queue, about five or six across, and they were queuing to the left of the gate and the right of the gate. So, we went to the left. Uhm, it did move a little bit, and while we were there, some French – and I know they were French cos they were speaking French – pushed through, climbed the fence. There was one steward stood the other side and he went [waves hands around] and didn't stop any of them. They all ran past and that happened two or three times and they were not Liverpool supporters. They didn't have anything Liverpool on them, they were speaking French. The Liverpool people in the queue were trying to sort of just move to stop them, but they climbed the fence and went, uhm. I think we were there in that queue for an hour and a half, and it had hardly moved. And then the sort of thing came back - they've closed the gate. So, I think my son got out of the queue and walked down. He said, "the gate's closed." There's nobody there to ask why. And then suddenly there was a surge of fans, and the queue got from sort of six across too, well, it was nearly right across everywhere and people were saying "they've just let us... they're not checking the tickets anymore," and they'd come from the underpass, and they weren't checking the tickets. They'd just let the whole lot come through. And it was getting, time getting on, and everybody was then in amongst. Well, there wasn't a queue anymore, it was just a mass of people. There were a lot, a lot of French youths running about".

4.5.71. Given the gate closures, supporters describe moving to those that remained open but then experiencing an inability to get their tickets to register on the respective turnstiles. The CSDF indicated to the Panel that valid tickets would register at any turnstile - a position not consistent with UEFA's evidence - and this was certainly not the experience of Liverpool supporters which added further confusion and delay. Due to the poor flow rates the concourse around the stadium became crowded with thousands of supporters with legitimate tickets unable to

access the stadium, most of whom had been queueing for several hours without access to water or toilet facilities. Contrary to the agreed plan official drink stalls on the concourse closed at 18:00. In contrast to the planning documents, there appear to have been no stewards deployed on the stadium concourse to check or activate tickets or to otherwise manage people seeking to progress through the turnstiles, or at least they had been withdrawn due to the congestion.

4.5.72. As disabled Liverpool supporter Chris McNulty described to the Panel. “Over in France there was no signage. You know, the gates are Y, X, Z - they were all signposted, that was it. But then when you looked at it, you think: well, where’s the wheelchair one? You know, we didn’t know that it was, like, to the side, there was a gate. The rest of them were all turnstiles. But, at gate Y where I was supposed to go in, there were barriers along both sides where they were queueing to come in. So, for me to get to that entrance, I’d have to join one of the queues, but I didn’t know which one, because you can’t see. You couldn’t get near it to see. No stewards, no one outside to ask”¹⁰⁰.

4.5.73. Whilst eyewitness accounts suggest similar difficulties were occurring at multiple gates around the stadium, the situation continued to become particularly acute in the vicinity of gates X, Y & Z. Within the context of this melee, there is eyewitness evidence that some Liverpool supporters did breach the turnstiles.

4.5.74. As a delegate from the English FA observed. “At 18:50 an ignited pyrotechnic was thrown through entrance gate Y which landed under one of the industrial waste bins. Red smoke then billowed from beneath, thereby distracting the stewards and between ten and fifteen LFC supporters jumped through the end left hand side turnstile. The supporters ran across the inner concourse to both the upper-level steps and lower concourse ramp. At this point the stewards closed all the gate Y turnstiles”¹⁰¹.

4.5.75. With no police to protect anyone from sporadic criminality, it appears from video footage and eyewitness accounts, that Liverpool supporters on this part of the concourse spontaneously formed orderly queues, regularly admonished those seeking to circumvent these and collectively organised to protect the vulnerable. Indeed, the Panel concurs with Scraton et al (2022) that the capacity of the Liverpool supporters to self-organise within this context was a primary factor in

100 — Meeting with Liverpool Disabled Supporters Association – Appendix, V.7

101 — English Football Association Security Advisor, Steve Lewis, Position Statement – Appendix, IV.25

preventing harm and ensuring our inquiry is investigating a ‘near miss’ rather than a stadium tragedy involving fatalities.

4.5.76. Ian Byrne described his experiences in this location in his written response to the Panel. “I called to all supporters nearby to take videos of the events unfolding if they could and I went in search of someone in authority to do something before people died. I ended up in a line of people being funnelled towards one single open turnstile. All around me people were screaming that they were being crushed as the pressure being built up by the funnel. I shouted at the police to open additional turnstiles, but to no avail. Some of us shouted to supporters to take a step back to relieve pressure, which they did thankfully. We had to steward the crowd ourselves, using our experience, due to the absence of any stadium organisation. I eventually was funnelled through turnstile and came out into the space behind turnstiles, then I saw a scene I thought and prayed I would never see again; people with their faces pushed against the railings, screaming, and being crushed. I ran to the two stewards I could see, and I begged them to open additional turnstiles to relieve the pressure, because I could only see people once again dying at a football match. A steward who looked senior came running up to me and told me I would be arrested if I did not stop protesting. I was then called over by LFC stewards who were in tears because they were shamefully not being utilised and their warnings were being ignored by the stadium management”.

4.5.77. Such negative experiences were not isolated to Liverpool supporters seeking to access the stadium from the south. Real Madrid fans accessing the stadium also had similar experiences, as an anonymous supporter described to UEFA. “The situation deteriorated when they suddenly opened again one of the doors at the gate, with people shoving and pushing. My brother and I at that point were really scared as we had a sensation of being crushed. I realised that near to me was a father trying to protect his crying son and I was able to quickly form a buffer of space with a few other people by using our arms to aid him. After we finally broke free from the pushing and were allowed in the turnstile area, my brother’s e-ticket worked but mine did not work. It was as if the stewards had simply stopped doing their jobs because they had enough, and likewise they were not even trying to stop or catch those entering without a valid ticket. We entered the concourse and the stadium just as the Police were (finally) reacting and heading to calm the situation at our gate. In all my years of attending football matches, I’ve never felt so insecure and vulnerable”¹⁰².

¹⁰² — UCLF22 Testimonies compiled by UEFA (publication not authorised)

4.5.78. Video footage and eyewitness evidence also indicates that at around this time several individuals, who appear to the Panel to be French locals, climbed the outer perimeter fence in the vicinity of gates X and Y. While one or two were detained by stewards, several evaded capture and ran into the stadium. The incursions and attempted breaches at Gate Z appear to have then led FFF to request police support to protect the integrity of the outer perimeter and assist with body searches at the turnstiles. Video footage shows that as police arrived a large group of locals were attempting to collectively force their way through Gate Z. As FFF representative present in the control room subsequently noted, “now the only solution [was] to remove them because they are ready to fight. They are not afraid in front of the police... so they used tear gas because it was the only solution to remove them away from the fences”.

4.5.79. Police in full protective equipment deployed out onto the concourse and attempted a forceful dispersal of a crowd of at least 300 people, who again appear on video footage to be locals rather than supporters. This dispersal activity began with the firing of tear gas onto the concourse outside gate Z, but the wind blew the smoke in the direction of gates X & Y where hundreds of Liverpool supporters were densely crowded into the concourse.

4.5.80. Liverpool supporter Jim Galvin described his subsequent experiences to the Panel. “When we were in the queue you see, you know, you did see the odd person trying to get over the fence and I was trying to get into [inaudible] with my daughter, and people were absolutely livid with the people that we’re getting on the fence saying to them, “you’re never ever going to, we’re never ever going to get in. If you’re getting over that fence, they’re never ever going to open the gates. Get down.” You know and shouting them down and pulling them down. And everyone was just saying, “just stay calm. Just stay calm.” You know. But it’s difficult when you’re getting pepper sprayed when you’re getting tear gassed. And, you know, we were close to the fence that segregated the concourse from the ground itself. And you could just see the people, you know, in authority, on the other side of the fence, that were just standing and laughing at you. Absolutely just laughing. No concern. Absolutely nothing, just absolutely laughing at you for 10, 15, 20 minutes. Unbelievable”¹⁰³.

4.5.81. Liverpool supporter Paul Corke was also subjected to these forceful

¹⁰³ — Meeting with LFC Supporters 1 – Appendix, V.8

weapon-based police interventions and described his experience of them to the Panel. “So, in the end, they wouldn’t open the gates, so I said to him, I said, let’s just try another gate and we moved. Because we’re a little bit back from the gates, as we moved to the centre [inaudible], I said hang on a minute, I said, just wait one minute they, might open the gates again because it looked like there was some activity. And instead of them opening the gates, and we’re standing [inaudible], they tear gassed us and the tear gas came right, and we weren’t even the closest, it came right across and hit us both. My mate ended up on the floor choking. I was over a barrier with it in my eyes and my throat, you literally choke on it and it’s like, I can’t believe this is happening and I really, really had to support, I came around quicker than my friend and I had to support him, and he was absolutely devastated”¹⁰⁴.

4.5.82. Mr Corke goes on to describe how he and his friend moved to another gate to try to escape from the disturbances only to be subjected again to what he experienced as the random deployment of pepper spray by police. “By the time we got off, we were then caught between, uh, there’s quite a large number of Parisian folks and the police and they were basically having a square off, a runoff. The police were chasing them by this point. We had to dodge what was going on, which is fairly silly. I say to one of the policemen “look how do we get in? How do we get in? We just been tear gassed” and he said, “go the next gate.” And when we got to the next gate it’s just those folks there. There were loads of them there again, it was just more folks there. We were doing better at the other gate with Liverpool fans. So we were there again, and I was pushing and shoving outside, this guy, and I’m not kidding, this guy who looks in charge, be it behind, behind the gates, of the police force, [with] police uniform on, he was kind of suited, he’s arguing with the people trying to get in and the next thing, he took the pepper spray or the tear gas, whatever it is off the policeman next to him and started spraying everybody, started spraying everybody. So, we ended up tear gassed again, pepper sprayed whatever it was and, on the floor, again and my friend was on the floor with another guy who was on the floor. The guy who was on the floor, he couldn’t see. He was literally blind. He was like, “I can’t see, I can’t see.” So, we were there trying to work through that, and I was going “look, look, come on mate you we’ve got to get up, we’ve got to get in. We’ve come this far, [inaudible] you can’t just walk away” but, to say the truth, walking away probably would be more dangerous than trying to keep getting in”.

4.5.83. While the Panel concludes that these munitions were deployed primarily

¹⁰⁴ — Meeting with LFC Supporters 2 – Appendix, V.8

against the large group of locals involved in the attempted breach of gate Z, footage and eyewitness accounts clearly indicate that these were used in confined areas already densely populated by supporters otherwise peacefully queueing to gain entry. The use of such munitions, particularly on the concourse around gate X, significantly increased the dangers from crushes. Video footage shows temporary fencing bent through pressures caused from supporters trying to escape¹⁰⁵.

4.5.84. As Liverpool supporter Dawn Eaton, described to the Panel. “We didn’t know about the tear gas because why would you even think that that could be a thing? But we were just, again, patiently waiting and then, as Paul was saying about the local folks. We were waiting there and, somebody, like you were saying, there was somebody filming, I think they might have been Spanish, appeared behind us and helped us move a couple of the fence Panels back a bit to give us a little bit more space because it was starting to get like crushed and everybody sort of breathe a little bit when they helped us move these, so that everybody had a little bit more room because, as I say, there weren’t even any gates open where we were waiting”¹⁰⁶.

4.5.85. The Panel concludes that the deployment of tear gas in this confined location was completely inappropriate as it was both life threatening and disproportionate, and it should have been obvious to any competent police commander that its use in such circumstances would be dangerous to supporters legitimately and peacefully trying to watch a football match. As FFF representative noted: “the consequences, they are the Liverpool supporters. Who are so many - 100% of the guys of the fans of Liverpool with real tickets, who are so peaceful. It was incredible”.

4.5.86. In addition, to the deployment of gas, the Panel concludes that individual police officers inside the outer perimeter in the vicinity of gates Y and Z also used pepper spray targeted directly against ticketed supporters otherwise peacefully queueing on the concourse, simply verbally remonstrating with police about their use of force or compliantly entering through the turnstiles with legitimate tickets. Regardless of the underlying rationale for these interventions, the Panel judges that there was no justification for the use of this weaponry and its deployment was also entirely disproportionate and inconsistent with the model of policing agreed within the Saint-Denis Convention.

4.5.87. While the difficulties entering through the turnstiles were particularly acute, such experiences were not isolated to the south of the stadium. Eyewitness

105 — Video footage from UEFA’s Broadcaster Partners (publication not authorised)

106 — Meeting with LFC Supporters 2 – Appendix, V.8

and sponsor accounts also describe gate closures, delays, and incursions by locals to the north. Liverpool supporter Daniel Nicolson described to the Panel his experiences trying to enter through gate A. “At gate A there were hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of hundreds of people, sort of lined up queuing to get in. This is when I first noticed, the gathering of people that, were clearly not Liverpool fans and they, I’ve got enough experience of Paris to be able to say with confidence, but not without any judgment, there was a huge gathering of people from the local North African Community, so, I’ve spent enough time around Saint-Denis to know the make-up of the population and there was a significant amount of people that, I feel, were from that local community. Without tickets. Trying to gain access to the stadium, basically so they’d obviously broke through the first line or second line even, of police checks, they broke through the external security, and they were in that internal part before the final ticket check, and they were just doing anything by any means possible to get into that stadium.”

4.5.88. Due to the delays in supporters being able to access through the various gates, a decision was eventually made to delay the kick-off of the match. We deal with this decision later in the report so do not discuss in any detail here other than to note that the decision was not communicated to supporters queueing outside.

4.5.89. As a Liverpool supporter described to the Panel. “We came out of the queue and tried to get at the side. We walked down to the next gate and that was closed. We walked to the gate before and that was closed with riot police across it. So, those gates were closed. Uhm... just got my notes here just so that, we phoned home to see what was happening and they said, “they’re saying the match is delayed because Liverpool fans are late.” I said, “well, we’ve been here, sort of, 2 and a half, three hours.” They said, “that’s what was coming out on the telly.”

4.5.90. Eventually, the supporters queueing at the gates appear to have largely managed to access the stadium, with the last supporters entering at 22:10. As we analyse in subsequent chapters, the Panel has found no evidence to support widely shared assertions that there were upwards of thirty thousand ticketless supporters outside once those queuing had entered.

4.5.91. The Panel noted that the transport networks reported an increased number of people who travelled back to central Paris during the period of the match, however it is also noted that UEFA have confirmed that about 2,700 supporters with valid tickets were not recorded as entering the stadium. We cannot confirm if these supporters were unable to access the stadium or withdrew because of the

dangers they had encountered. Nonetheless there is a clear inference that most of them would have left Saint-Denis to return to central Paris, we assume largely by rail.

4.5.92. Inside the stadium the fact that many locals had managed to get inside was apparent from multiple eyewitness accounts of people occupying seats for which they did not have tickets.

4.5.93. As Liverpool supporter Tony Fitzgerald explained to the Panel. “So, between, I would say, 20:30 and when the game eventually kicked off at 21:30’ish, there was a constant battle between Liverpool fans eventually getting into the ground and saying to these locals who taken the seats, “you’re in my seat mate.” And it was constant, like, they’d move off, but then as more and more people came in there was less and less seats for them to go into, and bit by bit there was more and more confrontation. Now, just after they had announced the fact that the game was going to be delayed. In the kerfuffle, I was on the end of the row. I end up being dragged down 10 flights of steps on my back. Purely because there was chaos going on, the stewards weren’t doing anything. There were people coming in. There were people standing in the steps. There’s just a constant flow of aggravations – the best description of it”.

4.5.94. As the match concluded, police in full protective equipment deployed pitch side. The UEFA event risk assessment indicated a high risk of pitch invasion by Liverpool supporters. From interviews with UEFA staff, it is apparent that this was a linguistic error, and was meant to indicate the risk of incursion by individuals rather than a mass invasion.

4.5.95. Whether even that risk assessment was correct is questionable, however it evidently led to a substantial misdirection of police resources. As supporters departed the stadium, many were confronted, once again, with hostility, violence, and robbery from locals, against which they were not afforded police protection.

4.5.96. As Neil Atkinson described to the Panel: “Got onto the footprints of the stadium outside the grounds. Could not for the life of me work out how to get off the footprints of the stadium. It’s dark. It’s not very well lit there’s groups wandering around, there’s gangs wandering rounds, there’s young people running around. We went to an underpass, and it was another kettle job with riot vans and police and railings of some description moving you to an exit and when we got to the exit it was full of French riot police with the Shields in front of them.”¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁷ — Meeting with LFC Supporters 3 – Appendix, V.8

4.5.97. LDSA Chair Ted Morris also experienced similar problems as he moved toward the rail station to return to central Paris via RER B: “It was the most terrifying experience I’ve had following Liverpool football club in 41 years and it was 400 meters of sheer hell with everyone running for their lives... Wife’s terrified, she’s still traumatized by the events of it. There wasn’t one policeman, there wasn’t one policeman in that 400 meters from the underpass to when we got to the station. The first time we saw a policeman, sounds pathetic to say this with nearly 60 years of age, I said to my wife, “it’ll be alright, there’s the police” and then the police just started pepper spraying and gassing people and it was like “what?”. So, quite upset by this time. Got to the accessible lift, we make them take us up to the platform, got in the platform and this man is there with this 7-year-old girl, eyes streaming from the tear gassing, in absolute [inaudible]. I’ll never forget that as long as I live. Then there were two bangs, which must’ve been the cans, the tear gas hitting the wall, we didn’t know that and, as naïve as this sounds, we thought it was a bomb. We thought the station was being bombed, it was absolutely terrifying, I’m not ashamed to say it. But then at the same time we start panicking about our 24 and 25-year-old daughters. I got lifted onto the train, the train filled up pretty quick and just left that ground... I’m just glad to get back to Gare du Nord, get to the old town, and I’m just glad to be alive”.

4.5.98. Once again, such circumstances were not isolated to the south of the stadium. Real Madrid supporters departing to the north also described experiencing hostility and police inaction. Emilio Dumas described his post-match experiences: “And after leaving the stadium, near the underground entrance we saw again, local thieves molesting fans and without any reaction from the police. The police were there but they didn’t do anything. In our case, the buses and private cars were parked almost 3 kilometres away. It was a frightening road for Madrid fans, and many found their cars vandalized and the baggage stolen and so on”,¹⁰⁸

4.5.99. Julian García Arribas also described how in the face of these threats he and others formed large defensive groups to move to places of safety: “Because we have that problem, we knew the problem, so we decided to be... we talk to each other, “OK, wait for us, wait for us. We go all together because we don’t want to have any problem. Be careful, be careful.” We phoned other friends because we knew that they were there so, they come with us because there is this problem, ok. And we don’t really have any problem to get to the bus because we were about

¹⁰⁸ — Meeting with RM Supporters - Appendix, V.10

maybe 30, 30 friends between 20 and 45, all of them men and so, I think we were difficult for them to be the people who were stolen. But I could see... Ok, when we go at the end of the match, the streets were full of police, a lot of police and possibly the final where I could see more police, but they were doing anything, anything. I see a case where; some Real Madrid supporters were stolen, and they run to catch the person who stole their thing. They caught them then the police caught the Real Madrid supporter and let the other one go, like this. Some of the police were smiling, I could see the police talking one to each other like this, nothing happened, and they were smiling when people were really, really, afraid".¹⁰⁹

4.5.100. In addition, the Real Madrid supporters leaving from the north did so collectively because the bulk of them had stayed on to see their team lift the trophy. Consequently, as they tried to depart across the narrow footbridge some experienced significant dangers simply because of the inadequacy of the infrastructure for handling mass egress.

4.5.101. Emilio Dumas described his movement away from the stadium as he walked over the Passerelle de l'Écluse. "Well, after the match my side is OK. It was the winning one. But I must say that we were very worried because we had to leave this stadium, and nobody was reassured. As I say we have to go again through this gangway, it was very narrow and with rather low banisters at both sides. It was a mouse trap. And anyone could have fallen in the canal underneath, the people were pushing each other, I was really afraid for the children and the elderly and the elderly people who was there and people walking with crutches, whatever. And I thought that if one single person had stumbled there and then, we could have gone through a second Hillsborough tragedy. I was very afraid for my friends and for the people, for the supporters and for myself. And again, there was no police either. The CRS, the Compagnies Républicaines de Sécurité, kept themselves down the staircase, but they were of no help. The only thing they kept saying was, "get moving." I have never seen a police force so unhelpful and passive."

4.5.102. We conclude our account of events that occurred during planning and on match day and turn next to the Panel's analysis of why events materialised in this way.

¹⁰⁹ — Meeting with RM Supporters - Appendix, V.10

5. The Clubs

5. The Clubs

5.1. Introduction

5.1.1. The Panel has always considered the views of the finalist clubs – Real Madrid CF and Liverpool FC – to be important to the Review, because they were partly involved in the planning stages, and due to their proximity to and understanding of their supporters.

5.1.2. The cooperation of Liverpool FC has greatly assisted the inquiry. For reasons of its own, Real Madrid CF did not give a substantive response to our requests for information. Supporters of both clubs have provided invaluable testimonies, which the Panel has analysed and integrated into the narrative in Chapter 4.

5.2. Liverpool Football Club

5.2.1. The Panel interviewed senior executives and operational managers from Liverpool FC, in Liverpool, on 25 September 2022. A wide range of topics relevant to the review were discussed and the club was able to offer its perspective on the planning and circumstances surrounding the final in Paris.

5.2.2. Of particular help was the collation by the club of supporter testimonials, which have been provided in full to the review. In their written evidence, LFC highlighted the importance to the club of requesting a full and transparent investigation into what happened in Paris. Central to this was the club being proactive in asking supporters to put forward their own testimonies through the club. They note: “Supporters testimonials, we felt, were essential to any independent investigation process and therefore immediately on landing at Liverpool airport from Paris, Billy Hogan, Chief Executive recorded a video message for supporters.”¹¹⁰

5.2.3. Following this call by the CEO over 8,500 written submissions were received. More than 700 were analysed by LFC and all have been made available to the Independent Review. In addition, a comprehensive and in-depth analysis of supporter accounts was conducted by Professor Scraton and others (2022), and the Panel has drawn from that report. Furthermore, the Panel carried out an extensive series of supporter interviews.

¹¹⁰ — Liverpool FC Position Statement - Appendix, IV.18 (p. 371)

5.2.4. In this section, the Panel focusses on the evidence gathered during interview with five senior executives of LFC on 25 September 2022.

5.2.5. During the course of interview, the club was asked if its candour in providing information that circa 50,000 ticketless supporters would travel to Paris could have had an adverse, unintended effect.

5.2.6. In response LFC said: “I think yes, I do - speaking openly - yeah, I do. I think it’s a problem for us that being that open. I think if you take the 20,000 ticketed supporters, let’s say, that we get 20,000 allocation and then you’ve got 45 to 50,000 supporters without tickets. That’s 75,000 people. 75,000 football supporters descending onto a city it’s seen as a huge problem, despite the fact that there is no evidence of any disorder when we travel on mass, there’s certainly no history of disorder between Real Madrid and the Liverpool fans.”¹¹¹

5.2.7. LFC continued: “I feel our objective has always been to be as transparent as possible about the numbers that will arrive, whether with a ticket or without a ticket to enjoy the city, because it’s absolutely critical that a plan is in place to accommodate that number of fans and as [LFC] points out, we just don’t believe that those numbers can’t be accommodated with an appropriate plan.”¹¹²

5.2.8. UEFA, FFF and other stakeholders complained to the Panel of the apparent lack of information coming from LFC regarding the precise number and travel plans of its supporters. In principle, the Panel agrees with UEFA that clubs have a responsibility to the organisers but moreover to their own supporters to optimise the amount of information provided. The more accurate the information, the easier it will be for arrangements to be made for extra travel capacity, accommodation and facilities, including ‘fan zones’ and information points. Indeed, the Panel understands that this sort of assistance is already required by UEFA regulations, and it is an important feature within the 2016 Convention.

5.2.9. Therefore, the Panel has no difficulty with the proposition that Clubs should be under a duty to collect as much information and data as is reasonably possible, on the numbers of their supporters who are likely to travel to major international fixtures, and their arrangements, as this has obvious benefits to the supporters and organisers alike. The Panel also note that supporters enjoy the

111 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1697)

112 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1698)

same freedom of movement as the rest of the population. Sharing personal travel or accommodation details can therefore only be expected on a voluntary basis and in line with GDPR and national data protection regulations. The supporter organisations, including Spirit of Shankly and the LDSA have close communication and relations with LFC and these are the channels by which this information may be collated. Merseyside Police also contribute intelligence as they did on this occasion. However, the Panel noted that LFC could have better prepared the fan experience and the club acknowledged to us the need to evaluate arrangements for fans during their site visits to future host venues.¹¹³

5.2.10. However, the Panel notes from its examination of the evidence, that the LFC estimate of 70,000 LFC supporters travelling to Paris for the final - 20,000 with tickets, 50,000 without – was largely accurate¹¹⁴. Furthermore, the Panel recognises that a feature of the Liverpool supporter base is that many prefer to travel independently and do so from across the world to attend fixtures of the scale and prestige of UCLF. The phenomenon of masses of supporters travelling to host cities without tickets is not universal but neither is it confined to LFC. It is a fact of modern football, and it should be embraced. The UCLF should be considered a festival of football in the host city and not simply a match within a stadium. As the 2016 Convention requires, proper facilities to welcome travelling supporters should be an integral part of the planning process.

5.2.11. The need for the organisers of UCLF22 to make appropriate plans to accommodate the large number of supporters travelling to Paris to enjoy the experience and celebrate their identity with others, was emphasised by LFC in their evidence to the panel. LFC expressed their frustration that in Paris “it was quite difficult and quite late to actually get [a fan zone] agreed.” LFC considered that there should have been much earlier and better planning for how the fan zone would operate, and where it would be. Fan zones have been a successful feature repeated and improved across multiple UEFA events and finals over recent years. LFC asserted that the organization of fan zones should be a standard part of planning for a final and it did not believe that was the case in Paris. “Although, obviously, when the point was understood and agreed, I think the authorities did react very quickly to assist.”¹¹⁵

5.2.12. The concerns expressed by LFC on the late organization of the fan zone at

113 — Meeting with Spirit of Shankly – Appendix, V.6 (p. 1859); Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1803)

114 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1690)

115 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1695)

Cours de Vincennes, were echoed by Richard Bouigue, Deputy Mayor of the 12th Arrondissement in Paris which was the host to this facility.

5.2.13. In evidence to the Review, Richard Bouigue stated: “For example, we found it difficult to get concrete answers to our questions about the organisation of this fan zone. That is to say: where it would be located, the opening hours, the link that there would be between this fan zone and the surroundings, i.e., the shops, the neighbours, the local residents, and in particular the presence of a weekly food market which is held on the Cours de Vincennes, on the side of the 12th Arrondissement, and which we didn’t know whether it could be maintained or not. There were also concerns about the information on what would be happening inside the fan zone. For a long time, we didn’t have clear information from the Préfecture de Police. This information even went against the information from UEFA concerning the presence, or not, of giant screens to broadcast animations and to broadcast the match when it started. There were, still, three days before, from memory, indications on the website of the Préfecture de Police that there would not necessarily be a screen.”¹¹⁶

5.2.14. In the Position Statement provided by UEFA, it was confirmed that: “Fan meeting points were announced on 25th May, immediately after information was provided by FFF and UEFA communication greenlighted by FFF/public authorities.” It goes on to state: “Approval from FFF/public authorities to communicate the match screening for non-ticket holders in the Liverpool Fan Meeting Point was only received on MD afternoon, at which point the message was pushed across UEFA channels and shared with Liverpool FC.”

5.2.15. The Panel notes the earlier evidence suggesting that the fan zone was established once English teams were likely to qualify and then primarily as a means to address fears of a public order problem rather than as a means of welcoming supporters, with or without tickets, to the city. We assume the delay in communicating that the fan zone would be available was, at least in part, due to assumptions that such knowledge might encourage more fans to attend adding to the perceived difficulties that might be faced. We concur with the view that where fans are expected to travel in number that fan zones/meeting points should be embedded as early as possible into the planning process. Information about their availability should also be disseminated at the earliest opportunity. They should not, as appear to have happened in the present case, be a casualty of dispute or poor cooperation between different local stakeholders.

¹¹⁶ — Meeting with Richard Bouigue – Appendix, V.13

5.2.16. This interoperability failure is evidenced in the testimony of 12th Arrondissement Deputy Mayor, Richard Bouigue, “The choice of the Cours de Vincennes, that is to say, the site that hosted the Liverpool fan zone was made by the Préfecture de Police but against or, in any case, without the initial approval of the City of Paris, since the City of Paris and the Town Hall of the 12th arrondissement would have preferred other sites than this one. It should be noted that this site had never before been chosen to host an event of this type, it was a first, and that therefore it was not necessarily our initial preference. And this in fact created organisational problems between the institutions themselves once the choice of site had been made. Obviously, there was a desire for things to go as smoothly as possible, but for all that, there were dysfunctions that we might not have had in other circumstances,”

5.2.17. Amongst other issues which were of importance to the club were the misconceptions upon which the risk assessments informing policing strategy were based. Of particular note was the flawed intelligence referred to in the report of the DIGES¹¹⁷, which stated: “Because police’s responsibility had been pointed out in the 1989 Hillsborough disaster (97 deaths) authorities decided to design a strong police build up to maintain order. They wanted to be able to counter a possible phenomenon of hooliganism and destruction as had happened in the 13 June 2016 England v Russia match in Marseille.”

5.2.18. When asked their opinion of this comment, LFC responded: “Absolute outrage. Outrage. Because well, let’s deal with the Hillsborough issue. They’ve conflated hooliganism with Hillsborough, and we don’t need to revisit that path. It’s such a calamitous error of judgment, it beggars’ belief. Absolutely beggars’ belief. We’ve reiterated a number of occasions the profile of our football fan is they will come, they will celebrate their team, they will support their team, they will enjoy your city, and they will go home. It can’t be any simpler than that. So, that as planning assumption, it’s absolutely outrageous. That was never challenged at the start and never was it ever discussed with us.”¹¹⁸

5.2.19. The panel had already noted the inappropriateness of the police strategy as commented by the DIGES, and this issue is covered elsewhere in this report. The Panel concludes that basing a policing operation on such a flawed and

117 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p. 124)

118 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1719)

prejudicial misconception was not just a remarkable failure by the Préfecture, but also a substantial failure by the DIGES, UEFA and FFF for apparently not realising, challenging and escalating what was clearly an inappropriate policing approach.

5.2.20. Further to this, LFC commented on their concerns that the safety and security focus was based upon disorder rather than on what the actual intelligence provided by Merseyside Police and the Club presented: “I think the mindset to have referred to an event which happened over 30 years ago, which has been proven to have nothing to do with hooliganism and, frankly, nothing to do with the behaviour of the fans, I think just, absolutely beggars belief and, from our perspective, we couldn’t have been, more outraged and more offended on behalf of the families, on behalf of our fan base and on behalf of the club and the reputational damage that comments like that continue to do to Liverpool and, frankly, to our fans, but also, to supporters more widely. It’s unbelievably outrageous to have made those comments. So, I’m thankful that you’ve raised them because the fact that someone who is responsible for the event to be referencing something like that, a) incorrectly and b) that is 30 plus years ago, and that was part of their mindset is outrageous.”¹¹⁹

5.2.21. LFC expressed deep concern about a different but related matter: messaging. In announcing the delay to kick-off, UEFA caused a message to be displayed on the giant screens in the stadium indicating that the delay was due to late arrival of supporters. The Panel has discussed this issue in chapter 7, but it is important to record the concern of LFC and its supporters at this erroneous message.

5.2.22. The LFC written evidence lists several key themes from supporter testimonies, amongst which is mentioned:¹²⁰ “The emotional impact of the incorrect reason for delayed kick-off being displayed in the stadium despite the issues many supporters had endured to get into the stadium. Some supporters reference that this had echoes of the post Hillsborough narrative which heightened the emotional impact for them both on the night and post-match (especially since UEFA did not remove this statement from their website for a number of days after the event).

5.2.23. In the same vein, LFC in interview stated:¹²¹ “Between 21:00 and 21:20,

119 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1725)

120 — Liverpool FC Position Statement - Appendix, IV.18

121 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1754)

I was pitch side and spoke to (UEFA Official) and told him forcibly that the communications channels had broken down and the decision-making process was a mess and that the comments blaming the late arrival of fans for the delay was untrue, as things had been shambolic outside when I arrived at 18:30. The message was on the big screen and was being read out over the tannoy. He eventually denied that that was what was being said and, at this point, it had gone off the big screen. I then had a small discussion with him saying that was the comments that were being put out by UEFA. He denied this, saying it wasn't. In almost comic timing, they then read it out over the tannoy, and it came up on the big screen. At this point I'd started to walk away from him, at which point I turned around, pointed at the big screen to him and he looked... well, he was incredibly apologetic and embarrassed and held his hands up and said, I'm so, sorry, and I said, well, I swore about what the messaging that was on the screen, I won't repeat it, but I swore and he clearly acknowledged that it was clear that he didn't believe that was the communications that UEFA were putting out. And then it came on the big screen."

5.2.24. In explaining the sensitivities for LFC supporters around this messaging, LFC explained that: "It was a narrative that was pedalled around Hillsborough, around late arrival of fans, fans that had been drinking and that didn't have tickets. It doesn't stand up, that's been proven by very vigorous reports into Hillsborough. That wasn't what contributed to the disaster. It was... it's nonsensical. So, it seems that the default position and why I think supporters get so disenchanted and wary of these figures is that its automatic position is blame the supporters, in the interim, blame the supporters. Everything will be the supporters' fault. The supporters have a right to turn up to the stadium and expect to be able to enjoy an experience. The default position, whenever something goes wrong seems to be blame the supporters. It will be a supporter problem"¹²²

5.2.25. The Panel agrees. Hillsborough occurred in the UK, but it remains the worst sporting disaster in Europe in living memory. No one involved in the planning of a major football match has any excuse for believing it was a disaster caused or contributed to by the actions of supporters. Those responsible for the safety and security of UCLF22 were right to consider whether supporters of either finalists were likely to present a threat to security or safety. Hillsborough occurred more than 33 years ago. UEFA and the French authorities had ample evidence and intelligence available to them from recent seasons from which to consider their

¹²² — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1756)

risk assessments. That evidence, from match delegates, UEFA Security Officers, Merseyside police, and the UK NFIP, comprehensively showed that LFC supporters did not engage in significant public disorder, or raise other abnormal safety or security issues. The only relevant information was that LFC has a huge following, including from places outside the UK, and many of their supporters would travel to the host city even if they did not have tickets for the match. That was information that should have been embraced and managed, not by deploying riot police, but with facilities befitting a showpiece festival of football.

5.2.26. The Panel has concluded, without hesitation, that referencing Hillsborough with respect to the policing approach was an appalling error, which should not have been made. In addition, this error was amplified by publishing messages blaming ‘late’ supporters for the delayed kick-off, which was not only untrue, but was obviously going to offend and traumatise LFC supporters. The Panel accepts UEFA’s explanation that it did not set out to do so, but the messaging represented both a casual disregard for the truth and a lack of understanding of the supporter base they were responsible for managing. UEFA senior managers should have understood the way the message would resonate with well-known issues surrounding the Hillsborough disaster and subsequent cover-up. Many survivors from Hillsborough were at the Paris events.

5.2.27. Several concerns about risk assessments were highlighted by LFC. The club noted that as well as the risk to public order wrongly perceived by police, their supporters were wrongly assessed by UEFA as presenting a high risk of pitch invasion.

5.2.28. LFC stated: “I mean, the pitch invasion stuff is remarkable. I mean, maybe lower league clubs, Anfield, it’s just not a thing. It’s, it’s almost self-policed. You know, the fans don’t accept it. And yet there was this mindset of pitch invasions, really high risk, ticketless supporters, really high risk. To us, there is a strong chance, so, a high risk of ticketless supporters. What risk those supporters then pose is a different question. But there will be ticketless fans. That doesn’t mean that those fans are going to storm the gate, are going to attack people, going to rampage through the city. They will just be ticketless fans who come to enjoy the city. But that’s not a problem or a negative.”¹²³

5.2.29. LFC highlighted concerns that this aspect of the UEFA event risk assessment was not discussed with them until it was presented at the UEFA MD-2

¹²³ — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1717)

Security meeting. In the Position Statement submitted to the Review, LFC referred to this meeting:¹²⁴ “The UEFA-organised meeting was approximately ninety minutes long but took on the form of a formal presentation from the UEFA Security Officer with only a short time allocated to Clubs to ask questions. LFC had concerns regarding some of the information that was contained in the risk assessment section of the meeting, as the information appeared to have been taken out of context, for example, “Pitch invasions” were deemed to be highly likely and high risk. LFC pointed out that only minor incidents of “pitch invasions” were evidenced through the club’s previous comparable fixtures (e.g., an individual entering the field of play after the final whistle to obtain a souvenir) and that in fact mass pitch incursions by large groups of supporters was something our supporters would actively be against. Similarly, we noted that Real Madrid had similar misgivings about some of the subjects contained within the risk assessments.”

5.2.30. The dissatisfaction with the risk assessment process was articulated further by LFC during the interview: “I know we’re going to talk about risk assessment, but the first time we get presented with risk assessment for the event is at the match day minus two security meeting. And we’ve never had an input for that, as to that risk present itself, what are your plans to deal with it? And if we go back to the ticketless fans and the tourist fans travelling. At quarter-finals stage, those discussions should have been had to mitigate that risk and they weren’t, or they were, and they were dismissed. It was a point raised when we got to the finalists’ meeting.”¹²⁵

5.2.31. Taken together, it is evident that LFC were of the view that an erroneous and inaccurate approach to risk assessment had contributed to the overall approach taken by authorities to the match. As they stated: “I think the difficulty with the risk assessment and the challenge of it is we didn’t really understand where they had got the information from. So, we didn’t feel we had fed into that process. So, we challenged, no problem, we’ll change the colouring of it. And, so, to us, I think it’s almost a case of, in hindsight now, we could perhaps have said how much of what happened was based on that risk assessment? But, given we hadn’t really fed into that, we hadn’t been asked about pitch invasions particularly, we had raised, you might get the odd individual go on for a photo or a shirt at the end of a match, you know? But because we hadn’t really fed into it, it was difficult to know, have you based any of your practices and policies around this? Because we haven’t fed into it. And then we challenged it, and it was like,

¹²⁴ — Liverpool FC Position Statement - Appendix, IV.18

¹²⁵ — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1700)

OK, no problem, we'll change it. So, it felt like, this doesn't seem a very, I don't want to say important document, but yeah, valid. It was almost just a colour chart of this is what we've identified and both sides go, no, no, no. OK, we'll change it, no problem. Well, if that's a risk assessment that you've based things on that the police are reacting to, you wouldn't just change it. There would be a level of conversation, but this, it was just accepted. OK, no problem, we'll change it. So, then it was, we've not fed into this. They've changed it on our request. It must not be a particularly important table that they've based any of their policies or procedures around, really."¹²⁶

5.2.32. The Panel later established during interview with the UEFA Safety and Security Unit, that the identified risk should not have been one of pitch invasion but rather pitch *incursion*. The former relates to an incident with a mass of people and the latter to an incident with an individual. The mistake was explained by the UEFA Safety and Security Unit as one of linguistics: confusion with the English language terminology.

5.2.33. The panel shares the dissatisfaction of LFC regarding the format of the UEFA Security Meeting on MD-2 and the misrepresentation within the risk assessment. Despite the admission by UEFA that there was a mistake in language over pitch invasions, the Panel is in no doubt that this mistake, left uncorrected, was a direct influence on the decision by police to deploy a significant number of officers in front of LFC supporter sections inside the stadium towards the end of the match. Given the subsequent eyewitness testimony of post-match attacks by locals on both LFC and Real Madrid supporters (described elsewhere in this report) outside the stadium, the Panel can only conclude that these police resources, apparently deployed in response to erroneous risk assessment, would have been better utilized outside the stadium protecting the egress of supporters.

5.2.34. As LFC stated in evidence to the Panel: "post-match, we've got some horrific stories of things that happened to our fans and we've got hundreds of riot police blocking our fans in, that could have been outside assisting fans, Real Madrid fans as well as Liverpool fans, let's be quite clear on. And we had hundreds of riot police protecting the pitch, and no one assisting supporters leaving the stadium who were just picked off and left the night, if you will."¹²⁷

5.2.35. The LFC were also critical of the reluctance of FFF to allow 50 stewards

¹²⁶ — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1709)

¹²⁷ — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1715)

supplied by LFC to be deployed outside the stadium perimeter fence to assist with communication to supporters on the emerging situation: “I had stewards deployed inside to welcome our fans in and direct them to whichever area inside the stadium. But we weren’t permitted to go outside. And this all comes back to how this crisis was managed along the timeline, because, in my own view, is if the right command and control structure had been in place, that would’ve been an option for us to deploy at the transport hub to start speaking to our supporters which is what our stewards would have done.”¹²⁸

5.2.36. The Panel was told by LFC that a request by their stewarding manager to utilize the 50 LFC stewards outside the stadium perimeter fence was refused by a local stewarding manager on the ground without being referred to the stadium control room.¹²⁹

5.2.37. The Panel finds the absence of integration of the 50 LFC stewards into the local stadium operation unsatisfactory. It was a missed opportunity. UEFA Safety and Security Regulations 2019, Article 24, creates an obligation on visiting clubs that stewards must be provided to accompany and assist the travelling supporters¹³⁰. As that document states: “These stewards provide a liaison point for the match organisers, public authorities and supporters and assist supporters during journeys to and from the venue and at the match.”

5.2.38. In the experience of the Panel, it is normal for the respective clubs’ stewards to be integrated into the stadium match day operation, alongside domestic stewards, in particular to facilitate active communication with visiting supporters. The Panel concludes from the testimony of LFC that the failure to optimise the use of the LFC stewards represents a further example of interoperability failure in addition to those evidenced elsewhere in this report.

5.2.39. LFC also commented on the refusal to allow their Security Director access to the stadium control room during the operation. In evidence, he stated that during the emerging crisis before the match he attempted to enter the control room but was denied access and was only permitted to enter after intervention by the UEFA Project Leader. In the experience of the Panel, it would be normal for both the stewarding deployment and the control room access to have been decided in advance at either the MD-2 Security meeting or the MD Organizational

128 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1738)

129 — Meeting with Liverpool FC – Appendix, V.5 (p. 1737)

130 — [UEFA Safety and Security Regulations](#) (Article 24.02)

meeting. It would appear that at UCLF22 this was not the case, exemplifying the extent to which the safety and security operation systematically excluded key stakeholders who would have been important for improving decision making and communication during the crisis that emerged.

5.2.40. The Panel fully discussed ticketing matters during the interview, with most of the discussion centred on LFC's preference to have paper tickets as opposed to digital tickets. The Panel decided to treat these issues as a separate theme in a dedicated section of Chapter Seven, given the controversy this has generated.

5.2.41. Liverpool FC officials provided accounts of their experiences of arrival at various times at the stadium and their subsequent experiences of the period leading up to the delayed kick-off. They describe increasing tensions outside the stadium and a pressing need for action to be taken to delay the kick-off of the match. Cumulatively their accounts point towards a breakdown in communication and a breakdown of coherent crisis management, and consequently a failure by anyone to react to a situation which was spiralling out of control.

5.2.42. The comments of these officials included:

- "At about 18:30, I was on the outskirts, I could see the stadium. It was hundreds of yards from me. It was chaotic. And I said in the car a few times to my colleagues, there's something not right here. The number of supporters that were in the vicinity, no one was moving, and things looked problematic. That was at 18:30. It clearly wasn't something that was just evolving. It was there. There was a problem already".

- "It was at the Liverpool end of the stadium, the opposite side for the Presidential Box. And I started to make my way around and you could see that there were problems, and I was becoming quite concerned at this point, probably about 19:20, half seven, I begun to make my way around."

- "So, the reality of it is, as a senior leadership group, we started to become aware after 20:00 that there were significant issues and that was really from [the CEO]'s own experience coming via comments within the VIP lounge. I managed to get a hold of [LFC rep] in the control room at around about 20:15, and that was the first time, as a senior leadership group, that we'd had any kind of briefing that there was an issue. It was shortly after that I spoke to [LFC rep] again. We very quickly decided that we needed to request to delay kick-off. It seemed like the most obvious or critical thing that we could perhaps influence. And we decided to split up and, but [the CEO] went up into the VIP lounge and I focused on talking to [LFC rep] in the match

day control room. And we took that decision because we'd assumed that match day control was failing. It seemed obvious that that must be the case, because we'd heard nothing, and the situation was so significant. It appeared to be the case - the way to formally request in match day control a delay to kick-off around 20:25."

· "The next sort of 10, 15 minutes went by and then I was told by [LFC reps] that they were having trouble, or they couldn't communicate that kick-off had been delayed outside. So, the people weren't aware that they had, potentially had, more time than they thought. And they, obviously, as the time wears on and people have been there for two and a half, three hours in certain cases, they're obviously getting really desperate. I wasn't aware at that point, yet, about the tear gassing and the pepper spray and then the next conversation that I had with Giorgio [Marchetti] was actually after 21:00 and he said, at that point, we're going forward at 21:30. And I said, OK, is that safe? That we figured what's happening outside, that this, you know, is everything under control? And he said, well, let me go check on that, and then I never saw him again and we kicked that off at, I don't know what time was, 21:36, 21:35, something like that."

5.2.43. The elected Mayor of the Liverpool City Region, Steve Rotheram, who himself survived Hillsborough, was pickpocketed outside the ground, losing his VIP pass, wallet and phone.

5.2.44. In his written statement to the Panel, he described his approach to the stadium: "My experience was highly distressing though I was, in a sense, one of the lucky ones. I was not assaulted; I was not dangerously kettled by the police. I was not tear gassed and I was not pepper sprayed. I have personally spoken to others who were – and whose experiences were extremely frightening. With the help of a police officer I was able to make it into the ground, passing by the queuing fans who were waiting patiently to go to the turnstile area. On my way, I witnessed chaotic scenes and what appeared to be a breakdown in policing, with fans left to self-steward."¹³¹

5.2.45. As a Liverpool supporter who had experienced Hillsborough, Steve Rotheram, "still shocked at some of the scenes and worried about my fellow fans" attempted to impress the need for an appropriate response on those present in the VIP area, including the UEFA President, but he was unable to gain a meaningful response.

5.2.46. Ian Byrne, graphically recalled: "There was very clearly a palpable feeling

¹³¹ — Metropolitan Mayor of Liverpool City Region, Steve Rotheram, Position Statement - Appendix, IV.21

of fear and terrifying déjà vu for LFC supporters of my generation. I was 16 at the time of Hillsborough and 50 at the time of Paris, but when I witnessed the scenes of fans being crushed against the railings at the turnstiles in gate Z, including many women and children, it chilled my soul. I was instantly taken back to Leppings Lane and April 15th 1989. I feared contemplating the potential scale of what could unfold in Paris because so many people were suffering the same experiences around the stadium. I feared a loss of life greater than at Hillsborough. Panic began setting in and I considered what I could do to help, both as an elected representative of Parliament and as a Hillsborough survivor. I felt a profound duty of care to my fellow supporters, but I felt helpless. I did however take confidence from and pride in the absolutely magnificent behaviour of the Liverpool supporters, who kept calm despite the worst provocation I've ever seen at a football match by the people who were supposed to be in control of the event."¹³²

5.2.47. In concluding the LFC interview, the club voiced the following opinion: "This is the biggest team event in the world, in sports; and the idea that we would be having a conversation that Paris, one of the cities, one of the world's great cities, couldn't welcome more than 80,000 people, because those were the people who got to go to the event, is ridiculous. If you said to Miami or Phoenix or Minneapolis, which hosted a Super Bowl in the dead of winter, that they could only have the number of people that would come to that city that had a ticket to the match, that is madness. This should be a celebration. People should be welcomed, there should be signage all over the city. Our supporters were told that they couldn't wear colours inside the city the afternoon of the match or face getting fined. That's not a mind-set that is welcoming people to a city. And I understand that there are issues around the timing and the selection of Paris, but I would go back to the comment around process. It starts with the decision to award the final to a city. And if that can't be defended and it can't be defended by the people who work in the organization who made the selection, then there's a problem."

5.2.48. The club continued: "I think, you know, the mind-set shift is exactly the right point. And the supporters, the people who are traveling, whether you have a ticket to the game or not, should be at the heart of that mind-set shift. And we should be thinking about welcoming them and making that experience the best experience they can possibly have. It's supposed to be a celebration, it's supposed to be there to be supporting your team."

5.2.49. The Panel does not disagree.

¹³² — Member of Parliament for Liverpool West Derby, Ian Byrne, Position Statement - Appendix, IV.22

6. The Role of Key Stakeholders

6. The Role of Key Stakeholders

6.1. Introduction

6.1.1. This Chapter analyses the evidence related to the role of the key stakeholders.

6.2. Union of European Football Associations (UEFA): ‘delegation and deference’ versus ‘interoperability and accountability’

6.2.1. The Panel conducted extensive interviews with senior officers and executives, and operational staff at UEFA and UEFA Events SA. As well as the planning, organisation and operation of the 28th May final, the interviews covered management and governance, the model operated for the organisation of UCLFs, and various relevant operational matters. UEFA also provided a written response to our requests and a significant amount of disclosure of relevant documents. The Panel is grateful for this assistance.

6.2.2. UEFA is the governing body of European football and a continental confederation of 55 national associations, recognised as such by FIFA. It is based at Nyon, Switzerland, and registered as a society in the Swiss register of companies. Amongst other activities, it is a tournament organiser. It organises its events through a wholly owned subsidiary: UEFA Events SA.

6.2.3. The President of UEFA is Aleksander Čeferin, and its decision-making bodies are its Congress and Executive Committee. The administration is run by General Secretary Theodore Theodoridis, and two Deputy-General Secretaries, Giorgio Marchetti, and Kevin Lamour.

6.2.4. The CEO of UEFA Events SA is Martin Kallen, and its Operations Director is Sharon Burkhalter-Lau.

6.2.5. Zoran Lakovic is the Director of the UEFA National Associations Division, which includes the UEFA Safety and Security Operations Unit (S&S Unit). There is also a Head of Safety and Security Operations and a Safety and Security Advisor, who was the representative of the S&S Unit in the control room on 28th May 2022.

6.2.6. All of the above-named UEFA senior officers and executives were at the UCLF22, indicative of this being the annual UEFA flagship event.

6.2.7. The Panel has interviewed all of the above (with the exception of the President who chose to reply to questions in writing), and a range of key operational staff.

6.2.8. As described at Chapter 3, UEFA is the UCLF “event owner”, through UEFA Events SA. Its model has been to set requirements and standards via a bid process and subsequent staging agreements, and to delegate or sub-contract planning and operational components of the project to other stakeholders, in particular the relevant local or ‘host’ federation/association. UEFA Events SA manages each UCLF through a Project Management team and its Executives, with input from operational staff on specific components and issues.

6.2.9. Through its evidence to the French Senate hearings, UEFA has presented this model in such a way as to avoid accountability for the failures which almost led to catastrophe. As UEFA would have it, responsibility for public security and safety was split between FFF and the French policing authorities¹³³, and the actual issues that arose were caused by a combination of the response to a strike on part of the public transport system, a huge number of Liverpool supporters who had fake tickets or none at all, unilateral decisions taken by the police on the day, and local criminals.

6.2.10. The Panel concludes that the public response of UEFA in the aftermath of the problems on the night, and in its subsequent evidence to the Senate was striking in its orientation to protect itself, rather than to seek to ensure that nothing similar can happen in the future. This continued to be evident in the interviews of UEFA Events SA executives¹³⁴, although as we discuss below, we found a somewhat different mindset from the General Secretary, his two Deputies and the Director of National Associations. It was apparent also that UEFA’s S&S Unit, and its external Security Officers recognised that things must change.

6.2.11. In reality, most of the reputational and financial rewards of a successful UCLF event accrue to UEFA. It was a serious error for UEFA to assume it could avoid accountability for a foreseeable near disaster at its flagship event, as the public reaction has shown.

6.2.12. The current model is one the Panel defines as ‘delegation and deference’ which stands in contrast to a preferred model of ‘interoperability and

¹³³ — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 805-806)

¹³⁴ — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 805-806)

accountability'. The former, which casts UEFA as "event owner" and the local federation as "event organiser", has a superficial logic. In Paris, FFF has organised matches at the Stade de France regularly. Constitutionally, the Préfecture and Préfet de Police are responsible for public security and safety. The Consortium Stade de France operates the stadium. The local authorities control the spaces which may be used for 'fan zones', and other public and private authorities control the airports and transport networks.

6.2.13. However, from the evidence, the Panel concludes that UEFA is not simply the "owner", passing all responsibilities on to an "organiser" or deferring to public authorities, but via UEFA Events SA it maintains a substantial measure of control through its senior management and project team and some operational staff. For example, UEFA maintains control over most ticketing decisions, including allocations and whether they are digital or paper, but FFF were formally the agents (primarily for legal and tax reasons) and were responsible for ticket-checking and access to the ground. Indeed, FFF used CSDF hardware – scanners and turnstiles – which involved a third partner. The ticketing operation involved joint working – interoperability – and thereby shared responsibilities.

6.2.14. The reality is that UEFA does maintain control over components of the project, which illustrates the fallacy that it can avoid consequences and accountability when things go wrong. We can show this with a simple example. One of the elements of any UCLF is ensuring that there is a high-quality pitch. In theory, this will be dealt with by a series of agreements with the host federation, the venue and contractors. If the final is remembered not for the excitement of the goals, not for the tactical qualities of the teams, but for the commentators complaining that the pitch was so uneven that the passing of the ball was all but impossible, then it will be the reputation of UEFA that will be damaged, irrespective of where any legal liabilities may lie. Planning and operation of ensuring a pristine pitch will be contracted but UEFA does strictly monitor its progress and delivery through its project management.

6.2.15. On 28th May, French police used tear gas and pepper spray on locals and football supporters outside the turnstile perimeter, and failed to protect supporters from widespread street violence in the vicinity of the stadium. UEFA is entitled to say that policing is the responsibility of the host State. However, the consequences of the deployment of such weaponry, and failures to protect supporters, are that henceforth a festival of football will be seen by supporters, sponsors, broadcasters, and the wider public as an event which is less accessible, in particular for children,

and those with disabilities. The constitutional position of security forces in host states is unquestioned, however, UEFA has enormous ‘soft power’, and it should use it to ensure its customers and clients are treated properly and protected. This can be achieved by negotiating guarantees, joined-up planning and interoperability, and invoking the 2016 CoE Convention, as we have discussed.

6.2.16. What emerges from our interviews is a need for clarity, and an acceptance that where key components are contracted or delegated, it does not mean that responsibility can be ignored. That is particularly so with issues of public safety and customer experience, which rely on stitching together various elements of the overall project, and ensuring the interoperability of various stakeholders. This is irrespective of actual legal liabilities and applies to deference to public authority powers and responsibilities - such as policing duties - albeit in a different way.

6.2.17. On the evidence, the headline of the model is clear and reasonable: the final is a project with multiple components managed by UEFA Events SA. However, responsibility for the execution of the components is ill-defined, and it is the Panel’s judgment that this lies at the heart of what went wrong on 28th May 2022. Of key relevance, the role of UEFA with respect to safety and security, and its Safety and Security Unit in particular, was entirely unclear.

6.2.18. Giorgio Marchetti, Deputy General Secretary, told us that the S&S Unit were involved in ensuring that the operational plan and its execution were appropriate¹³⁵. That is not borne out by the evidence, but undoubtedly, he is correct that this is what should have happened. It was appropriate that UEFA delegated operational planning to FFF, and deferred to police planning by the Préfecture de Police, but its S&S Unit should have been fully involved in monitoring and ensuring both were appropriate and intervened where they were not, or where there were deficits in joined-up working.

6.2.19. The description of UEFA as “event owner” and FFF as “event organiser” is therefore inappropriate, because UEFA maintained control of key parts of the organisation of the final. The failures in mobility arrangements, last kilometre routing, additional perimeter and turnstile access - which all impacted on public safety and nearly led to catastrophe - were also the responsibility of others, but UEFA’s overall project was the way that all those strands should have been drawn together, and problems identified before it was too late.

¹³⁵ — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 736)

6.2.20. Where it is appropriate to sub-contract, the role of event owner should only be to monitor, supervise and sign-off. With respect to state responsibilities – for example policing duties – UEFA’s role was to engage and assist, and to identify problems and escalate where they are not rectified. In short, to ensure all components of the project are covered, all contracts, agreements and warranties are honoured and executed effectively, and to ensure UEFA is working efficiently with all other stakeholders. Crucially, UEFA must be able to identify where interoperability between other stakeholders is deficient or challenged. That is the role of a responsible event owner, rather than delegation and deference being misused as a device to avoid liability and reputational damage – and hence avoid accountability.

6.2.21. The Panel noted that although they stuck to the official UEFA position on the delegation of responsibilities, and therefore accountability for what went wrong on 28th May 2022¹³⁶, the General Secretary and his Deputies (the UEFA senior leadership team: SLT) recognised that the UEFA model may be flawed. Mr Lamour commented that this was a debate that had been going on for as long as he had been at UEFA which was since 2007¹³⁷. Mr Theodoridis added: “after situations like this, the debate starts again”¹³⁸.

6.2.22. At the outset of the interview with Mr Lakovic, Director of National Associations, and the UEFA S&S Unit, the Panel were expressly asked by him to consider this question, and it was explained that changes had already been made to ensure the greater involvement of the S&S Unit going forward, and in particular for UCLF23 in Istanbul¹³⁹.

6.2.23. UEFA Events SA is a separate legal entity but wholly owned by UEFA. As stated, Martin Kallen is the CEO and Sharon Burkhalter-Lau is the Operations Director. Mr Kallen has been at UEFA since 1994, becoming Head of Events in 2002 and later, CEO of UEFA Events SA. Ms Burkhalter-Lau has undertaken several roles at UEFA since 2004 and has been Operations Director of UEFA Events SA since 2016¹⁴⁰. They each played a substantial role in the organisation of UCLF22, and were at the head of the project management chain. Below them were a range of operational staff. The relevant operational staff dealt with project management, ticketing, and mobility.

136 – Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 722)

137 – Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 728-729)

138 – Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 731)

139 – Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1295-1297)

140 – Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 773, redacted by UEFA)

6.2.24. A UCLF is viewed as a project, and the Project Leader is the single person in charge of managing the event, which means he/she coordinates the UEFA teams involved and liaises with the partner organisations, in particular the host federation. The Project Leader reported to the Head of Unit for club finals, and in turn he reported to Ms Burkhalter-Lau¹⁴¹.

6.2.25. Rationally, that model should include an important component covering safety and security, which should be undertaken by the UEFA S&S Unit. However, the UEFA Written Response to this Review asserted that all aspects of safety and security for the final were to go through project management, rather than the S&S Unit¹⁴². UEFA was in fact represented at planning meetings involving security by the Events team led by Martin Kallen, with no representation from the UEFA S&S Unit¹⁴³.

6.2.26. In interview, Ms Burkhalter-Lau indicated that the UEFA written response was inaccurate, and that from the outset FFF had proposed using the security concept from the French Cup Final on 7th May 2022, given the short timeframe, and the plan for the French Cup was adopted for UCLF22 in substitution for the normal process. Project management had agreed this without consultation with UEFA's S&S Unit¹⁴⁴. There were multiple problems with this approach, as we shall discuss.

6.2.27. The Project Leader – told us that he was not given the opportunity to get into discussions with those involved in planning the policing operation, that UEFA did not have access to the police at an operational level, and that FFF engaged in most of the discussions with the Préfecture de Police¹⁴⁵. The result was a policing operation which involved what Mr Theodoridis suggested was a unilateral decision to divert a large volume of supporters onto RER D without notice to UEFA or FFF, the routing of those same supporters to the most vulnerable and limited access point - ASP3 - the consequent failure of the access arrangements, the subsequent teargassing and pepper spraying of supporters, including those most vulnerable, and the failure to stop criminal attacks on supporters arriving and leaving the event.

6.2.28. The DIGES accounts for the security-based policing strategy on a woefully inaccurate view of the 1989 Hillsborough disaster - that it was caused by hooliganism. That UEFA were unaware even of the nature of the policing operation is wholly unacceptable. This was not appropriate deference to the authorities of

141 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 777)

142 — UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p. 50-52)

143 — UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p. 36)

144 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 780)

145 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team – Appendix, V.1 (p. 983-984)

the host State, it was a failure to engage, and through the right people. France is a signatory to the 2016 Convention, it is under an international, binding obligation to police a UCLF through a supporter engagement plan. Such a plan implies full cooperation with the event owner.

6.2.29. The Project Leader noted that he had approximately 33 components of the UCLF to manage. He is not a safety and security expert. Even where he perceived there to be a problem with policing, we were told the channel of escalation was via Ms Burkhalter-Lau to FFF¹⁴⁶. Had the UEFA S&S Unit had direct contact with the police commanders, had they been given a copy of the operational order, they would have been able to establish an effective working arrangement – or foreseen the impending problems and escalated them to the DIGES, or if necessary actual Ministerial level or President Macron’s office. It was a nonsense that policing issues were dealt with by project managers and generally through FFF, when UEFA had a highly experienced S&S Unit.

6.2.30. This deficit was not mitigated by the presence of a S&S Unit safety advisor and a security adviser at some of the planning meetings¹⁴⁷. It was apparently compounded by a reluctance to reduce agreements to writing for “cultural” reasons¹⁴⁸, which the Panel rejects without hesitation. Matters pertaining to public safety at a major sporting event should always be reduced to writing, and there are appropriate and sensitive ways of so doing.

6.2.31. Mr Lakovic referred to the problem of communications concerning S&S going through UEFA Events as “key learning” and that there needed to be direct communication and working between his Unit and local partners including the local Federation and the police commanders¹⁴⁹. He stated: “the concept of UEFA: are we the advisors, consultants, are we sharing the information, or we should take more responsibility? This is the question number one”¹⁵⁰. The panel took this to mean not only joint working with relevant partners, but taking control of UEFA’s responsibilities for monitoring and ensuring the effectiveness of all aspects of S&S planning and operations for the event. Mr Lakovic asserted: “I would say...we should treat safety and security a little bit in isolation”¹⁵¹. The Panel agrees, and we go further: UEFA should make this an express part of its model so that there is absolute clarity.

146 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 995-996)

147 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1044-1045)

148 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1051)

149 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1307-1309)

150 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1310)

151 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1310)

6.2.32. The decision to switch venue to Paris was taken without engaging any normal process. According to Giorgio Marchetti, Deputy General Secretary, there were a very limited number of options, and it was merely a matter of working out where was available and whether the host state and federation would undertake the task at such short notice¹⁵². The decision was formalised through a conversation between President Macron and President Čeferin. Any ‘process’ would have reduced the preparation time still further.

6.2.33. In our view this led to a crucial error - there was no venue risk assessment, which would have been the natural starting point for any UEFA S&S assessment, and should have brought to the fore known access, congestion and crime and disorder problems which we discuss below¹⁵³. The lack of a venue risk assessment may have been overlooked - in the changed and curtailed circumstances – because there is a safety and security section of the normal bidding process¹⁵⁴, but it is inconceivable that it would have been overlooked if the S&S Unit had ownership of safety and security issues¹⁵⁵.

6.2.34. As the venue for the UCLF had actually been changed in each of the previous two years (due to Covid), changes to normal arrangements were generally foreseeable even if the specifics were not. The Panel notes that a number of stakeholders have referred to the impact that the late change of venue posed. We do not doubt that a much-shortened preparation period created widespread problems for the organisation of the event. It is therefore even more remarkable that the S&S Unit were not involved from the outset and that they were effectively side-lined. A responsible approach would have been the opposite: for UEFA Events SA to ensure their full involvement from the earliest possible point, precisely because of the increased chances of something being missed due to the changes.

6.2.35. The use of a previous plan as a starting point for event planning is commonplace. However, adaptation is crucial – events are rarely identical. The French Cup Final was a poor comparator for the UCLF22, and the adoption of its planning without proper adaptation was an inappropriate short cut. Moreover, there had been novel security arrangements at that event, which included double checks at the ASPs, and it could not therefore be seen as a tried and tested plan. The usual perimeter checks at the Stade de France were for security only – as part

152 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 745-748)

153 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 649-650, 849-850)

154 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1318)

155 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1336-1341)

of the Vigipirate counter terrorism plan - but UEFA had asked for the addition of ticket checks¹⁵⁶. As we discuss below, the position became even more complex with two types of ticket checks at UCLF22, because of the mix of paper and digital tickets.

6.2.36. There was no crowd modelling for UCLF22, and the effect of multiple different checks was not adequately factored in to throughput calculations relevant to the ASPs. The Panel concludes that these were serious deficits and highly relevant to the problems on the night. In the view of the Panel, they were obvious to any safety expert, yet they were entirely missed by UEFA (and indeed FFF and the police).

6.2.37. Martin Kallen emphasised that the French Cup Final was just the starting point and “we afterwards looked at the plan, it’s not that we took it blindly”¹⁵⁷. From the interview evidence, this was not correct: UEFA’s S&S Unit told us they did not see an Operational Plan for either the French Cup Final or the UCLF22. Indeed, they had no documentation relating to S&S at the French Cup Final, just their own observations, which they noted showed different access arrangements to those on 28th May. The documentation available to them for the UCLF22, notably slides presented to the finalists on 6th May 2022 and to the MD-2 security and safety meeting chaired by an external UEFA security officer, included inaccurate representations of the actual ASP access plans¹⁵⁸.

6.2.38. The French Cup Final had different ticketing arrangements to UCLF22, and it had different ticket checking arrangements (a ‘soft’ check rather than activation as on 28th May, and no use of chemical pens)¹⁵⁹. The French Cup Final involved two domestic clubs, whilst UCLF22 involved two foreign clubs with different fan cultures. For UCLF22 there was intelligence that a very large number of supporters would travel to Paris without tickets. There was no such intelligence for the French Cup Final¹⁶⁰.

6.2.39. From the evidence, it is clear that UEFA Events SA project management, through Mr Kallen, agreed to FFF plan for the French Cup Final to be the basis for UCLF22, without reference to the S&S Unit. Although Mr Kallen has stated that the plan was then looked at, the UEFA S&S Unit told the Panel in express terms that they did not see any such plans for either the French Cup Final or UCLF22. There

156 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 786, 868-869)

157 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 783-784, 789)

158 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1328-1332, 1345-1352, 1360-1365)

159 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1325-1327)

160 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 795-797)

are also serious questions about a) the extent to which that event acted as an appropriate comparator for UCLF22 and b) the fact of any UEFA evaluation of the Safety and Security arrangements¹⁶¹. When asked who signed-off the safety and security access and ASP arrangements, Ms Burkhalter-Lau informed us that UEFA does not sign off a “security concept”, and Mr Kallen repeated that safety and security from the ASPs inward is always the responsibility of the host federation, and outward is the responsibility of the public authorities¹⁶².

6.2.40. Although this does provide an explanation, it rather contradicts Mr Kallen’s earlier assertion that UEFA looked at the Operational Plan and did not accept it “blindly”. It does not sit with other evidence including the fact that UEFA claims it provided FFF with a “hybrid template” document dealing with strategic and operational issues relating to safety and security, which they translated into French¹⁶³ (although FFF told the Panel that it had not received this document). Nor does the explanation sit easily with the fact that the final security, safety and mobility planning meeting held two days before the match, was chaired by an external UEFA Security Officer. When asked why this was, given his earlier answers, Mr Kallen could only assert that this was the way it always had been done¹⁶⁴.

6.2.41. The issues relating to the ASP3 go further. The evidence indicates that there was little or no joint working between FFF, UEFA and the police regarding the arrangements or the operation of the perimeters. More generally, neither FFF nor UEFA received any operational plan for the final from the Préfecture de Police¹⁶⁵. FFF made a particular point that the police failed to have a first line ahead of the ASP checks, but from the evidence, the Panel has concluded that the lack of interoperability on the planning and operation of the ASPs was much more fundamental than that.

6.2.42. Problems with joint working relevant to ASP3 started with mobility - travel to the vicinity of the stadium, and arrangements in the last kilometre. The police and the transport networks apparently followed a different plan to UEFA and FFF regarding travel from central Paris. The UEFA website advised supporters to travel via RER B or D depending upon where they were coming from, advice UEFA says was repeated by announcements at stations¹⁶⁶.

161 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1328-1332)

162 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 805-806)

163 — UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p.26), see UEFA SSNS Concept & Operational Plan (9 March2022) – Appendix, VI.3

164 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 806-807)

165 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1599, partially redacted by FFF)

166 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1060-1066)

6.2.43. According to UEFA, customer service agents deployed jointly by FFF and UEFA, at stations including Châtelet – Les Halles, to direct supporters onto RER B and thence to the main thoroughfare to the stadium, were countermanded by police who were directing them onto RER D (although this is disputed by the Préfecture). UEFA further assert, that on 27th May 2022, MD-1, the transport networks RATP and SNCF had agreed between themselves and the Prefecture de Police to divert supporters coming from central Paris onto RER D and away from RER B, but failed to tell anyone else¹⁶⁷ (this is disputed by the networks, with some justification given the minutes of the Mobility Working Group considered in Chapter 4, and below).

6.2.44. According to UEFA’s operational staff, the first they knew of the diversion of supporters was 19:45 on MD, even though the police control room adjoined the stadium control room where UEFA was located and there was a representative of the transport networks with them¹⁶⁸.

6.2.45. So far as the transport networks are concerned, we add a caveat. On the evidence from RATP and SNCF, discussed at Chapter 4, the Panel concludes that their approach was to shift the volume of traffic to RER D, rather than wholly divert supporters. This may well have been appropriate from their point of view, however, the lack of proper interoperability meant that the consequences were not dealt with downstream, with nearly catastrophic results. SNCF has also contradicted UEFA’s position, asserting in evidence to the Senate that it provided passenger flow information to the stadium control room every half an hour from 18:05¹⁶⁹.

6.2.46. General Secretary, Mr Theodoridis, noted the police diversion at Châtelet–Les Halles to be a particularly significant failure, compounded by the lack of communication. The Panel has taken account of this assertion in light of the factual disputes regarding the diversion of supporters and the extent of knowledge. Mr Theodoridis noted that there was a strong driver to cooperation by public authorities given the benefits to hosting the event, and asserted that UEFA would have tried to talk the police out of operating the diversion, and would have encouraged them to route supporters arriving at RER D to the wider access from RER B¹⁷⁰, if UEFA was aware of it.

167 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1060-1067); UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p. 51)

168 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1060-1066, 1070)

169 — [L'Essentiel sur les incidents survenus au Stade de France le 28 mai 2022: Finale de la Ligue des Champions au Stade de France : un Fiasco Inévitable](#), French Senate - English translation at Appendix, VI.18 (p. 2827)

170 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 723-725)

6.2.47. We reflect that if UEFA S&S Unit had established proper contact and joint working with the Préfecture de Police and the commanders, and the transport networks, there would have been little room for any factual dispute, and the risk of a failure of this nature would have been minimised.

6.2.48. In the last kilometre, UEFA was aware of a dispute between FFF and the Préfecture de Police which had arisen five days prior to the match regarding the removal of signage and the routing of supporters arriving via RER D, and UEFA had supported FFF position. Mr Kallen asserted that FFF was the organiser and sometimes there were differences with the police about an arrangement. He stated that UEFA knew about the signage issue in advance but did not know about the routing issue until match day, and the responsibility and power rested with the public authorities.

6.2.49. However, Mr Kallen did concede that UEFA are able to use ‘soft power’ and do try to push to get the best outcome. We were told that the learning is to be “more careful” in the future¹⁷¹. Mr Theodoridis suggested that similar problems will not occur in 2023 in Istanbul because there will be close cooperation with the police commander¹⁷². As we will develop, the Panel firmly concludes that being ‘more careful’ or wishing for ‘greater cooperation’ are aspirations and not solutions.

6.2.50. The assertion by Mr Kallen that UEFA did not know about the routing issue until MD is difficult to comprehend in light of various conflicting maps and slides put out by UEFA during the planning phase (see Annex Figure 7).

6.2.51. The Panel concludes that the separate but cumulative police and transport network diversions of supporters onto RER D, represented a major interoperability failure. Likewise, the dispute over signage and its subsequent removal, and the failure to have appropriate routing from RER D to the stadium, represented serious joint working failures. Both plainly contributed to the problem at ASP3. The diversion and routing failures were compounded by the fact that they were either not communicated to, or were not acted upon by FFF and UEFA, a problem made all the more surprising given that all relevant stakeholders had attended planning meetings and were represented in the MD control rooms.

6.2.52. Evidence from the UEFA S&S Unit indicated that it was obvious that

171 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 812-813)

172 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 730-731, 735)

ASP3 was only able to cope with a restricted number of people¹⁷³. The Panel has concluded that this fact made it imperative that any known problems with mobility in that vicinity were dealt with in advance, or at least as soon as they were observed. It also made it crucial that there was a contingency plan if congestion did occur at this known bottleneck. There was no contingency plan for this, or indeed other access problems, except the placing of four volunteers on the route between RER D and ASP3 as a response to the signage issue, which was ineffective and plainly inadequate¹⁷⁴.

6.2.53. The Panel notes that at the UCLF2019 in Madrid where there were concerns related to crowd ingress and egress an expert crowd flow modelling report was commissioned by UEFA in advance of the event. In the present case no such crowd flow modelling exercise was conducted¹⁷⁵. An expert crowd modelling report would have identified the vulnerability of ASP3 and the imperative to ensure that only a manageable number should be allowed to access by that route, and others should be diverted to ASP4. The fact that routing supporters from RER D had been identified by FFF and UEFA as problematic but the police had overruled the mitigation plan, should have led to escalation to resolve the matter. Had it done so, an expert crowd modelling report would have been instrumental in resolving the disagreement with the police.

6.2.54. The UEFA Project Leader told the Panel that the S&S Unit helped FFF to design ASP3¹⁷⁶, although, on the evidence this overstates the position. A member of the UEFA S&S Unit had considered flowrates for the ASPs, and he told the panel that his assessment had led to advice being provided to the Head of Security for FFF, which led to an increase in the number of stewards at ASP3. His assistance did not go beyond this.

6.2.55. There were several problems with this evidence. Firstly, we were told that this was not put into writing and there is no documentation regarding this advice. Secondly, the flowrate calculation itself was wholly defective. It was based on figures which did not take account of the security and ticket checks, or their combined effect. It was based upon 15 access lines, whereas it is apparent from photographs that the width of the ramp at ASP3 could not accommodate anywhere near that number. There were in fact 6 lanes at ASP3, separated by crowd control barriers, although FFF and others have asserted that there were 10

173 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team— Appendix, V.1 (p. 1315-1318)

174 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team— Appendix, V.1 (p. 1078-1081)

175 — Meeting with UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1495)

176 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team— Appendix, V.1 (p. 1093-1094)

channels for ticket checks, the difference being explained by an assertion that there was room for two lines per lane. The UEFA Security Officer responsible for the south of the stadium told us there was room for about 7 channels¹⁷⁷.

6.2.56. As we discuss below, two members of the UEFA S&S Unit observed aspects of the police operation which seriously affected throughput at ASP3 – the positioning of vans and the extent of the security checks – and FFF added a third – the failure of the police to establish a line at the front of ASP3 to regulate access to it. It is clear from this evidence that the S&S Unit member who undertook the throughput calculation had not gathered this highly pertinent information: how the police were going to operate the ASP. Neither had he taken account of the double role of the stewards at ASP3: to activate digital tickets, and check paper tickets with chemical pens, nor the absence of an escape lane. Congestion at ASP3 caused its failure because too many supporters were directed or allowed to go toward that access point, plus these multiple failures. It could not cope with the throughput of valid ticket holders, irrespective of any issue of ticketless supporters, fakes or problems with locals (see Annex Figure 8).

6.2.57. Whereas UEFA have been quick to assert that the stewards at ASP3 encountered a high proportion of fakes, they have been more circumspect regarding the reliability and efficacy of the stewarding operation in that respect. UEFA has accepted that a large proportion of stewards deployed on the day had not completed its e-learning package, but it has been stressed that all the stewards were accredited, and thereby fully trained as stewards under French regulations. In written evidence UEFA stated: “Only 934 out of 1,716 successfully completed UEFA steward e-learning which focusses on ticketing and access principles”¹⁷⁸. Although it is impossible to say with certainty, the Panel considers that this is likely to be relevant to what occurred at ASP3. The stewards may well have been trained to a standard required by French law, but almost half of them had not undertaken the UEFA training related to access and ticket checking. It is clear no account of this was taken in calculating the throughput rates.

6.2.58. The Panel has no hesitation in concluding that the arrangements at the ASPs generally, but most specifically at ASP3 where there were obvious and known bottleneck and congestion issues, were wholly inadequate. There was a substantial failure of joint working between UEFA, the Préfecture de Police and

177 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1364-1380); Flow Rates (as per security concept) - Appendix, VI.14; Meeting with UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1489)

178 — UEFA Analysis and initial findings related to the matchday events at Stade de France (8 June 2022) - Appendix, VI.16 (p. 2746)

FFF about this particular and crucial aspect of arrangements, both in planning and operation. We single out UEFA, not only for its failure to assist in designing safe and effective access arrangements, but for failing to spot the obvious dangers of the arrangements made by FFF. The fact that some effort had been made to look at the ASP arrangements makes this failure even more stark. The Panel concludes that all access arrangements at a UCLF should have been monitored and signed-off by UEFA's S&S Unit.

6.2.59. This conclusion by the Panel is underpinned by the view of the UEFA Security Officer responsible for the south side of the stadium who was forthright in his evidence. On arrival at about 15:30 on MD he accessed through ASP3. He immediately identified that it was “not fit for purpose”. He stated “to my horror” that police vans half-blocked the already narrow entrance ramp. He called his colleague, the other external UEFA Security Officer, and reported: “This will not survive contact”. Having looked at other ASPs, at about 16:27, he again reported to his colleague: “I’m not sure the outer security perimeter will survive contact”, and at 17:19 he messaged to the UEFA S&S Unit WhatsApp group: “I asked [external SO colleague] to accompany me around OSP cos it will need a lot of police for it to survive contact!”. The recipients of this message included Mr Lakovic, the Head of Safety and Security Operations, the Safety and Security Advisor and the Head of Unit for Club Finals who reported to Ms Burkhalter-Lau and was located within the stadium control room¹⁷⁹. The UEFA Security Officer mentioned above also noted other defects at ASP3 including the absence of any ‘escape’ lane, and he later observed the congestion without any attempt by police to divert others away from the scene for a considerable period.

6.2.60. The failures relating to ASP3 are perhaps the single best example of the overall defect of the UEFA model identified by the Panel. If UEFA viewed safety and security as a priority component within its UCLF project, and required its S&S Unit to play a full part in the arrangements – to monitor and sign-off each key part of arrangements affecting safety and security – then it is far less likely that an access arrangement described as “not fit for purpose” would occur.

6.2.61. The Safety and Security Advisor agreed that on the day, inappropriately positioned police vans “had a huge impact on flows”. Another member of the S&S Unit noted that the Vigipirate security screening at ASP3 involved checks on

¹⁷⁹ — Meeting with UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1479-1481); UEFA Champions League 2021/2022 Final Security Report (publication not authorised); UCLF22 – SSNS WhatsApp Group - Appendix, VI.15

everyone accessing rather than a proportion as UEFA anticipated, which impacted on flowrates, and he noted that police did not prevent further people joining the crowd outside ASP3 once congestion occurred. The UEFA S&S representative in the Stadium Control room had reports from his UEFA security adviser regarding the congestion at ASP3, and its breakdown. In the stadium control room, he had access to a CCTV feed for that location, the clarity of which has been noted by the panel. By 18:52 he saw the congestion for himself when he went to the vicinity of ASP3 to escort another UEFA manager to the ground. The congestion at ASP3 had spilled over onto the adjacent motorway and a number of UEFA VIP vehicles had been prevented from progressing further, with guests and the UEFA Match Delegate having to finish their journeys on foot¹⁸⁰. Inexplicably, none of these observations led to any action by UEFA (although in later evidence he suggested that the report by the UEFA Security Officer above may have resulted in escalation to FFF)¹⁸¹.

6.2.62. Compounding the failures in the design of ASP3, there was no contingency plan so when it was abandoned, there was no 'plan B' and the problems then transferred to the concourse which became quickly overcrowded, and then to the turnstiles. At the turnstile perimeter poor queue management was overwhelmed by weight of numbers and supporters were left to self-regulate. The Panel agrees with Scraton and Others (2022) that the collective actions of LFC supporters was probably instrumental in protecting vulnerable people and averting what might well have been more serious injuries and deaths¹⁸². Congestion added to the problems and gates were shut for significant periods.

6.2.63. Although UEFA managers at the control room were involved in meetings with FFF, these related to arrangements at the end of the match and were not crisis meetings. The Panel was unable to identify anything done by UEFA Events SA managers or the UEFA S&S Unit once safety issues became apparent, which was intended to mitigate the emergency. The explanation offered was that UEFA doubted that the police commander would have taken any advice from them¹⁸³. Evidence from the UEFA Security Officer mentioned above may support that view. He observed attacks on supporters outside the stadium footprint and asked police officers to intervene. They declined to do so on the basis they were deployed for counter terrorism duties, and claimed that they were unable to contact other units.

180 — Meeting with UEFA – Safety & Security Team – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1407-1408)

181 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1316-1317, 1369, 1409); Meeting with UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1481-1483)

182 — [“Treated With Contempt”: An Independent Panel Report into Fans' Experiences Before, During and After the 2022 Champions League Final in Paris](#), Phil Scraton et al. (2022)

183 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1413-1415)

He was unsurprised by the street crime as he had witnessed similar incidents when working at a Wales v France friendly at the Stade de France in 2017. Asked to comment on the DIGES report conclusions that police had deployed on a security basis rather than with a supporter engagement approach, he stated: “Having done several games in France, I think police doctrine doesn’t allow them to provide the service element”, noting that France is a signatory to the Convention and needed to address this issue¹⁸⁴. He later witnessed the use of tear gas and pepper spray, describing it as disgraceful¹⁸⁵.

6.2.64. When asked whether the current model – based primarily upon delegation and deference – was the real problem, and that a joint planning and responsibility model was required, Ms Burkhalter-Lau responded that there is no simple answer¹⁸⁶. For reasons we have developed, the Panel disagrees.

6.2.65. The overall assessment of Mr Kallen was that there was good stakeholder cooperation at the outset but in the final week: “it was not ideal because certain police decision was done unilaterally... and [UEFA] were not informed”¹⁸⁷. In our view, this significantly understates the interoperability problems. Mr Theodoridis is correct that there is such significant benefit to host countries that cooperation should follow, and he recognised that UEFA has ‘soft power’ to drive such an agenda¹⁸⁸. UEFA plainly does not have legal powers regarding policing, and it may be sensible for UEFA to delegate and sub-contract operational aspects relating to safety, but it should exercise its considerable ‘soft power’ and require a fully integrated model where it remains at the core of managing the event. The fact that it can take its future events elsewhere should override any resistance.

6.2.66. The problems with the ‘delegation and deference’ approach were plainly contributory to the substantial interoperability failures in planning, but they also impacted on joint working on the day and evening. Once serious security and safety problems became apparent, no discernible crisis management policy was followed at command level. Although the main stakeholders - police, UEFA, FFF, CSDF, and the transport networks - were located in two adjacent control rooms within the stadium, there were no crisis meetings involving the police, and the others decanted to an anteroom for purposes which remain unclear but included discussions about VIP transport after the match.

184 — Meeting with UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1470-1475)

185 — Meeting with UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1503-1504)

186 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 813-814)

187 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 821-822)

188 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 732)

6.2.67. According to Mr Kallen, safety and security was the domain of FFF and the police who “constantly” liaised between themselves and therefore meetings involving UEFA were unnecessary¹⁸⁹. Ms Burkhalter-Lau added that under UEFA’s crisis management policy she would have had the responsibility to call a “VCC¹⁹⁰ escalation group meeting” but felt that it would have been inappropriate because it would have diverted the police and FFF from what they were doing, and it would not have added value. In the Panel’s view, this is a surprising assertion. UEFA not only had its senior Events managers in the control room, it had its Safety and Security Advisor stationed there too: representing the S&S Unit. For what purpose was he in the control room if UEFA were going to stand aside when a crisis occurred? In addition, the Head of the S&S Unit was present in the stadium as were the two external UEFA Security Consultants.

6.2.68. Both Mr Kallen and Mr Marchetti went to the control room as the crisis developed. General Secretary, Mr Theodoridis, indicated that elsewhere, in a stairwell next to the VIP area, the UEFA President and senior executives met to consider the delay of kick-off¹⁹¹. It is apparent that there was no crisis management process included in the planning for the UCLF22, and that UEFA’s own policy was not operated.

6.2.69. In the Panel’s view, the police commander should have had primacy over such serious threats to public safety as the crisis evolved, but there should have been a clear mechanism for the police command to have liaised in real time with FFF and UEFA, both of whom had significant expertise and operational roles. From the evidence, it is apparent to the Panel that there were no contingency plans for the failure of the ASP. Neither was there any multi-agency crisis management plan. There should have been. Furthermore, UEFA’s role in such crisis management should have been through a senior member of its S&S Unit, probably the Safety and Security Advisor as he was in the control room, and other managers should have played a supporting role, irrespective of position within the organisation. Amongst other matters, UEFA had access to public messaging, and highly experienced staff who had a wealth of crowd management experience. Through a multi-agency crisis plan, those assets should have been utilised.

6.2.70. The Panel also concludes that decisions to delay the kick-off because of security or safety problems should be taken by the police commander, in liaison

189 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 818-820)

190 — Venue Communication Centre

191 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 752-755)

with the nominated FFF and UEFA S&S officers, and should not have been a decision taken or ratified elsewhere. In this regard the Panel notes the evidence of President Čeferin that he was asked to make or ratify the decision, even though he had been in a meeting with the King of Spain in the VIP area, and not been in the control room or engaged with commanders¹⁹².

6.2.71. UEFA did play a role in messaging once the crisis occurred, putting up two messages on the main stadium screens, informing everyone within the stadium firstly that kick-off had been delayed “due to a security issue”, and then that the delay was caused by late arriving supporters. As the General Secretary, Mr Theodoridis, agreed, it was not true that the problem had been caused by late supporters¹⁹³, and in the words of Ms Burkhalter-Lau: “there would have been a better option”¹⁹⁴. The Panel agrees. It was stressed to us that there was no intention to cause offence, but messaging is important. It is important to allay fear, inform people to remain in place or move, correct misinformation, and it is right for the supporter experience to tell them what is going on if arrangements change.

6.2.72. Ms Burkhalter-Lau noted that UEFA Events SA used pre-prepared messaging given the difficulty of composing text in the moment and the need for translation. There were hundreds of messages to choose from, but these were the only two related to delayed kick-off. Whereas we do understand the reasoning for the use of pre-prepared messages, there is no excuse for putting out inaccurate information, and in this circumstance the message was not only wholly inaccurate but deeply distressing to Liverpool supporters. The assertion that Liverpool supporters caused the 1989 Hillsborough disaster in part by arriving late was one of the central elements of the cover-up of the gross negligence by the police commander which really caused the deaths of 97 supporters, and which had persisted for more than 25 years. Many survivors of Hillsborough were within the Stade de France when that message was displayed, many more were watching on TV.

6.2.73. On the evening of 28th May 2022, UEFA put out a press release asserting that “the turnstiles at the Liverpool end became blocked by thousands of fans who had purchased fake tickets...”¹⁹⁵. According to Ms Burkhalter-Lau that was what UEFA thought at the time the press release was put out¹⁹⁶.

192 — UEFA President Position Statement – Appendix, IV.2

193 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 711)

194 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 831-832)

195 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 835)

196 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 836)

6.2.74. We were informed by Deputy General Secretary, Kevin Lamour, that the original draft had asserted that the problems on the night were caused in part by locals, but that the Ministers for Interior and Sport, a representative of the Préfet, and the DIGES had asked them to remove that reference. UEFA did so¹⁹⁷. The problems were not caused by thousands of supporters with fake tickets. UEFA did not have and still has no evidence of that. The problems were plainly contributed to by locals. UEFA had observed that. UEFA also knew from its Security Officers that the perimeter arrangements were not fit for purpose and had collapsed hours earlier. UEFA should not have put out a media statement blaming supporters, and it should not have censored its own messaging due to pressure from the French authorities. Furthermore, UEFA failed to correct this inaccurate statement. Indeed, as we shall see, it compounded it.

6.2.75. By 8th June 2022, UEFA produced a presentation which included its view of the cause of the near-disaster: “it was therefore these late arrivals, and the masses of LFC supporters, many of whom without valid tickets, which caused the pressure on the screening point, with people taking the opportunity to force access and then to the stadium, profiting from this disfunction”¹⁹⁸. Given that the congestion had overwhelmed ASP3 around 19:00, it is clear that the problems did not result from anyone’s late arrival, as the General Secretary has acknowledged.

6.2.76. According to Mr Kallen and Ms Burkhalter-Lau, at the 8th June meeting, eleven days after the event, UEFA Events SA did not know that a mass of supporters had been diverted onto RER D and far too many had thereafter been directed to ASP3. Given their earlier assertions that customer service stewards provided by FFF and UEFA Events SA at Châtelet station had a) been countermanded by police officers directing supporters onto RER D, b) extensive post event media coverage and c) UEFA attendance at a Ministry of Sport debrief on 30th May, the Panel finds their evidence about the state of knowledge on the 8th June difficult to understand.

6.2.77. So far as the extent of supporters arriving without tickets, Mr Kallen noted that UEFA had evidence from the turnstiles that around 2,600 tickets had been presented which had wrong access codes, and it had learned from the internet that fake tickets had been on sale. They also had evidence from stewards undertaking the ticket checks at ASPs with chemical pens that there were a lot of fake tickets. At the Senate hearing, Mr Kallen had fairly stated: “it is impossible to

197 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 738-739)

198 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 837)

quantify the number of fake tickets”, but he then went on to say that in his view: “it can be assumed that there were more than the previous finals”. In interview with the Panel, Mr Kallen and Ms Burkhalter-Lau also agreed that the number of fake tickets recorded at the turnstiles was not robust given that there may have been multiple presentations¹⁹⁹.

6.2.78. Deputy General Secretary Giorgio Marchetti commented that the fake ticket issue: “may have been blown out of proportion”²⁰⁰. The external UEFA Security Officer deployed to observe the Liverpool end of the stadium told the Panel that once the match actually kicked-off he observed many local youths outside the turnstile perimeter but no mass of LFC supporters. This is consistent with media footage available in open source. The UEFA Security Officer responsible for the south of the stadium had been in charge of perimeter security for the UCLF at Cardiff in 2017 and he described problems with fake tickets as no more than he had seen there, and the number of ticketless supporters was probably no more than foreseen²⁰¹.

6.2.79. The issue of ticketless supporters is analysed elsewhere. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the stadium messaging, the UEFA press release on the night, and the UEFA analysis on 8 June 2022 all failed to mention any of the planning and operational deficits the Panel’s inquiry has identified, and laid the cause of the problems squarely at the feet of the supporters. That position is not acceptable because it was objectively wrong. A failure to properly understand what caused the near disaster, and accept its own shortcomings, meant that UEFA could not begin to put things right.

6.2.80. Mr Kallen was the voice of UEFA in the Senate hearings. When asked at the Senate hearing what went wrong on 28th May - what UEFA had learned – Mr Kallen mentioned the problems of paper tickets, the ASP arrangements, and difficulties with communications between stakeholders.

6.2.81. The importance of UEFA giving full and correct evidence to a parliamentary inquiry into a matter of such importance is beyond question. A lack of candour could well prevent changes vital to improving public safety – saving lives. It could also damage UEFA’s reputation and integrity with respect to the planning of future events.

6.2.82. When asked about assertions by French Ministers that 30-40,000

199 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 840-841, redacted by UEFA)

200 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 712)

201 — Meeting with UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1507-1508, 1500)

ticketless supporters had made their way to the stadium, Mr Kallen stated that there were around 100,000 people within and around the stadium, not all of whom were supporters. He had based these figures purely on statistics from the police and transport networks, and could not verify them himself.²⁰² As Giorgio Marchetti, Deputy General Secretary, told the Panel: UEFA has no idea how many ticketless supporters there were²⁰³. He went on to say that it is important to recognise that the final was a festival and ticketless supporters should not be seen as a problem, but a phenomenon to be catered for through fan zones²⁰⁴. The Panel wholeheartedly agrees that the UCLF should be viewed as a festival of football rather than just a match. However, the Panel has also concluded that none of the stakeholders, including UEFA, really treated it as such. This is vital to moving away from a security mindset to a supporter experience one, with proper engagement.

6.2.83. As considered elsewhere in the report, the Panel notes that the number of people in the vicinity of the stadium has been significantly over-stated, and the effect of ticketless supporters has been used as an excuse to mask other failures.

6.2.84. During the Senate hearings, Mr Kallen asserted that UEFA knew the Stade de France well as a venue and had staged “several Champions League Finals there without any problems, the last one being in 2006”. This was objectively untrue. Mr Kallen was Head of Events at the time and was present at the 2006 final. The assessment by UEFA after that final was that there had been serious interoperability issues with partners, and in particular the police, and there had been access problems and the Stade de France was not a suitable place for a Champions League final.

6.2.85. In interview, Mr Kallen stated that 2006 was a long time ago and there had also been successful Euro 2016 matches at the stadium. The panel was particularly unimpressed with this evidence. Before the Senate, as the UEFA representative, Mr Kallen chose to give the 2006 as a successful example. It was not, and UEFA expressly did not think so at the time, recording reasons which resonated with the problems occurring on 28th May 2022: interoperability failures, particularly with the police, and access problems²⁰⁵.

6.2.86. Mr Kallen was also asked about an event noted in the Cadot Report, page 11, regarding the same route between RER D and ASP3, which had occurred at the

202 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 844-845, partially redacted by UEFA)

203 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 712-713)

204 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 719)

205 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 850-853, redacted by UEFA)

2016 French Cup Final, and which he had not mentioned before the Senate. Mr Kallen explained that he had not known about those problems, despite the fact that the incident had prompted a review before the Euro 2016 matches. If Mr Kallen was not aware of those issues, he should have been, given the fact that he was involved in organising Euro 2016.

6.2.87. Furthermore, UEFA had a 5th April 2022 report from Football Supporters Europe, presented as part of the planning for the UCLF22, which had warned of serious congestion problems between RER D and the stadium. In interview, Mr Kallen stated that he had not seen the FSE report prior to giving evidence to the Senate, and none of his staff had drawn his attention to it²⁰⁶.

6.2.88. Mr Kallen had also told the Senate that during the planning phase, the UEFA S&S Unit had identified pitch invasion by ticketless supporters as a high-risk factor²⁰⁷. That was incorrect: they had done no such thing.

6.2.89. In summary, the Panel considers that UEFA presented to the Senate a completely misleading view of what it knew of safety problems at its previous events at the Stade de France. This was unacceptable.

6.2.90. We have identified a key problem as the UEFA model. UEFA Events SA ran the final as a project and managed it as a series of components. In delegating safety and security to FFF and deferring to the policing duties of the Préfecture de Police, without maintaining any clear and effective role for itself, UEFA sought to insulate itself from anything that went wrong. In doing so, it largely removed its own S&S Unit from a vital role to monitor, supervise and draw together joint efforts, and troubleshoot and escalate problems as they arose and were identified.

6.2.91. The management of UEFA Events SA were primarily responsible for this central failure, however, by their own admission, the senior leadership of the wider UEFA family were aware of this issue and had failed to rectify it.

6.2.92. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Mr Lakovic as Director in charge of the S&S Unit, or the Head of the Unit, sought to clarify or assert their own position. This led to members of the Unit being no more than passive observers at planning meetings and in the control room, playing no positive role. No one involved in the S&S Unit saw an operational plan for the French Cup Final or the 28th May from

206 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 852-854, redacted by UEFA)

207 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Senior Management – Appendix, V.1 (p. 872-876, redacted by UEFA)

either FFF or the police, nor did they see a venue risk assessment. UEFA presented inaccurate slides to the finalists and to the MD-2 security meeting regarding access through the perimeters, and prepared a completely defective throughput analysis for ASP3. No crowd modelling report was sought: if it had been, the obvious problems with ASP3 would have been highlighted.

6.2.93. The role of the external UEFA Security Officers was equally unclear. The Panel understands that these highly experienced professionals are commissioned to provide a further check on arrangements at a late stage and to observe and provide reports on what actually happens on MD. Article 65 of the UEFA Organisational Regulations 2020 Edition tasks these external officers to “monitor, assess and advise UEFA on safety and security concepts for UEFA club competition finals...”, and ascertain if the clubs and public authorities are satisfied that everything required has been done. The fact that one of them chaired the important MD-2 security, safety and mobility meeting should have indicated the centrality of UEFA to S&S issues, however their role appears to have been reduced to chairing and presenting UEFA slides about MD arrangements, rather than scrutinising anything. The fact that one of their Security Officers identified that ASP3 was not fit for purpose on arrival at that location on MD is testament to how badly arrangements had gone wrong, and the fact that there was a complete failure of joint working, oversight, and monitoring.

6.3. Consortium Stade de France

6.3.1. The Panel interviewed Alexandra Boutelier, CEO of the Consortium Stade de France (CSDF), Benoît Lavallée, Sport Programming Director, Florent Coulon, Development and Strategy Director, Jean-Philippe dos Santos, Security Manager, and Loïc Duroselle, Programming and Institutional Relations Director, also representing the CSDF, and is grateful for their assistance²⁰⁸. The Panel also received a detailed written response to its request for a Position Statement, and were assisted by the CSDF in attending a site visit which took in the stadium, its control rooms, concourse and access points, the ASPs and the relevant routes to the RER stations.

6.3.2. The CSDF operates and maintains the national stadium: the Stade de France at Saint-Denis, on a concession contract with the French State, which runs until 2025. It has multi-year contracts with the French Football Federation (FFF) and French Rugby Federation (FFR), and the UCLF22 involved adding an

²⁰⁸ — CSDF would not agree to the interviews being recorded and so references are to the minutes of the meeting.

appendix to FFF general contract²⁰⁹. UEFA was the ‘event owner’ and it delegated responsibilities to FFF as ‘event organiser’. Apart from being the host stadium operator, CDSF retained responsibility only for fire security and seated capacity. Other responsibilities were contracted to UEFA and FFF as event owner and organiser, respectively. French law holds public authorities responsible for public administration, order and security. Under French law the ‘organiser’ must be a French entity. The Panel views this as a formality and CDSF have referred to the reality that UEFA and FFF were “joint organisers for the event”²¹⁰. The CDSF indicated that it had no general concerns given that UEFA had hosted Euro 2016, and FFF were a regular partner, and its relationship with the main stakeholders, including the Préfecture de Police, was good²¹¹.

6.3.3. The Stade de France is situated in an urban environment in a very deprived department, within the Grand Paris metropolis in the Île-de-France region. The stadium is surrounded by developments and several major arterial roadways. The combination of its difficult urban geography and social deprivation, was an important context for the events of 28th May 2022.

6.3.4. In terms of problems which occurred on the day, CDSF has asserted to the Panel that it is now aware that at around 16:00 on MD, the transport network RATP unilaterally decided to direct supporters at Châtelet-Les Halles station (near to the Liverpool Fan Zone) to travel via RER D rather than the usual and better route, RER B. The Panel notes that this is only partially consistent with information from other stakeholders, as discussed more fully above. According to CDSF, this decision was not communicated to other stakeholders including itself, although, again, this is disputed by others. CDSF note that the strike action taking place on RER B had been discussed at the planning meetings and it had been jointly agreed that RER B would be able to run almost normally (80% capacity), and therefore the strike action would not cause undue problems. CDSF state that this ‘unilateral’ decision had caused a substantial displacement of arriving supporters, and if CDSF had known, it would have raised “a big alarm signal”²¹². The Panel has not been able to fully resolve the dispute as to who knew what about the displacement of supporters, however, the comments of CDSF underline the imperative for joint working and communications, because this was such an obvious issue which could have been resolved quite easily by proper routing from RER D to the stadium.

209 — Meeting with Consortium Stade de France - Appendix, V.4 (p. 1674)

210 — Consortium Stade de France Position Statement - Appendix, IV.12 (p. 199)

211 — Meeting with Consortium Stade de France - Appendix, V.4 (p. 1675-1676)

212 — Meeting with Consortium Stade de France - Appendix, V.4 (p. 1676)

6.3.5. CSDF also noted that it had been unaware that the Préfecture de Police had overruled a FFF plan to route supporters arriving via RER D to ASP4 rather than ASP3, and had removed signage to that effect. This was yet another stark example of the failure of interoperability. The rationale for the signage plan was that ASP4 was a much more accessible entry point given the width of the Avenue du Stade de France, as compared with the alternative ASP3 which had a restricted capacity. CSDF noted that they were unsurprised that they had not been notified, stating that France is a hierarchical country, however, if it had known, it would have been of such concern that CSDF would have raised it with stakeholders. CSDF noted that routes to the stadium was an issue not taken seriously enough, given the difficult environment, and it would have welcomed involvement in such decisions²¹³.

6.3.6. CSDF asserted that the outer perimeter is usually only a counter-terrorism check and the addition of ticket checks at the ASPs was a recent addition which should have been trialled at smaller events. CSDF had not been asked for its view or approval, and described the addition of ticket checks at the outer security check perimeter as “the main change” from the usual access arrangements²¹⁴. At ASP3 the space was tight, it was not optimal to have two different checks, and there was no escape lane for rejected persons²¹⁵.

6.3.7. Although the CSDF was not responsible for security and safety or access arrangements at UCLF22, its retained fire safety responsibilities meant that it was involved in planning meetings, and its representatives were able to observe and take part in arrangements. The Panel notes that it is reasonable to contract arrangements for events to organisers, however, those responsible for safety and security at the stadium had local knowledge, and ‘muscle memory’ of problems unique to the stadium and its environs, which others may not have. For that reason, the Panel takes the view that the Stade de France should be more fully involved in planning for major events at the stadium, irrespective of whether the actual operation of the plans is contracted out. The above examples of a displacement of customers from RER B to RER D, the routing problem, and the shortcomings of ASP3 arrangements, illustrate the point.

6.3.8. In its written response CSDF also referred to the presence of “30,000 people on site without valid tickets” as a contributory factor to the problems, a figure obtained from estimates provided by the transport networks, SNCF and

213 — Meeting with Consortium Stade de France - Appendix, V.4 (p. 1676-1677)

214 — Consortium Stade de France Position Statement - Appendix, IV.12 (p. 202)

215 — Meeting with Consortium Stade de France - Appendix, V.4 (p. 1677)

RATP. The combination of too many people near to the stadium, and the diversion of supporters to RER D was too much for the outer perimeter checks at ASP3, whereas the much larger access at ASP4 was left underutilised. Furthermore, the double checks at the ASPs – for tickets and security – slowed the flowrate and was not usual practice, and in turn the mix of paper and digital tickets would have had a further deleterious effect on flow²¹⁶. As considered elsewhere, the Panel has found no evidence to support the assertion of 30,000 ticketless supporters being in the vicinity of the stadium, but it is clearly correct that ASP3 was overwhelmed, whilst ASP4 was underused, and the other criticisms put forward by CSDF are well made.

6.3.9. So far as ticketing was concerned, CSDF own the hardware – scanners at the turnstiles and the connected IT - and it was compatible with the UEFA blockchain software. The same had worked at a recent Ed Sheeran concert. CSDF was aware of a problem which occurred due to a 4G outage and there were some compatibility issues but otherwise it thought the IT did work on MD. CSDF were however surprised that UEFA had allowed for a mixed system of digital and paper tickets²¹⁷.

6.3.10. A week after the events of the final, the CSDF CCTV system auto deleted the footage from all 260 of its cameras for 28th May 2022. No official authority or other stakeholder had requested that the material be retained, and a judicial order would have been required to retain it for longer than 30 days. CSDF conceded that it was a mistake not to have retained the footage and that in the aftermath of a future incident it would not allow it to be deleted, accepting that the footage would have been useful to investigations and potentially to the CSDF itself²¹⁸.

6.3.11. In view of the Panel’s conclusions on the overall model of the organisation of UCLF22, it is clear that greater involvement of the CSDF may well have made a significant difference to what occurred. The framework described by CSDF places responsibility for safety and security on FFF and the Préfecture de Police, save with respect to fire and capacity which is a requirement placed on the owner or operator by French law. The underlying reason for the retention of those responsibilities must be the fact that the owner or operator of a venue has familiarity which an event organiser does not, irrespective of their general experience or expertise. In the Panel’s view, the same should pertain to access and mobility issues within the last kilometre.

216 — Consortium Stade de France Position Statement - Appendix, IV.12 (p. 201)

217 — Meeting with Consortium Stade de France - Appendix, V.4 (p. 1677-1679)

218 — Meeting with Consortium Stade de France - Appendix, V.4 (p. 1681)

6.3.12. Elsewhere, we criticise the lack of a venue risk assessment. We criticise the lack of an operational plan, and we criticise the lack of interoperability. As hosts, the CSDF should not only have been involved in discharging their fire safety and capacity obligations, but they should have been involved in a joined-up multi-agency effort to ensure public security and safety and to maximise the positive experience of those using their facility.

6.4. Fédération Française de Football (FFF)

6.4.1. The Panel interviewed the Director of International Institutional Relations and International Competitions of the Fédération Française de Football (FFF), the Head of National Teams and International Competition Department, and the Head of Security. The Panel also received a substantial written response to its request for a Position Statement, together with supporting documents. The Panel is grateful for the assistance provided.

6.4.2. FFF is a member federation of UEFA and as such it will naturally play a leading role in organising UEFA events in France. The relationship regarding UCLF22 has been characterised as UEFA ‘event owner’ and FFF ‘event organiser’.

6.4.3. The extent to which FFF was involved in the decision to switch the 2022 final to Paris at three months’ notice is not clear, however FFF welcomed the decision “with pride and enthusiasm”²¹⁹. In interview, FFF recognised that shortening the preparation period from the usual eighteen months to three months created inevitable problems and was “definitely... not enough”²²⁰.

6.4.4. FFF describe its responsibilities as providing private security guards (stewards), facilitating mobility (supporter travel to and within the stadium), volunteers, and relations with the host cities and government. UEFA was responsible for the sporting event, TV and marketing, dressing the stadium, budgets and ticketing (although FFF was formally their agent for legal and tax purposes)²²¹. FFF told the Panel that it liaised with UEFA’s Safety and Security Unit and with the Events team during the planning phase and on match day²²².

6.4.5. FFF deployed 1,680 stewards for security duties. 258 were allocated to

219 — FFF Position Statement – Appendix, IV.11 (p. 180)

220 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1553)

221 — FFF Position Statement – Appendix, IV.11 (p. 180)

222 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1596-1598)

12 pre-screening points – referred to as ‘Additional Security Perimeters’ – and 212 were allocated to 18 access gates which consisted of 6 to 9 turnstiles, equipped with QR code readers (sometimes referred to as scanners). According to CSDF, there were 141 functioning turnstiles available on MD (although as we discuss elsewhere, some were closed from time to time)²²³.

6.4.6. The stewarding was contracted through 12 different companies, 6 or 7 of which worked regularly at the SDF. The effect of the pandemic had caused problems with recruitment, and it was necessary to involve companies with less familiarity with the stadium. FFF told the panel that only 53% of the stewards had completed the relevant e-learning package. The Panel has received evidence of a lack of professionalism and inappropriate conduct by some stewards, and was concerned at the number of companies involved and the apparent training deficits. However, FFF indicated that all stewards were in fact fully trained and were required to carry accreditation. The e-learning was an extra requirement and was most relevant to awareness of the stadium and event²²⁴. Whereas it is impossible for the Panel to confirm that stewards were all accredited and trained, the extent of failure to enforce the e-learning is of concern, as is the proliferation of different companies. The Panel concludes that the training deficits and lack of familiarity with the venue may have been a contributory factor on the day, however, the evidence on this matter is inconclusive.

6.4.7. The evidence indicates that there were problems at many of the ASPs, including ASPs dedicated for UEFA’s Commercial Partners, and that their design was not fit for purpose. For the purposes of this report, the focus is on ASP3 and 4, to which Liverpool supporters arriving on RER D and B were respectively directed. The ASPs had a dual purpose: security checks involving the opening of coats and bags (known as “Vigipirate”), and ticket checks. According to FFF, the ticket checks had been requested by UEFA, and were an addition to the normal arrangements which were only a security check. The ticket checks were complicated by the fact that UEFA had sold both paper and digital tickets. Therefore, the ticket checks involved both the use chemical pen and digital activation, depending upon the type of ticket²²⁵.

6.4.8. FFF asserted that double security and ticket checks had been undertaken during Euro 2016, although the Panel has not seen evidence of this, and this would appear to be at odds with the CSDF evidence. FFF could not recall whether it had

223 — Meeting with Consortium Stade de France - Appendix, V.4 (p. 1677)

224 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1604-1609, redacted by FFF)

225 — FFF Position Statement – Appendix, IV.11 (p. 181)

undertaken throughput calculations, but asserted that it had designed the ASPs based on estimated arrival figures provided by UEFA (although this seems unlikely given that estimated figures were included on some of the earliest documents that the Panel has seen). At ASP3, FFF had supplied the number of available channels and UEFA had calculated the flow rate²²⁶. As the Panel has noted, both the planned arrival figures at ASP3 and the UEFA flowrate calculations were entirely wrong.

6.4.9. From the evidence of an external UEFA Security Officer, and images taken by him on the day, it can be seen from these that there were 6 lanes at ASP3, divided by metal barriers. FFF have asserted that this allowed for 10 channels or lines of supporters. The Security Officer commented that ASP3 was located on a fairly narrow ramp about 10m wide, and in his opinion there was room for a maximum of about 7 channels if ignoring the need for a return or escape channel for rejected persons²²⁷. The only throughput calculation the Panel has seen for ASP3 was provided by the UEFA S&S Unit and was based upon the assumption there would be 15 channels at ASP3²²⁸.

6.4.10. The Panel notes the evidence from the Consortium Stade de France concerning double checks at the ASPs being largely untested, and the conclusions of the Senate investigation that double checks were a part of the problem because they slowed throughput rates²²⁹. FFF has also noted in its written evidence and interviews that the checks were “too long and tedious for the security guards”²³⁰. In agreeing with all those observations, the Panel notes that it is axiomatic that the closest of attention should be paid to throughput rates at any access point. Without such calculations, it cannot be known what volume of arriving supporters can safely be directed through that entrance.

6.4.11. On the evidence, it appears that FFF took little or no account of throughput rates at ASP3, and such calculations as were done by the UEFA S&S Unit used several channels that was more than double that which is said by their own Security Officer to have been physically possible. Moreover, the flowrates appear to have taken no account of the fact that there were both security and ticket screening checks in proximity or that two different types of ticket check were required.

226 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1568-1570)

227 — Meeting with UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1486-1494)

228 — Meeting with UEFA - Safety & Security Team – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1376-1384)

229 — Consortium Stade de France Position Statement - Appendix, IV.12 (p. 201); Meeting with Consortium Stade de France - Appendix, V.4 (p. 1677); [L'Essentiel sur les incidents survenus au Stade de France le 28 mai 2022: Finale de la Ligue des Champions au Stade de France : un Fiasco Inévitable](#), French Senate - English translation at Appendix, VI.18 (p. 2823, 2826)

230 — FFF Position Statement – Appendix, IV.11 (p. 188); Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1627)

6.4.12. FFF has identified three key factors regarding the number of persons trying to access through ASP3. Firstly, that supporters travelling from the fan zone in central Paris were diverted from the main route on RER B to RER D, without notice to FFF or other stakeholders, and against their own guidance. Secondly, the fact that repeated requests from FFF to divert supporters arriving at RER D to the main access on Avenue du Stade de France, through ASP4, were rejected by the Préfecture de Police and signage to that effect was removed. Thirdly, the number of supporters arriving there without valid tickets, and anti-social behaviour by locals²³¹.

6.4.13. According to FFF, the usual number of supporters arriving at the Stade de France for major events via RER D is between 10-15,000, whilst 30,000 arrive via RER B. On 28th May, FFF assert that 36,000 arrived via RER D and only 6,000 via RER B. The Panel has considered the actual figures in Chapter 7; however, it is undoubtedly the case that a major diversion of supporters took place on the day.

6.4.14. According to FFF, the planning meetings fully considered the fact that a strike notice had been issued with regard to RER B, but stakeholders had agreed that the disruption would only reduce capacity by around 20%, and therefore no alteration to the usual transport planning was necessary since 80% capacity is considered an acceptable level of service on RER B.

6.4.15. UEFA and FFF gave public guidance on this basis, through the UEFA App. However, according to FFF, on the afternoon of Match Day, the transport network, RATP, unilaterally decided to direct Liverpool supporters to RER D, in particular at Châtelet-Les Halles station which is on route from fan zone to the SDF. This was even though FFF had paid the transport networks to provide additional stewards and leaflets to give directions to supporters in accordance with the normal plan.

6.4.16. FFF referred to the late change by the network as “crazy” and without explanation, and they did not learn about it until 19:00²³². Compounding that problem, FFF allege that the police contradicted the UEFA/FFF mobility plan and handed out 10,000 flyers at Châtelet and Nation stations to that effect²³³. The Panel has noted elsewhere that the transport networks dispute there was a change of plan or that their intentions were not communicated. Furthermore, the Panel had understood from other evidence that FFF knew about and objected in advance to the police flyers, because they indicated that LFC supporters could travel via

231 — FFF Position Statement – Appendix, IV.11 (p. 185-187)

232 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p.1582-1584, 1627-1628)

233 — FFF Position Statement – Appendix, IV.11 (p. 187)

Line 13, when that route had been earmarked for RMCF supporters, in particular because the station was at the north of the stadium²³⁴. This would indicate a security concern rather than safe routing.

6.4.17. In the days prior to match day, the Préfecture de Police had rejected repeated requests from FFF to divert supporters arriving from RER D toward the main route to the stadium via Avenue du Stade de France and ASP4, where there was a wide concourse and plenty of room, compared to the narrow entry point at ASP3. This had apparently been the arrangement at the French Cup Final²³⁵. Once the serious problems arose at ASP3, the Director of Int. Competitions, positioned in the stadium control room, asked the police commander in the adjoining police control room to revert to the FFF/UEFA plan which had been rejected by the Préfecture de Police days before, to direct arriving supporters away from ASP3 to relieve the pressure. It took almost half an hour to action that request, an unacceptable delay which probably meant that ASP3 was rendered unrecoverable except for a short period²³⁶.

6.4.18. Whatever the actual figures, and whatever the true picture of prior knowledge, the Panel has concluded that it is beyond doubt that the decisions to divert a substantial percentage of the arriving Liverpool supporters onto RER D, without managing the routes to the stadium, meant that the restricted outer perimeter entrance at ASP3 would be overwhelmed, as it was in fact.

6.4.19. The Panel recognises that the transport networks had a role to play, and were involved in planning meetings, but fundamentally, the three key stakeholders who should have ensured that the travel to the stadium, last kilometre mobility, and access were safe, were FFF, the Préfecture de Police, and UEFA. Failures in communication and joint working were down to them.

6.4.20. The Panel has dealt with the evidence relating to ticketless supporters and locals in Chapter 7, but as noted, the transfer of supporters onto RER D and the failure to regulate the flow to ASP3 led to the inevitable breakdown of ASP3 irrespective of whether supporters without valid tickets, or opportunistic locals compounded the problems.

234 — Préfecture de Police Tweet: "[@LFC fans, you got a ticket? Go to the @StadeFrance. You don't have one? A fan zone welcomes you. Cours de Vincennes!](#)" (27 May 2022)

235 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1575-1577)

236 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1645-1647)

6.4.21. FFF acknowledged that the MD-2 security briefing included the legend: “expect to see lots of fake paper tickets/screenshots”, and that information from Merseyside police had informed them that at least 50,000 Liverpool supporters would be travelling to Paris²³⁷. Whatever the evidence regarding numbers of supporters without valid tickets, this was a factor actually foreseen.

6.4.22. FFF acknowledged that difficulties from locals were obviously apparent from around 13:00 on MD. By 18:45 there was serious disorder involving locals. Both CSDF and FFF have suggested that the scenes of disorder caused by locals on the day were unprecedented. However, no effective action appears to have been taken to address the problems which were apparent at least 4 hours before the stadium opened, and 7 hours before kick-off. The Panel has addressed the failure of the Prefecture to deal with disorder below.

6.4.23. In addition to asserting that supporters without valid tickets were a major part of the problem, the Director of Int. Competitions maintained in interview that late arrivals compounded the situation. Unhesitatingly, the Panel rejects the suggestion that late attendance by supporters contributed to the problems on the night, given that serious congestion problems had arisen at ASP3 by 18:30 at the latest: two and a half hours prior to kick-off.

6.4.24. In terms of learning points, FFF identifies real-time collaboration with the transport networks concerning the flow of supporters as a key issue. The Panel agrees, and understands that measures have already been taken to address this issue. However, the transport networks had a representative in the stadium control room, alongside FFF, UEFA, and adjoining the police control room. Irrespective of the dispute between stakeholders as to what was and wasn’t shared between them in the days prior to MD, it is both surprising and disappointing that the diversion of such a substantial number of supporters went unspoken on the day.

6.4.25. Similarly, FFF expressed frustration at the refusal of the Préfecture de Police to adopt its proposal for the appropriate routing of arriving supporters. In interview, the Director of Int. Competitions of FFF, indicated that he recruited the CSDF to support the concerns, and regretted that he had not taken the issue up with President Macron’s office²³⁸. FFF also noted that it had not spoken with the Préfecture de Police regarding the policing operational plan, and they never received one²³⁹.

237 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1630, 1636)

238 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1593-1594, 1608, both redacted by FFF)

239 — Meeting with FFF – Appendix, V.3 (p. 1599)

6.4.26. The Panel notes the fact that as the host federation, FFF had a key role to play in organising the event and in particular operational aspects of security and safety. The issues with the transport networks and Préfecture involved serious communication and interoperability failures. Those failures should not have arisen. Where they were known, FFF should have escalated them.

6.4.27. As the Panel has already commented, the relationship between FFF and UEFA was less than clear. As event owner, UEFA coordinated the project through UEFA Events SA. On the UEFA model, and on FFF's own analysis, responsibility and liability for private safety and security was delegated to FFF, and public safety and security remained the responsibility of the police²⁴⁰. The position should not have been viewed as binary, UEFA should not have washed its hands of those matters, it should have utilised its specialist S&S Unit with annual experience, and it should have played a central role in ensuring arrangements were appropriate, and ensuring effective joint working and communication between stakeholders. Where it identified shortcomings, it was in a powerful position to escalate and troubleshoot. It did not do so.

6.5. French State and Préfecture de Police

6.5.1. The Panel has taken account of the report of Mr Michel Cadot, the Inter-Ministerial Delegate for Major Sports Events (DIGES), dated 10th June 2022, and the report of the French Senate, dated 13th July 2022, dealing with the events of 28th May 2022. The Panel has also been assisted by a written response and an interview with Mr Cadot who was assisted by members of his staff and an advisor from the Ministry of Sports and of Olympic and Paralympic Games, and with David Clavière, Chief of Staff, Jérôme Foucaud, Head of DOPC, and Alexis Marsan, Commissaire, of the Préfecture de Police de Paris. Mr Cadot is also the Interdepartmental Delegate for the Olympic and Paralympic Games (DIJOP) and he is under the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister and the Minister of Sports and of Olympic and Paralympic Games.

6.5.2. The DIGES

6.5.2.1. The position of DIGES was established by Article 2 of Decree no 2008-1142 of 6th November 2008 (as subsequently amended). The DIGES role is defined as follows: "While respecting the powers of the prefects, the interministerial

²⁴⁰ — UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p. 24, 27, 35-36)

delegate for major sports events leads and coordinates the activities of the State administrations and national public institutions involved in hosting and organising major international sports events on French territory.”

6.5.2.2. The role involves coordinating the State’s responsibilities with the organisers of major sporting events and related local authorities, takes part in public information, and advises the government.

6.5.2.3. With respect to the UCLF22, the DIGES took an active role in organising multi-agency planning meetings, although he had no decision-making powers²⁴¹. The DIGES office is small, consisting of seven or eight people. Its role is to facilitate relationships as was the case with persuading local authorities to establish fan zones on MD, and in facilitating extra transport arrangements, in particular rail and airport management. Part of the role is to “seek a possible arbitration” at a governmental level where there is no agreement on an issue between stakeholders²⁴². The DIGES clarified that recommendation 1 of his report seeks the institutionalisation of the oversight of certain major sporting events where special vigilance is required, and which is beyond the resources of the DIGES. Mr Cadot commented that had this arrangement been in place for UCLF22, it may have highlighted that the presence of a large number of supporters without tickets did not equate to a risk of hooliganism²⁴³.

6.5.2.4. The DIGES has confirmed that the Ministry of Interior, through its National Division for Combating Hooliganism (DNLH), had information that between 50-70,000 LFC supporters without tickets would travel to Paris for the final, but that both UEFA and DNLH confirmed that there were no causes for concern regarding LFC supporters and the phenomenon of large numbers of supporters travelling without tickets was not unusual. The fact that there would be so many supporters present, meant that arrangements were put in place for a fan zone at the Cours de Vincennes²⁴⁴.

6.5.2.5. The DIGES has clarified the statistics included in his report for supporters travelling to the Stade de France. The figures were supplied by the transport networks and were estimated based upon the number and capacity of trains running during the relevant times. The DIGES used figures provided by FFF for

241 — DIGES Position Statement - Appendix, IV.8 (p. 151, 158)

242 — Meeting with French Authorities - Appendix, V.2 (p. 1518)

243 — Meeting with French Authorities - Appendix, V.2 (p. 1518)

244 — DIGES Position Statement - Appendix, IV.8 (p. 151, 158-159)

those arriving by coaches, and figures provided by the Préfecture de Police for taxis and private drivers.

6.5.2.6. The DIGES has informed the Panel that the information in his report concerning fake tickets was provided by FFF. He has not provided any basis for the assertion that the number of fake tickets was ten times higher than usually encountered, or the assertion that there was intelligence relating to 50,000 forged tickets. It appears that the latter related to the information available concerning supporters without tickets, rather than counterfeits²⁴⁵.

6.5.2.7. The DIGES has stated that he was not involved in planning meetings which discussed the diversion of supporters from RER B to D, however he has commented that the Préfecture de Police and transport networks were involved in meetings to consider the effects of the notified strike on RER B, and FFF were invited to some of those meetings. The DIGES has further commented that the removal of signage arranged by FFF, directing supporters arriving via RER D to the main avenue connecting RER B to the stadium was an error by the Préfecture, and there should have been a redirection of supporters to the RER B route²⁴⁶.

6.5.2.8. The DIGES report noted that the Préfecture de Police had adopted a security rather than engagement approach to policing at the UCLF22, because of the Hillsborough disaster in 1989. The DIGES has clarified to the Panel that reference to Hillsborough was made by the Préfecture de Police in a note to the Ministry of the Interior but not during the planning meetings. It is said that this was relevant to a historical perspective of the management of the flow of supporters and the possibility of supporters without tickets forcing gates at the Stade de France²⁴⁷. The Panel is at a loss to understand how a mass fatality event more than 33 years previously, which involved no contributory behaviour by supporters, could have provided any relevant “historical perspective”.

6.5.2.9. The Panel does understand how such a remarkable error by the Préfecture de Police led to an inappropriate policing operation on MD. That error should have been identified by the DIGES and other stakeholders, including UEFA and FFF, during the planning stage, and addressed. As the Panel has noted, France is a signatory to the Saint-Denis Convention, and its primary approach to policing should have been engagement. If the planning stages had involved

245 — DIGES Position Statement - Appendix, IV.8 (p. 152-153, 158-161)

246 — DIGES Position Statement - Appendix, IV.8 (p. 154, 160-162); Meeting with French Authorities - Appendix, V.2 (p. 1518)

247 — DIGES Position Statement - Appendix, IV.8 (p. 156, 164)

proper cooperation between the key stakeholders, the policing model would have been obvious at a stage where it could have been questioned, with escalation to Ministers and the President's office as appropriate.

6.5.2.10. The DIGES has confirmed that like the Senate, he has had no access to footage of the events other than from the media and open-source material²⁴⁸. The Panel recognises the need for strict data protection and privacy laws, however, there must be a balance with public safety and security. The ability to identify systemic failures and make changes for the future, which may save lives, is dependent on the extent to which inquiries and reviews are able to analyse what actually happened. In many circumstances, CCTV footage is crucial to that endeavour. It is for the government to determine the legal framework in France, but it is clear to us that the ability of the Senate, the DIGES and this Panel to determine what changes need to be made for the future has been hampered by the absence of available footage.

6.5.2.11. The Panel notes that the DIGES was asked to report on the events of 28th May 2022 very soon afterwards. Mr Cadot told us he did not ask for the Stade de France footage because he has no investigative powers²⁴⁹. The Panel is disappointed in this answer. Had the DIGES or the Préfecture de Police (or indeed FFF or UEFA) asked the Stade de France to retain the footage, it would not have been deleted, as the CSDF were permitted to keep it for 30 days without any judicial order. With respect to the street CCTV which would inform the Review as to what happened on the route between RER D and the stadium, and in particular what occurred at the approach to ASP3, the Préfecture informed the Panel that this has been retained and provided to the courts. Requests by the Panel to the Public Prosecutors for Bobigny and Paris, for sight of this footage, have not elicited an answer.

6.5.2.12. Mr Cadot confirmed to the Panel that there had been significant congestion problems at the underpass to the N1 which he described as being "quite narrow", on the day of the French Cup Final on 21st May 2016. This had led to a review of the access plan for the Stade de France in advance of the Euro 2016 matches played there²⁵⁰. The Panel notes that this same underpass was part of the route between RER D and ASP3 to which supporters were directed on 28th May. Had there been a proper venue risk assessment the previous problems would have been highlighted: this did not happen.

248 — DIGES Position Statement - Appendix, IV.8 (p. 155-156, 162-164)

249 — Meeting with French Authorities - Appendix, V.2 (p. 1518)

250 — Meeting with French Authorities - Appendix, V.2 (p. 1518); Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p. 128)

6.5.2.13. In his report, Mr Cadot criticised the arrangements at ASP3, in particular because of the double checks – security and tickets – and the two types of ticketing involved, which would slow the throughput flow. He also questioned the legal basis for including ticket checks at these points²⁵¹.

6.5.2.14. In conclusion to the Panel, Mr Cadot referred to the “brief time frame” in which preparations had to be made, and he expressed the view that 30,000 supporters who should have stayed at the fan zone created a bottleneck²⁵². Despite Mr Cadot’s willingness to accept that mistakes had been made, the Panel is concerned that there remains a misconception about what actually happened and a complacency regarding what needs to change. This is particularly acute given the proximity of the Rugby World Cup and Olympic and Paralympic Games and the importance of the Stade de France to both events.

6.5.2.15. The Panel notes the five recommendations made by Mr Cadot in his report²⁵³. These include the need for institutionalisation of national governance for major sporting events, optimising access flows to stadiums, promoting interoperability, requiring digital ticketing, and for a new Stade de France traffic plan. The Panel respectfully agrees with each recommendation; however, it notes from the evidence that interoperability problems are deeply rooted, and have recurred across the years. The Panel has already noted, the similarity between some of the recommendations made by the DIGES and those made following the 2015 inspection visit by the CoE delegation, which were not acted upon. Given the forthcoming major events, the implementation of measures to adopt those recommendations will require swift and robust management at the highest levels.

6.5.3. The Préfecture

6.5.3.1. Mr Clavière, for the Préfecture de Police, explained that the Préfet de Police was located at the police control room at police Headquarters in Paris, and he had delegated command for the MD operation to Alexis Marsan who was located at the police control room in the stadium²⁵⁴.

251 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p. 128-129)

252 — Meeting with French Authorities - Appendix, V.2 (p. 1518)

253 — Report on the organisation of the UEFA Champions League Final on Saturday 28 May 2022 at the Stade de France and on strengthening the management of major sporting events (10 June 2022), DIGES – Appendix, IV.7 (p. 135-136)

254 — Meeting with French Authorities - Appendix, V.2 (p. 1518)

6.5.3.2. Mr Clavière explained that the dispute with FFF over signage arose before there was any question of a strike on the transport network, and he maintained that the purpose of the signs was to do with FFF wanting to avoid the flow of supporters interfering with the access of FFF VIP buses rather than any crowd volume issue. The Préfecture de Police had removed the signage for “simplicity”, and to avoid overcrowding on the route between RER B and ASP4²⁵⁵. Mr Clavière also told the Panel that he personally had met with RATP and SNCF on MD-1, to discuss the strike on RER B. He had been told that RER B would be running at two-thirds capacity on MD, and that: “it was not the police headquarters that decided to transfer passengers from the RER B to the RER D”. He continued that it was the decision of SNCF to transfer passengers from RER B to D and they had not informed the police²⁵⁶.

6.5.3.3. Mr Clavière indicated that with a normal volume of supporters arriving via RER D there was no problem of access to the stadium. The problem was the increase through RER D and the “widespread ticket fraud, made possible by paper tickets”. He continued that the Préfet de Police had taken action to avoid a tragedy: namely the abandonment of ASP3 and the withdrawal of police officers inside the stadium to prevent the stadium being “invaded”. He did not think that police officers diverting supporters on the route between RER D and the stadium would have made a difference, because the real problem was not the flow but the presence of those without tickets. Mr Clavière concurred with the evidence of others that there had been no crisis meetings at the control room, but the police had liaised with the organisers.

6.5.3.4. Mr Clavière told the Panel that the perceived threat of a stadium invasion came from English supporters and that is why the police used pepper spray from aerosols. The problem from locals came later and he estimated there were about 300-400 of them, robbing and mugging supporters who were trying to get in. The police had therefore used tear gas to push them back. The Panel notes that this is an underestimation of the numbers of locals involved and contradictory to other evidence: from FFF as to much larger numbers of locals from early afternoon causing difficulties, reports of fighting on the L’Ecluse footbridge north of the stadium, and footage widely available on open source which shows far greater numbers. Mr Clavière denied that the perceived threat of hooliganism guided the policing plan. Mr Clavière indicated that there were about 44,000 Liverpool

255 — Groupe de travail «mobilités» finale de la ligue des champions du lundi 23 mai 2022 (23 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.11

256 — Meeting with French Authorities - Appendix, V.2 (p. 1518)

supporters at the fan zone, 20,000 in the stadium and an unknown number, perhaps 30-40,000 supporters and local youths, in the vicinity of the stadium, but outside the police system²⁵⁷.

6.5.3.5. An inspection visit to France by the Council of Europe Consultative Team of the Standing Committee on Spectator Violence in 2015, highlighted the fact that attacks on football supporters by groups of locals was a general problem for France. The extent of this phenomenon on MD may have been unprecedented, but it was not unforeseeable and there should have been contingency plans in place. The Panel finds it remarkable that the Préfecture de Police did not take effective action at an early stage before supporters arrived, and re-deploy some of the considerable resources at its disposal to deal with ongoing problems should they recur, as they did later in the day. Eye-witness evidence from multiple supporters (including the Metropolitan Mayor of Liverpool) and UEFA's external Security Officer, responsible for the south side of the stadium, graphically shows how there was little or no effort to prevent street robberies, assaults and pickpocketing before and after the match.

6.5.3.6. The Panel has analysed the numbers of supporters and others in the vicinity of the stadium in Chapter 7, and has rejected the assertions of Mr Clavière which have been made without proper evidential basis.

6.6. Summary of issues between key stakeholders: a lack of insight into what went wrong, a willingness to blame others without proper evidence, and wholesale interoperability failures

6.6.1. The Panel is grateful to the French authorities for their written and interview evidence. However, the Panel is left with a sense of real concern at the lack of insight into what occurred on 28th May and the failure to recognise the role of the authorities. The Panel is also troubled by a number of stark differences as to the facts of what happened, and a general default position of blaming the Liverpool supporters, without any proper evidential basis.

6.6.2. The role of the DIGES should have helped ensure interoperability between the authorities and the organisers. Undoubtedly the DIGES played a positive role with respect to the fan zones and some other arrangements. However, the evidence clearly shows an unwillingness by the Préfecture de Police to work

²⁵⁷ — Meeting with French Authorities - Appendix, V.2 (p. 1518)

collaboratively with other stakeholders, and a general failure of communication and joint working.

6.6.3. The Panel has concluded that the problems on 28th May were a result of a far larger number of supporters than expected arriving at the stadium via RER D, a failure to direct them appropriately to ASPs which would not lead to them being overwhelmed, and hopelessly designed access arrangements, in particular at ASP3. These issues were then compounded by an absence of contingency plans, a failure to deal with the problem of local youths, and a failure to maintain a reasonable throughput at turnstiles.

6.6.4. With respect to the first issue - the larger than expected arrivals via RER D - this was not only foreseeable, it was also planned. All relevant stakeholders agree that there were discussions concerning the likely effect of the strike on RER B, and that there was general agreement that the effect would be marginal. However, it is clear from minutes of planning meetings that a transfer of a significant volume of supporters onto RER D was contemplated, a point ignored by UEFA and FFF. UEFA and FFF say there was a unilateral decision by the Préfecture de Police to divert the passengers, the decision was not communicated to them, and that police officers countermanded their customer services officers positioned at stations in central Paris. Mr Clavière flatly denies this. FFF, UEFA and CSDF also say the transport networks followed a different plan to divert supporters onto RER D but did not communicate to other stakeholders, despite the existence of a press release issued on 26th May. The transport networks accept that they did shift volumes but did not seek to prevent supporters travelling on either RER B or D, a position supported by evidence of increased trains running on both lines.

6.6.5. The transport networks were best placed to determine optimal flows of supporters to the stadium vicinity, and there was no overcrowding or significant incident during the movement of supporters to the RER B and D stations. The failure was the lack of communication of a vital fact: the route by which large numbers of supporters were approaching the stadium on match day. The stakeholders cannot agree who took what decisions or had the relevant knowledge in this respect, blaming each other. Whoever is correct, the Panel concludes that this is a clear example of a failure of joint working.

6.6.6. The arrival of a disproportionate number of supporters via RER D, expected or not, should have been obvious to the police and the stewarding operation for the last kilometre. From the evidence it appears that the Préfecture de Police and

FFF had officers and volunteers positioned on the route from RER D, but neither were monitoring the flow volumes. If they had done so, it would have been relatively straightforward to deploy officers to the area and divert supporters toward the greater access at ASP4. No attempt to do so was undertaken until far too late.

6.6.7. FFF had a plan to signpost a proportion of supporters arriving at RER D toward ASP4, but this was countermanded by the Préfecture de Police several days prior to the MD. The Préfecture de Police still defends this decision on the basis that FFF had wanted the signage to prevent arriving supporters impeding the travel of VIP buses, and they removed the signs for “simplicity”. UEFA and FFF should have escalated this issue as it posed the risk which in fact materialised: too many supporters going toward the bottleneck at ASP3. They failed to do so. The Panel is concerned that the Préfecture de Police continues to defend this decision now, on the basis of FFF’s supposed motive. Given the historical issues with access to the stadium from this approach, the Préfecture de Police should have been alive to the problems which in fact arose.

6.6.8. The dispute over the routing of supporters between RER D and ASP3 is clear evidence of a failure of joint working between the Préfecture de Police and other stakeholders.

6.6.9. The design of the ASPs, and in particular ASP3, was plainly defective. According to UEFA, this was the responsibility of FFF. FFF have indicated that it based its design on expected arrival patterns and throughput flow rates provided by UEFA. UEFA has criticised the placing of police vans in front of ASP3 exacerbating the congestion problem. FFF has criticised the police for failing to have a line of officers in front of ASP3, and for the extent of the police checks being too long and “tedious”. CSDF say that ASPs normally only had security checks and the addition of ticket checks would have an effect on throughput. They noted the lack of an escape lane at ASP3 and expressed surprise at the use of both paper and digital ticketing which should also have been taken into account. The DIGES concurs with these opinions. UEFA’s external security officer, commissioned to observe MD access arrangements at the Liverpool end, told us the arrangements were “not fit for purpose”. The police were responsible for public safety generally, FFF were responsible for access arrangements. UEFA plainly paid some attention to the ASPs with their (defective) throughput calculations. It is difficult to imagine a more obvious or potentially disastrous failure of joint working than the design of ASP3.

6.6.10. Undeterred by these obvious facts, Mr Clavière lauded the decision to abandon ASP3 and for police resources to retreat into the stadium to prevent incursions. The Préfecture de Police has not accepted its role in failing to prevent the congestion at ASP3 or its failed design. The Préfecture de Police has not conceded that it failed to protect supporters from street crime, failed to prevent local youths challenging access points or climbing fences into the stadium, and it has not resiled from its use of tear gas or pepper spray.

6.6.11. UEFA and FFF have each told the Panel that they received no policing plan or summary for the UCLF22, and UEFA has indicated that it did not have access to the police at an operational level. From the evidence, and according to the DIGES, it is clear that the police deployed with an orientation to dealing with hooliganism - resulting from a wholly inappropriate and erroneous reference to the Hillsborough disaster. If there had been any real relationship between stakeholders, this inappropriate policing model should have been understood during the planning phase and challenged.

6.6.12. The Panel concludes that despite multiple planning meetings, there was an illusion of interoperability, and the reality was a substantial absence of joint working between stakeholders, underpinned by key failures of UEFA to oversee the safety and security aspects of the overall project, and identify and escalate the obvious interoperability failures. Subsequently, key stakeholders have put institutional defensiveness and protection of reputation above candour and a willingness to learn lessons. There has been a carousel of blame, whereby each stakeholder has sought to offload accountability to each other, and there has been a casual disregard for the evidence in their attempts ultimately to blame supporters.

7. Evidence relating to themes

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7.1. Late change of venue

7.1.1. No stakeholder has asserted that the late change of venue was responsible for the problems which occurred on 28th May 2022, however, several have referred to the complications which arose as a result of the change of location.

7.1.2. UEFA has explained the changes in the normal organisation of the UCLF brought about by the late move of venue²⁵⁸: “due to the change of venue, the preparatory phase for the 2022 Final had to be accelerated. With a 3-month preparation period, it was clear that typical arrangements for the UEFA Champions League Final would require a much more dynamic approach than usually timed event. Typically, a number of documents would be requested to be produced by the Local Organising Structure (LOS) team in conjunction with local/ national authorities. The main and first document is the Safety and Security Concept integrating private and public security arrangements as described in the staging agreement, followed by the Safety and Security Operational Plan. The completion of these documents is typically done in a period of several months”.

7.1.3. Under normal circumstances the LOS would submit a bid to host the Final, using a template provided by UEFA. Upon being successful, the LOS is required to deliver to UEFA a draft SSNS concept (UEFA acronym for Safety, Security and Service). In consultation with the LOS, UEFA would then assist with transforming the concept into an operational plan. Under UEFA guidance the SSNS concept should be integrated with the medical and mobility concepts to ensure a holistic approach.

7.1.4. These processes are designed to ensure the SSNS concept delivered by the LOS will reflect recognized international best practice, as evidenced in the 2016 Council of Europe Convention on Safety, Security and Service at Football Matches. However, according to UEFA: “[due] to the shortage of time, it was deemed by UEFA that deviating substantially from FFF’s normal security operations of FFF’s matches held at Stade de France would create uncertainty and confusion. It was therefore proposed by FFF and agreed by UEFA that the 2022 UCLF safety and security concept would be based on the French Cup Final security arrangements, for the match (assessed Level 4 risk – highest on the scale) that was to be played

²⁵⁸ — UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p. 26)

at Stade de France on 7th May 2022. These arrangements included the Additional Security Perimeter operations which were implemented successfully at the French Cup Final.”

7.1.5. In the case of the UCLF22, as well as no bidding process, there was no concept, and ultimately no proper plan. The Panel has already analysed the decision to replace these processes for a fixture with an international dimension by adopting the safety and security concept for a domestic Cup Final, and concluded that it was inappropriate and a significant error. If UEFA had operated proper oversight of the arrangements through its S&S Unit, the defects in that approach should have been identified and rectified.

7.1.6. The Panel is not confident that the ASP arrangements for the French Cup Final, whatever these may have been, were as successful as UEFA suggest, in particular because of the stance taken by FFF and UEFA with regard to the route signage from RER D. We are confident that such efforts as there were to observe the working of any ASP arrangements at the French Cup, did not lead to any significant or meaningful changes at ASP3. This is despite the fact that the problems noted at Paragraph 4.4.13 were apparently the reason FFF wanted the signage to route supporters arriving at RER D away from ASP3. As it was, basing the UCLF approach on planning for a match which was not a proper comparator was a shortcut which contributed to the failures we have identified.

7.1.7. The Panel has concluded without hesitation that the late change of venue, and shortened timescale, is not a reasonable excuse for any of the planning or operational problems which arose. The late change of venue should have underlined the requirement for full interoperability and effective communication between stakeholders, and highlighted the need to check and re-check all arrangements were robust and fit for purpose. As the Panel has already asserted: safety and security are binary, they cannot be compromised. A shortened timescale should have been met by greater monitoring and oversight.

7.2. Locals

7.2.1. As already noted, the Stade de France is situated in Saint-Denis, an area with a significant degree of social deprivation, allegations of structural racism, and a high crime rate.

7.2.2. The Panel received evidence from one of the UEFA Security Officers

regarding attacks on supporters arriving or leaving the Stade de France, during a previous international fixture. The 2015 CoE delegation to France, preceding Euro 2016, highlighted significant issues of violence by locals against foreign supporters (in general, not specific to Saint-Denis).

7.2.3. As the Panel has already noted, FFF observed groups of locals who they saw as a problem near to the Stade de France from around 13:00. FFF has told the Panel of various break-ins and other disorder which occurred in the afternoon. There are numerous reports of arriving supporters being attacked and mugged, or pickpocketed, and footage shows large groups of locals involved in conflict with police on the concourse as supporters queued to get in. Similarly, there are many accounts of locals climbing fences or jumping turnstiles to access the stadium, and further accounts of locals attacking supporters as they left the stadium.

7.2.4. It is not for the Panel to comment on the causes of social unrest in the environs of the Stade de France. There is some evidence that the scenes of criminality on 28th May were far worse than had been seen at other events. However, the Panel is clear that conflict between some locals and the police, and criminality against supporters was entirely foreseeable.

7.2.5. The Panel has not been informed of any initiatives taken in advance of the event to relieve community tensions, for example through community leaders, and there is evidence of unhappiness from some local traders with the organisation of the event and the disruption it would cause to their businesses.

7.2.6. The Panel has concluded that plans to police foreseeable criminality against visiting supporters were woefully inadequate. Furthermore, once problems became visible, there was a lack of dynamic risk assessment and redeployment of officers to effectively protect the security of supporters both before and after the match, despite the clear warning signs and incidents much earlier in the day.

7.2.7. The failure to police local criminality significantly exacerbated the access problems at the ASPs and turnstiles. Ultimately, it led to the deployment of tear gas and pepper spray, which was ineffective in dealing with the actual problem, and was used inappropriately against peaceful supporters as various footage shows, and affected a large number of vulnerable supporters, including wheelchair users, the ambulant disabled, children, and senior citizens.

7.2.8. Quite apart from the serious consequences noted above, the Panel observes

that the use of such weaponry, resulting from failed planning and an inappropriate policing model, does great damage to the image of UEFA, France and football. The Panel has therefore concluded that criminality and disorder by some locals contributed to the problems at UCLF22. However, this should not be overstated. The fundamental cause of the problems lay elsewhere, and the disorder should not have been used by any stakeholder to avoid their own accountability.

7.3. Ticketing

7.3.1. The Panel deals with ticketing for UCLF22 as a separate topic for two reasons. Firstly, it has generated considerable controversy, but secondly because we have concluded that decisions on tickets made only a marginal difference to the events of 28th May 2022.

7.3.2. The capacity of the SDF for UCLF22 was 74,234, plus 979 VIPs. The finalist clubs were allocated 19,618 tickets each. LFC received all their allocation as paper tickets, whilst RMCF received 8,504 paper tickets and the rest were digital²⁵⁹.

7.3.3. Paper tickets have been used to regulate access to football matches and many other leisure activities and transport systems for as long as any of us can recall. In recent years, digital tickets carried on mobile phones have begun to replace paper for several reasons. Security is one reason - it is generally thought that digital ticketing is harder to counterfeit than paper tickets - but there are others, including cost and convenience.

7.3.4. It is likely that digital ticketing will completely replace paper over time, however there are many reasons why this change cannot be achieved quickly: including the development of the technology, compatibility of different systems, cost, and user familiarity and competence. As a result, it is common to see both methods of ticketing used as alternatives on flights and train journeys. However, there may be good reasons why a dual ticketing system is not appropriate at a high football event such as a UCLF: counterfeiting, and the effect on throughput rates being two of them.

7.3.5. UEFA wanted to use digital ticketing exclusively for all its 2022 finals, however, there was pushback by several clubs. For UCLF22 UEFA relented and provided paper tickets for the whole LFC and part of the RMCF allocations, and VIP ticketing.

²⁵⁹ — UEFA Analysis and initial findings related to the matchday events at Stade de France (8 June 2022) - Appendix, VI.16 (p. 2759-2760)

7.3.6. Both LFC and RMCF use forms of digital ticketing at their stadiums and it is clear that neither are against the use of such technology in principle. The objections were primarily related to compatibility between the UEFA system and their own, and the speed at which allocation had to be undertaken before the final.

7.3.7. UEFA could have insisted on using only digital tickets, but it would have created practical difficulties with allocations and subsequent protests, and discord with LFC in particular. In interview, UEFA ticketing staff did not think the LFC objections were insurmountable but also conceded that they were not unreasonable²⁶⁰.

7.3.8. UEFA asserted to the Panel that their digital ticketing system is robust and well thought through. The Panel understands that digital ticketing had been successfully implemented at previous UEFA events including the UEFA Europa League Final in Baku involving two English clubs in 2019, the UEFA European Football Championship in England in 2020 and other UEFA 2022 Finals. However, they also emphasised that this was the first time that they had attempted to have exclusively digital tickets at a UCLF, and that their system was not perfect. UEFA candidly conceded that it could not guarantee that its digital ticketing could not be counterfeited, although they were unaware of any successful attempt²⁶¹.

7.3.9. Ticketing staff also noted that considerable efforts had been made to counterfeit-proof paper tickets, and this resulted in a position whereby valid tickets could readily be distinguished from fakes by visual or simple chemical pen techniques. However, the Panel understands that problems with paper tickets have occurred at previous finals.

7.3.10. The blockchain ticketing system used by UEFA involves activation at an outer perimeter check by a steward with a handheld beacon, and then entry through a turnstile by presenting the activated ticket to a scanner. This requires the ticketholder to present the mobile device, with the ticket application open and Bluetooth turned-on, to the perimeter steward, and to use the scanner at the turnstile.

7.3.11. There are two back-up systems if Bluetooth is not on, or the ticketholder makes their way to the vicinity of the turnstile without having the ticket activated. Internet connection is not required for any of the activations or to enter through the turnstile, and stewards should be available to troubleshoot or assist.

260 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1109)

261 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1129-1131)

7.3.12. UEFA informed the Panel that the system removes human judgment from ticket checks and access, and should lead to swifter throughput. From the lay view of persons who have some general familiarity with digital ticketing, the principle and processes of the UEFA system appear robust. However, we have seen no evidence as to its actual efficacy and whether the claims made are correct.

7.3.13. In our view, both the resilience of the system – its ability to work reliably time and again in different venues and with different hardware and stewards – and its effect on throughput rates, need to be further and thoroughly tested before reliance can be placed upon it fully. We note that a fundamental technology breakdown could cause very serious problems where a large crowd is converging on a major sporting occasion. The Panel understands that there was a substantial failure of the FIFA digital ticket system affecting supporters accessing fixtures in Qatar during the World Cup in 2022²⁶². It is more difficult to devise contingency plans for such an adverse event, than it is for access problems where there are paper tickets.

7.3.14. The evidence from 28th May 2022 indicates that mobile ticketing was not as smooth as UEFA might suggest, with multiple reports of activation problems, and failures to pass through the scanner²⁶³. The Panel also notes that there were multiple reports of valid paper and digital tickets being refused at turnstiles, or having to be presented multiple times before the scanner allowed entry. The number of such reports strongly indicates that there was an issue with either the turnstile hardware or using the UEFA software on the SDF IT system.

7.3.15. However, the key point concerning digital ticketing on 28th May 2022 does not relate to the principle or the technology itself, but the effect on the ASP arrangements. UEFA had agreed to use the arrangements for the French Cup Final as a template for the UCLF22. But the mobile ticket systems were not the same and the actions to be taken by stewards were different, which meant that the two finals were not appropriate comparators.

7.3.16. The Panel has been presented with no evidence that the combination of Vigipirate security checks, chemical pen checks on paper tickets, and digital ticket activation by beacon or back-up system, was considered at all with respect

262 — [Angry England fans locked out of Iran match after Qatar ticket app chaos](#), The Telegraph

263 — UCLF22 Testimonies compiled by UEFA (publication not authorised) (p. 62, 73, 93, 111, 131, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 141)

to throughput rates²⁶⁴. Indeed, the evidence suggests that this was completely overlooked, and was a significant factor in the breakdown of those arrangements.

7.3.17. UEFA Events SA has defended its hybrid approach to paper and digital ticketing at UCLF22, despite the complications it posed for ticket activation and checks, and thereby throughput flow rates. However, the Panel notes that UEFA Events SA has changed its stance for the Istanbul UCLF23, and will insist on 100% digital ticketing²⁶⁵.

7.3.18. The Panel has no expertise on digital ticketing systems and cannot properly comment further on UEFA's current system. It is clear that digital ticketing is the future and the Panel understands the confidence of UEFA ticketing staff that digital ticketing is likely to reduce the possibility of counterfeits, even if it is unlikely to prevent the possibility of counterfeiting completely.

7.3.19. However, the Panel reiterates that reliance on any digital system should only follow rigorous and independent testing, and there must be contingency plans for the eventuality of a technology breakdown.

7.4. Counterfeits

7.4.1. In the immediate aftermath of the events of 28th May 2022, UEFA and others asserted as fact that a major cause of the near disaster was thousands of supporters with fake tickets. The Panel concludes that it was irresponsible to make that assertion without evidence.

7.4.2. As noted above, UEFA now accept that the issue of fake tickets may have been “blown out of proportion”. What therefore is the evidence?

7.4.3. UEFA's written response to the Review indicates that there was a total of 2,589 unknown ticket codes scanned and rejected at turnstiles during the ingress period²⁶⁶. This figure came from the access control system, which their own ticketing manager was monitoring in real time. Of that number, 1,644 were scanned at gates X, Y and Z which were dedicated to Liverpool supporters²⁶⁷. This represents 63.5% of the total number of unknown ticket codes scanned and rejected at turnstiles.

264 — Flow Rates (as per security concept) - Appendix, VI.14

265 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1130)

266 — UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p. 44)

267 — FFF Position Statement – Appendix, IV.11 (p. 182)

7.4.4. Given that ASP3 was abandoned, it is clear that anyone with a fake ticket was able to attempt to gain access through a turnstile, and those gates were the ones nearest to the failed outer perimeter.

7.4.5. The Panel considers that it is unlikely that a person who had made the effort and had spent a considerable amount of money to travel to Paris with a fake ticket, would not then have made such an attempt. It is a fair inference therefore that the number of actual fakes was no more than the figures stated above, subject to one caveat considered below: so-called ‘blag’ tickets (see 7.4.8).

7.4.6. However, the Panel considers that this number may in fact considerably overstate the position. As UEFA accepts, the above figures do not reflect the actual number of fake tickets, but the number of failed presentations. Most failed tickets were not seized and therefore the holder was able to try their luck at another gate. Once again, it is the Panel’s view that a person willing to try to get into the game with a counterfeit ticket, would be unlikely to give up after the first attempt. It is therefore a fair inference, again now accepted by UEFA, FFF and CSDF, that the number of persons holding fake tickets outside the Liverpool gates could have been and almost certainly was significantly less than 1,644²⁶⁸.

7.4.7. The only other evidence of counterfeit tickets comes from police reports of a raid on a house in Winsford, UK (with no details), intelligence from the English FA and Wembley that an unknown number of Liverpool supporters had used counterfeit or blag tickets to try to gain entry to the recent FA Cup final, unidentified reports in the UK media about supporters being defrauded online by fake ticket offers (which is a wholly different problem), and UEFA research indicating an unknown number of social media accounts were offering blag tickets. In addition, stewards at ASP3 “for some minutes” at a time prior to its abandonment reported that chemical pen check failures were so high that they doubted the pens were working²⁶⁹.

7.4.8. So-called ‘blag’ tickets are ones designed to be good enough to evade an initial check, but not get through a scanner check at the turnstile. It is said that the holder uses the blag to get close to the turnstile with the intention of jumping the access system. Apart from the Wembley and social media research, reference to blag tickets is wholly speculative.

268 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1146-1147); UEFA Analysis and initial findings related to the matchday events at Stade de France (8 June 2022) - Appendix, VI.16 (p. 2750)

269 — UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p. 31)

7.4.9. In interview, UEFA’s ticketing manager was candid in stating that UEFA had no figures for an ‘average’ number of counterfeit tickets at a final. The manager recalled being at the Milan UCLF in 2016 where she personally dealt with “piles of fake tickets”. The Project Leader added that passing reports of social media offers of blag tickets to the police was normal for UEFA, and there was no way of evidencing the extent of it²⁷⁰.

7.4.10. As noted above, the external UEFA Security Officer observing the LFC entrances, told the Panel that in his view the problems of fake tickets and ticketless supporters were no more than he had seen at the Cardiff UCLF in 2017 where he had been responsible for perimeter security.

7.4.11. The Panel notes that counterfeit tickets are a fact of life at UCLFs and many other sporting and other events. The Panel concludes that there is no evidence that fake or blag tickets were a significant contributor to the problems on 28th May 2022, and indeed, what evidence there is, suggests that they were not.

7.5. Statistics, mobility, travel, and ticketless supporters

7.5.1. On the night of 28th May 2022, the French Minister of the Interior, Gérald Darmanin, asserted as fact that the cause of the problems was the presence outside the stadium of 30-40,000 Liverpool supporters without tickets. Mr Darmanin referred to ticket fraud on a “massive, industrial scale”, whilst Amélie Oudéa-Castéra, Minister of Sports and the Olympic and Paralympic Games, made clear her view that it was exclusively a problem that arose with Liverpool supporters²⁷¹.

7.5.2. On 29th May 2022, Didier Lallement, Préfet de Police in charge of the security operation on the night, wrote to Mr Darmanin, asserting that “without doubt” there were 30-40,000 Liverpool supporters, with fake or no tickets, at the stadium in addition to the 80,000 holders of valid tickets. In addition, Mr Lallement indicated there were “300 to 400 young people from sensitive neighbourhoods in Seine-Saint-Denis” who were also part of the problem²⁷².

270 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1152-1154)

271 — [French minister shows difference between ‘real and fake tickets’ from Paris match](#), Liverpool Echo; [Stade de France : comment l’organisation de la finale de la Ligue des champions a viré au chaos](#), Le Monde; Gérald Darmanin Tweet: “Avec @AOC1978, au PC sécurité du Stade de France. Des milliers de «supporters» britanniques, sans billet ou avec des faux billets ont forcé les entrées et, parfois, violenté les stadiers. Merci aux très nombreuses forces de l’ordre mobilisées ce soir dans ce contexte difficile.” (28 May 2022)

272 — UEFA Analysis and initial findings related to the matchday events at Stade de France (8 June 2022) - Appendix, VI.16 (p. 2745)

7.5.3. The Panel has considered the issue of counterfeits above. The Panel has noted the fact that, on the night, the French authorities asked UEFA to remove any reference to groups of locals contributing to the problems. We have found an abundance of assertions that there were a large number of ‘excess’ supporters, but actual evidence is elusive.

7.5.4. It is convenient to start by looking at the position at around the actual kick-off time. Although the Stade de France CCTV footage is not available, the Panel has viewed much media and mobile phone footage. At around the time of the delayed kick-off, 21:36, the available footage shows there were still supporters queueing at turnstiles, and fairly large groups of locals milling around on the concourse sporadically running from the police. However, from this evidence, the Panel concludes that there was no large mass of supporters, certainly not 30-40,000 supporters, outside the turnstile perimeter, with or without tickets at this time.

7.5.5. Furthermore, the external UEFA Security Officer specifically tasked with observing and reporting on the access of Liverpool supporters at the South end of the stadium, reflected the same view: there was no large mass of supporters left outside the ground by that time²⁷³.

7.5.6. Some stakeholders have referenced that from around halftime there was increased train traffic for people returning to the city centre. The volume of extra footfall on the networks is not clear, however, we note that UEFA has accepted that 2,733 Liverpool supporters with valid tickets were not recorded as accessing the stadium. In fact, UEFA has recorded that a total of 7,112 tickets were not scanned as having entered the stadium, although it is said that some of the VIP guests were not scanned on entry and there are accounts that some supporters were allowed to enter elsewhere without being scanned²⁷⁴. Nonetheless, it would seem likely that many of those who did not access the stadium returned to the centre, and the Panel considers that it is likely that this accounts for much of the increased volumes on the train lines.

7.5.7. The justification for the figures of 30-40,000 ticketless supporters attending at the stadium is said to come from figures provided by the transport networks. The Panel has been provided with different figures from different sources for the same modes of transport to the stadium on MD.

273 — Meeting with UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1500, 1507-1508)

274 — UEFA Analysis and initial findings related to the matchday events at Stade de France (8 June 2022) - Appendix, VI.16 (p. 2776, 2780)

7.5.8. According to the UEFA ‘Analysis and Initial Findings’ document, the “planning assumptions” were that 54,000 spectators would arrive at the stadium by public transport: 17,000 via RER B, 9,000 via RER D, and 22,000 by Metro Line 13, and a further 6,000 would arrive by taxis. The balance of approximately 20,000 were anticipated to arrive by coaches, private transport and UEFA VIP transport.

7.5.9. UEFA states that the “match day actuals” were 17,000 RER B, 37,000 RER D, 26,000 Metro 13, and 6,500 by taxis, giving a total of 78,500, having adjusted the total by 10% who were assumed to be “regular commuters”, and having used a figure of 6,200 for RER B but added an estimated 10,800 “due turnstiles standing down”. We understand that this relates to turnstile barriers at the RER B station and not the stadium, and there has been no explanation as to how that figure has been estimated²⁷⁵. This would appear to provide an overall total of 98,500. UEFA comments that the planning assumptions were therefore accurate save for RER D, with the discrepancy accounted for by the RER B strike notice and “significant numbers of ticketless supporters”²⁷⁶.

7.5.10. In its written response to the Review, FFF state the expected arrivals for an event to be 30,000 at RER B, and 10-15,000 at RER D. FFF state the actual MD figures to have been: 6,200 at RER B, 36,000 at RER D, and 37,000 at Line 13, plus 20,905 by buses, 6,680 by Taxis, and 4,111 by private cars – figures said to have been provided by RATP and the Préfecture. FFF state that the overall total of people attending at the stadium was 110,000, which included 35,000 without tickets or having fake ones²⁷⁷.

7.5.11. The significance of these stated figures is that they both relate to considered analyses well after the event, and they are plainly incompatible. FFF asserts that there were 11,500 more people at the stadium than does UEFA. The comparable figures for RER B and Line 13 are both different in opposite directions by 10,000. Interestingly, the combined expected and actual totals for each of RER B and RER D given by FFF are similar (40-45,000 expected, and 42,200 actual), significant because these two lines serviced the south of the stadium, whereas Line 13 serviced the north. Although those arriving via Line 13 with a valid ticket could access the outer perimeter through any ASP, it would have been less than straightforward for those without valid tickets to have made their way around to ASP3.

275 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1190-1193)

276 — UEFA Analysis and initial findings related to the matchday events at Stade de France (8 June 2022) - Appendix, VI.16 (p. 2707)

277 — UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p. 181, 184)

7.5.12. As these figures are each said to rely heavily on those supplied by the transport networks, the Panel has carefully targeted questions to the transport networks to establish what the facts are and what are baseless assertions.

7.5.13. In its initial written response to the Review, RATP asserted that 60% of spectators attending sporting events at the SDF use the 3 lines referred to above, which equates to 50,000 passengers. RATP indicate the ordinary distribution of passengers for these events to be: 16,800 via Line 13 (although this can reach 30,000 as it is said was the case for the French Cup Final), 21,600 via RER B, and 9,600 via RER D. No evidence or explanation is provided for these figures, and they are significantly different to the ‘expected’ figures provided by either UEFA or FFF. Furthermore, the Panel notes that arrival patterns must vary substantially given the different origination points and modes of transport for spectators at various event.

7.5.14. The same RATP document asserts that the 28th May figures were 36,000 via Line 13, 6,200 via RER B, and 37,000 via RER D, but the explanation as to how these figures were generated and the extent to which they are estimates is unclear. RATP indicates there were manual counts carried out at La Fourche station on Line 13, which led to an “estimate” of the flows to Saint-Denis, but no details are provided of the extent of the counts or the basis of the estimates²⁷⁸. RATP indicated that SNCF provided the figures for RER B and D, which is understandable as SNCF operated the northern part of RER B which includes Saint-Denis, and the whole of the RER D line.

7.5.15. Answers to a further request to RATP referred to the Line 13 estimates being related to the number of trains and “field counts” at La Fourche station – there is no automated counting system, and no explanation is given as to how RATP estimate the number of passengers at La Fourche who alight at Saint-Denis²⁷⁹.

7.5.16. SNCF has provided a written response to the Review, and further answers to targeted questions. SNCF has confirmed to the Panel that the ‘normal’ figures for passengers travelling to sporting events at the stadium are those used for planning, and it has no automated counting which can inform as to how many people travelled to the Stade de France via RER B or D on 28th May. The figures provided are estimates made: “on the basis of manual counting carried out systematically by our agents on the outbound trains”.

²⁷⁸ — RATP Position Statement – Appendix, IV.13 (p. 208)

²⁷⁹ — RATP reply to Additional Request – Appendix, IV.15 (p. 273)

7.5.17. Both networks have been asked to provide evidence of any data provided to partners on MD. Both have asserted that they had real time contact and SNCF has indicated it transmitted “counts” via their representative in the stadium control room but has provided no detail or evidence.²⁸⁰ There is a dispute between the stakeholders concerning this issue.

7.5.18. UEFA has asserted that it did get real time figures from SNCF but only at 19:45 on MD. The UEFA Events SA mobility manager told the Panel that the figures were provided orally by the SNCF representative in the control room who was coordinating with RATP, and he noted them down. The figures were: 30,800 via RER D, 4,340 via RER B, and 30,000 via Line 13. UEFA understood that the figures were actual numbers of people auto counted as they exited through station barriers, and that the figure from RER B was estimated by station staff as the barrier system had gone down due to anti-social behaviour by local youths²⁸¹. It is clear from the evidence of both RATP and SNCF that UEFA are mistaken, and the numbers were not accurate auto counts, but estimates based upon some manual headcounts for which we have no detail and no actual data. Furthermore, on 30th May 2022, RATP had provided an overall figure for those arriving via Line 13 as 26,000, despite the figure at 19:45 being given as 30,000²⁸².

7.5.19. RATP and SNCF have reported no significant issues with the transport of supporters to and from the SDF on 28th May, whatever the actual figures, save for the anti-social behaviour at the Stade de France RER B station mentioned above. There was no imperative for the transport networks to collect accurate data relating to travel numbers, so long as it could avoid overcrowding. It did so. The Panel does not criticise RATP or SNCF for being unable to provide evidence which appears not to exist.

7.5.20. The travel figures have been the bedrock of assertions that there was a mass of ticketless supporters at the stadium. The Panel has no doubt that a key problem on the night started with the diversion of a large number of supporters onto RER D, without any plan to safely route them to appropriate ASPs. However, the Panel has gone to some lengths to obtain evidence of the travel figures without success. UEFA and FFF rely on very different figures. RATP has apparently amended figures after the fact. UEFA is mistaken that the figures it received were actual and based upon barrier counts: it is clear to us that all the figures were

280 — SNCF Position Statement – Appendix, IV.14; SNCF reply to Additional Request – Appendix, IV.15

281 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1195-1199)

282 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1199)

estimates. No one has been able to provide any verifiable data or even a clear explanation as to how the figures were reached, even following specific requests.

7.5.21. The Panel are quite clear that the figures that have been asserted are wholly unreliable. The stakeholders who have asserted these figures, including Ministers, the Préfecture de Police, UEFA and FFF have acted irresponsibly in doing so.

7.5.22. The Panel accepts as a matter of common sense that there will have been supporters without tickets outside the stadium. Despite significant efforts, the Panel has been unable to determine how many there were, and it concludes that there is no evidence that there were an abnormal number of ticketless supporters or those with fake tickets, at the SDF on 28th May. There is undisputed evidence showing that ASP4 – the access from RER B – was substantially underused. Other evidence does not support there being a mass of ticketless supporters left outside the ground at kick-off²⁸³.

7.6. Disabled Supporters

7.6.1. As part of the consultation process undertaken by the Panel specific evidence was received regarding the spectator experience of disabled supporters attending the match.

7.6.2. On 15th August 2022 a detailed written response to a request for a position statement was forwarded to the Chair of this Independent Review by Ted Morris, Chair of the Liverpool Disabled Supporters Association (LDSA). This response contained harrowing personal statements from disabled supporters and is included in full in the Appendix. On 24th September 2022 members of the Panel travelled to Liverpool and took evidence in person from an LDSA delegation.

7.6.3. CAFE (Centre for Access to Football in Europe) also carried out an investigation into the events surrounding the UEFA Champions League Final 2022.²⁸⁴ We understand that CAFE developed two reports. One was focused on recommendations to UEFA²⁸⁵ and the other on recommendations to French authorities²⁸⁶. The Panel notes with concern that UEFA only shared with us the report directed to the French Authorities, which is public.

283 — Meeting with UEFA – UEFA Events SA Project Management Team– Appendix, V.1 (p. 1280-1281); Meeting with UEFA - Match Delegate & Security Officers – Appendix, V.1 (p. 1500, 1507-1508)

284 — [UEFA Champions League Final 2022: CAFE Post Final Report](#) (September 2022)

285 — [CAFE submits UEFA Champions League Final feedback report to UEFA](#), CAFE

286 — [CAFE publishes report for French authorities on UEFA Champions League 2022](#), CAFE

7.6.4. This section draws upon both these reports as well as our other evidence to explore the experience of disabled supporters across the different phases of the event. We then discuss the content of the LDSA and CAFE reports and conclude by considering UEFA’s response to these submissions.

7.6.5. As with this inquiry more generally our approach to the Panel’s analysis of the evidence is framed by the Saint-Denis Convention. In this regard it is relevant to note from the outset that Article 5 of the Saint-Denis Convention states that “Parties shall encourage the relevant agencies to ensure that stadiums provide an inclusive and welcoming environment for all sections of society, including children, the elderly and those with disabilities, and incorporate, in particular, the provision of appropriate sanitary and refreshment facilities and good viewing conditions for all spectators.”

7.6.6. The following contains eyewitness testimonies from disabled supporters and their representatives. These individual spectator experiences illustrate the extent of the impact of the factors highlighted by LDSA and CAFE.

7.6.7. The confusion generated by the RER B strike announcement combined with poor signage and lack of an ushering system in the last kilometre caused huge circulation problems for disabled fans both outside and inside the security perimeter. According to CAFE, this led to “crowding and pressure build-up in several areas, with many spectators waiting for extensive periods of time, despite having arrived 3 hours before kick-off to avoid crowds”²⁸⁷. Jim Fitzsimons²⁸⁸ testimony (on behalf of Peter Rafferty) gives a good idea of the challenge faced by disabled fans in the last kilometre: “We arrived at the RER Saint-Denis at around 18:20. At that point, Peter was being pushed by his nominated assistant Vincent Dowd and had the support of me, my son and my niece. The supporter’s file was held a couple hundred yards from the RER station. Then we were allowed to proceed to the underpass, which we didn’t know was coming as there were no signs to inform anyone of the fact (or if there were signs, then they were not visible). At the beginning of the underpass, we were faced with a large number of steps down within the packed crowd. The help of the supporters there (both Liverpool & Real Madrid) in helping carry Peter in the wheelchair down the stairs and then up the stairs on the other side was the only reason we were able to navigate this obstacle.”

²⁸⁷ — [UEFA Champions League Final 2022: CAFE Post Final Report](#) (September 2022) (p. 9)

²⁸⁸ — Liverpool Disabled Supporters Association Position Statement – Appendix, IV.20

7.6.8. The crowding build-up in several areas in the last kilometre and around the stadium combined with the lack of dedicated lanes resulted in disabled people being caught up in dense crowds exposed to a variety of risks. Also, no dedicated lanes were identified at first security check (ASP) and inconsistent ticket & bag check for disabled people and their companions resulted in a very bad journey experience, particularly for the most vulnerable.

7.6.9. Within this perimeter the situation was similar, with lack of signage regarding accessible gates or priority lanes, which meant that disabled fans had to join the regular queues at the turnstiles. There are also multiple reports of stewards not being aware of accessible services at the stadium and being unprepared to deal with this category of supporter. Michelle Dunmore²⁸⁹, a wheelchair user, describes the reality faced by disabled fans close to the gates: “We reached gate Y and saw no disabled access, just masses of fans trying to get through the same gate. My sister attempted to find a steward to help; however, after speaking to 5 different stewards, no one spoke English, so no help was given. We returned to gate Y to queue. The chaos and disorganization surrounding this gate turned this experience into one of the scariest of my life. When I eventually got to the front of the entrance, the stewards pushed fans out of the gate I was supposed to go through. Fans were shouting that I was there, but the stewards continued to push fans out even though they saw me and made eye contact with me. I ended up with a shoulder dislocation (which is part of my medical condition but still incredibly painful, and I had a mild panic attack when I got through. I was approached by the only English steward I came across (I could have done with him before getting in the stadium). It was hard to fully relax during the game due to what I had just experienced, and I was in a great deal of pain due to my dislocated shoulder.”

7.6.10. As well as all the previous issues, the tear gas and pepper spray used by police in several areas outside the stadium also affected many disabled fans, with reports that some ended up separated from their companions and placed into extremely dangerous, vulnerable, and frightening situations. Ted Morris in his evidence states:²⁹⁰ “I started receiving messages saying our disabled supporters were being gassed and crushed outside the turnstiles. They started contacting me, saying they were terrified and panicking. It was harrowing to receive these messages with me unable to help them. They said the situation outside the stadium was becoming critical, and they feared for their lives. I thought many of our disabled supporters were now in danger of being crushed. This group included

289 — Liverpool Disabled Supporters Association Position Statement – Appendix, IV.20

290 — Meeting with Liverpool Disabled Supporters Association – Appendix, V.7

children with disabilities, blind fans and wheelchair users. At this point, they said tear gas had been deployed on several occasions, and they were all suffering from its effects. They told me that Liverpool fans, although subjected to extreme provocation, helped them as best they could and took them to a safe place. In my opinion, it was only thanks to the restraint and actions shown by the supporters of the LFC that a major disaster and probably a death were averted. No one in authority helped our disabled supporters. The saddest thing about this is that our disabled fans have arrived in Paris to attend a football festival, but at that very moment, they are in the middle of a carnival of horrors, which will leave them with long-term mental scars”.

7.6.11. Regarding issues inside the stadium, there are several accounts of non-disabled spectators occupying companion seating, some remaining throughout the match, meaning disabled people’s companion had nowhere to sit. According to CAFE, “during the match itself, the 93 wheelchair user spaces available also encountered sightline issues as no seating in front was killed despite recommendations”. Throughout the match several non-disabled fans stood in and around the reserved areas causing view obstruction for wheelchair users, despite the continuous request from disabled fans, their companions, and some stewards to move and allow full pitch view. The CAFE report also note that “some fans who require easy access seats are not able to stand for periods of time and CAFE has received reports of fans with easy access seats having to leave games early due to fatigue from having to stand to see parts of a match” (see Annex Figure 9).

7.6.12. Service levels for disabled fans inside the stadium were relatively poor, both in terms of facilities and personnel. This is evident from several testimonies as, for example, Ross Hovey²⁹¹, a wheelchair user who requires two personal assistants: “Once we got in, there was a steward that showed us where to go, but once we got into the concourse area, there was no one around. The area where the accessible toilets were was full of fans queuing for the 4 or 5 toilets there, seemingly unaware of the empty general use toilets just at the top of the short ramp because of the absence of adequate signage. Again, most Fans helped get us to the front of the queue with the wheelchair, but the mood was changing as people were all disgusted at how hard it was to get in or the fact, they’d seemed to stop letting them in, and the ground was still half empty this was now around”.

7.6.13. Ted Morris²⁹², LDSA Chair, also stated: “On attempting to use the accessible toilet, a young steward informed us that there was no lighting in the toilet. He

291 — Liverpool Disabled Supporters Association Position Statement – Appendix, IV.20

292 — Liverpool Disabled Supporters Association Position Statement – Appendix, IV.20

advised me to use the torch on my mobile phone; as you can see, given that I use a wheelchair, it would be quite a challenge for me, another failure, unfortunately, one of the many that happened on that terrible day and a snapshot of how disabled fans were being treated. At no time did the Stade de France feel inclusive.” The Panel understands there were similar problems at the French Cup Final that should have been identified if proper scrutiny by UEFA was in place for that event.

7.6.14. After the final whistle, the journey back had further safety and security incidents with reports of narrow routes, lack of proper lighting, signage and guiding/supporting personnel. On top of this, disabled fans were also exposed to the same threats from groups of locals and almost no police protection on their way to public transport.

7.6.15. Kate Seaman who is the wife of Daniel Seaman, a completely blind supporter gives this account: “We left the match a few minutes before the final whistle and ran out of the stadium. I saw gangs of youths and Police with batons and tear gas, and Daniel told me to run for the underpass as fast as I could. This process was complicated to do when my husband was blind. Not only does he have to hold onto me, but I also must run and shout to him when we reach steps, obstacles, ramps etc. And I must do this quickly. Daniel is also highly vulnerable in this situation as he relies on me to guide him quickly. We both heard what sounded like a gun firing as we neared the underpass, and glass bottles flew through the air. Although terrified, Daniel and I were running on adrenaline at this point, and it was a primary flight-fight survival response that we both experienced. Daniel shouted at me to get away from the middle of the underpass, get next to the concrete wall, and, if we heard anything again, drop us down to the floor. Once we got to the end of the underpass (we were at the front of the exiting crowds), we were met by a metal barrier and a police van. The Police had put barriers up across the exits, and we were against the fence. At this point, I was shaking, and Daniel was panicky and shouting at the Police to move the barrier. I could feel the weight of the crowd starting to push against us, and there was nowhere to go. We both felt trapped, and all we could do was scream and shout at the Police to move the barrier. We both admitted afterwards that Hillsborough was all that was in our minds. We both had thoughts that we were not getting out of that underpass alive.”

7.6.16. In his statement to the Independent Review, based on the evidence presented by the LDSA to the Hearing of the French Senate in June 2022, Ted Morris states: “Liverpool Football Club has received over 8,500 testimonies, many of them from extremely vulnerable disabled fans. These show first-hand accounts

of the shocking treatment of the disabled; men, women and children should shame those in positions of authority. They treated disabled fans like animals. Our fans were simply at the Stade de France watching their team play in the Champions League final; the treatment they received will be to the eternal shame of all those in authority who were there to protect us, they were responsible for our safety, but they failed. It was a complete dereliction of duty.”

7.6.17. The conclusions reached by LDSA in respect of the experiences of their supporters were as follows:

- Transport to and from the stadium was inadequate and caused significant problems for our disabled supporters.
- The outer perimeter ticket checks were wholly inadequate, understaffed and allowed groups of locals to access the stadium without tickets.
- The methods employed by the French Police to manage the Liverpool supporters caused severe distress to disabled supporters, leaving them fearing for their lives.
- The indiscriminate use of gas and pepper spray caused harm and distress to disabled supporters as young as six years of age.
- The closing and re-opening of gates at the Liverpool end of the stadium caused crushes and crowd surges that again left disabled supporters fearing for their lives. This group included children, wheelchair users and supporters who are entirely blind.
- There was a complete lack of accessible signage advising disabled supporters of their routes. Why weren't any announcements made outside the stadium?
- No trained accessibility stewards on the entrance gates and no Police presence. General admission fans used personal assistance seating, resulting in PAs (Personal Assistants) having to stand for upwards of four hours.
- Accessible toilets were unfit for purpose, and poorly prepared/trained stewards allowed non-disabled supporters to access them.
- Exit gates were closed, some wheelchair users had to be lifted by Liverpool fans, and the crowd surfed over the gates.
- No police protection was provided on the route back to La Plaine; disabled supporters were attacked by groups of locals on the 400-metre terrifying gauntlet of hate back to the station.
- On arrival at La Plaine, French Police indiscriminately gassed, and pepper sprayed disabled Liverpool fans who had been running for their lives.

- La Plaine station was poorly staffed, and policies allowed locals onto the platform with Liverpool fans.
- The heavy-handed approach of the Police is a stain on France, and it is only because of the exemplary behaviour of Liverpool fans that there wasn't a loss of life. Disabled supporters, including children, were placed in harm's way by the lack of planning around the stadium.
- Those in authority had a duty of care to warn disabled supporters about the potential that local groups may attack them. Who was responsible for providing this information to visiting fans? Why didn't French Police provide safe passage back to major transport hub.

7.6.18. Based on the evidence we have obtained the Panel concurs with the conclusions drawn, and is sympathetic to the comments made.

7.6.19. In their pre-event assessment CAFE noted in their report that: "Stade de France hosted matches at UEFA Euro 2016 and presented several accessibility issues, including obstructed sightlines from wheelchair user spaces. The learning from this tournament led UEFA to commit to only selling wheelchair user tickets that had a guaranteed view of the pitch, even when fans in the rows in front stood. Since 2017, UEFA has encouraged venues hosting the Club Competition Finals and EURO tournaments to invest in sustainable improvements to sightline issues. Where these needed improvements have not been made, UEFA has killed rows of seating in front of wheelchair user spaces to ensure a quality experience".

7.6.20. CAFE was therefore surprised during its site visit to the SDF in April 2022 that "no improvements to the issues raised in 2016" were apparent. According to CAFE, this was particularly evident at wheelchair spaces where "sightline issues still occur from all 550 wheelchair user spaces available at Stade de France. Companion seating for wheelchair users is located behind wheelchair user spaces at a distance that makes communication between the disabled person and their companion impossible".

7.6.21. The CAFE report further stated that "UEFA acknowledged number of seats available to disabled and low mobility supporters was insufficient, explaining that operational and security challenges, linked in particular to the change of venue for the final on short notice, meant UEFA was only able to identify 93 wheelchair positions that fulfilled the quality experience UEFA aims to offer to disabled spectators".

7.6.22. The outcome of the above was that only 123 out of 550 easy access tickets were then sold to disabled supporters when the demand for accessible tickets was extremely high. As CAFE note “This led disabled fans and journalists to rightly question why a UEFA Final would be granted to a stadium with inadequate facilities for disabled fans, and why France’s national stadium, which is also due to host the Rugby World Cup 2023 and Paris 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games, has not invested in providing sufficient facilities for disabled fans since 2016.”

7.6.23. The CAFE report concludes that “Many incidents at the UCLF22 could have been prevented had there been proper planning, had security staff been trained and had accessible facilities, services and policies been properly managed”. The Panel concurs.

7.6.24. The conclusions of the LDSA report were forwarded to UEFA by the Chair of the Independent Review and the response was received by the Panel on 12th December 2022. The UEFA response is reproduced in the Appendix²⁹³.

7.6.25. The UEFA response should be read in full but certain key passages are referred to here. Under the heading of General Information related to the arrangements for the disabled supporters UEFA states that: “In relation to the 2022 UCLF, UEFA would like to provide the following general comments: Based on the meeting with CAFE in April, the arrangements planned for disabled supporters (but also for general public and club supporters) was considered adequate, except the following: Disabled toilets were in poor state and not renovated since years: Due to time constraints, no further action was taken. Disabled signs above disabled gates: It was planned for the staff positioned at the start of the queue at each gate to provide the necessary information on the dedicated gate for wheelchair users instead of relying on signage. Match day disruptions, such as wrong directions provided by public transport staff based on police instructions, additional perimeter congestion, closing of gates (which were discussed during the interviews) affected all target groups. Police operations arising from the unilateral decisions of the police commander (as discussed during the interview sessions) affected all target groups.”

7.6.26. Considering these admitted failures by UEFA, it is difficult to see how it can be concluded that arrangements for disabled supporters were adequate. Moreover, it is important to reference some inaccuracies contained in the UEFA response. At p.5 of the UEFA response, it is stated that: “As a European

²⁹³ — UEFA Social Responsibility Department Position Statement - Appendix, IV.3

football governing body and event owner, UEFA's aim is to create a safe, secure, welcoming, and festive environment around its tournaments and finals. When preparing for any of our events, UEFA is providing active inputs and expertise to the national authorities responsible for safe and secure environment in the public areas of the host cities and around the stadiums. UEFA also cooperates proactively with host associations being the event organizer in their respective country to ensure the same safe and welcoming atmosphere inside the stadiums. As a part of it, UEFA includes within stewards e-learning a module 'Respect Access For All' in order to embed UEFA's expectation in regard to treatment of disabled supporters by the safety and security personnel."

7.6.27. Whilst the Panel agrees that the statement is aspirationally correct, we have concluded that it is misleading in the context of UCLF22. Whereas it is commendable that UEFA's stewarding e-learning course contains a module entitled "Respect Access For All", what UEFA do not acknowledge here is that only 56% of stewards completed this e-learning prior to the event²⁹⁴.

7.6.28. UEFA goes on²⁹⁵ to confirm its commitment to the implementation of the 2016 Council of Europe Convention by stating: "Since 2016 we maintain strong cooperation with the European Union and the Council of Europe on the implementation of the 2016 Council of Europe Convention on an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports Events ("Convention"), including through joint EU-UEFA programmes for national police training. The Convention also calls for "creating a safe, secure and welcoming environment in public spaces that are designated for supporters to gather before and after the event, or locations in which supporters can be expected to frequent of their own volition, and along transit routes to and from the city and/or to and from the stadium".

7.6.29. As has been pointed out elsewhere in the report, there is no evidence that the preparations for this event were indeed benchmarked against the standards of the 2016 Convention. Indeed, as highlighted earlier in this section UEFA themselves admit failings in provision of disabled toilet facilities which are specifically referred to in Article 5 of the Saint-Denis Convention, along with "good viewing conditions." As mentioned, the CAFE report was extremely critical of the viewing arrangements for disabled supporters.

294 — UEFA Analysis and initial findings related to the matchday events at Stade de France (8 June 2022) - Appendix, VI.16 (p. 2693)

295 — UEFA Social Responsibility Department Position Statement - Appendix, IV.3

7.6.30. The Panel has concluded that the service provision made for disabled supporters in respect UCLF22 fell far short of that which should reasonably have been expected. UEFA failed to adequately ensure the event met its obligations toward disabled supporters as set out in Article 5 of the Saint-Denis Convention.

7.6.31. The Panel concurs with CAFE that there was a failure by the SDF to address issues highlighted in 2016. We conclude it was unacceptable that, rather than working to address the issues constructively and equitably, a decision was made by UEFA and FFF to address the problems by further limiting the accessibility of the event to disabled supporters.

7.6.32. The Panel also concludes that the severity and magnitude of the negative experiences of disabled supporters at the event is beyond the capacity of this review to fully assess within its terms of reference. It is also evident that such failures and experiences are not isolated to UCLF22. The continuing failure to meet minimum standards for disabled supporters indicates that an urgent dedicated review is needed to address the necessary improvements which should be made in advance of future UEFA events, including the forthcoming UCLF23.

8. Overall Conclusions

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8.1. Factors which caused or contributed to the 'near-miss'

8.1.1. The Panel has identified eight factors which caused or contributed to the conditions which almost led to disaster:

- a. A substantially larger number of Liverpool supporters were directed to arrive via the 'Stade de France: Saint-Denis' station, on train line RER D, which was closest to the southwest of the stadium, compared to the volume of people attending other major events at the stadium by that route.
- b. Defective route planning between RER D and the stadium, resulting in too many people being directed by police toward the stadium via the south-west ASP3 entrance.
- c. Defective access arrangements at the ASPs. The effect of this was particularly acute at ASP3 because of the increased pressure created by the flawed routing, and that it was positioned on a restricted access ramp: a bottleneck.
- d. Ticketing: the use of two different forms of tickets, without extra measures to maintain throughput rates, exacerbated access problems at ASPs.
- e. Defective turnstile arrangements, which failed to ensure a sufficient throughput rate to guarantee safe entry.
- f. The activities of large groups of locals, some of whom were involved in attacks on supporters and attempts to breach the perimeters and turnstiles to gain entry to the stadium, and a failure to police them.
- g. The use of tear gas and pepper spray in the confined space on the concourse.
- h. A lack of contingency plans relating to both additional perimeter and turnstile access: there was no Plan B when things went wrong.

8.1.2. The Panel has identified two further matters which contributed to or exacerbated those factors: the late change of venue, and a remarkable failure of joint working or interoperability.

8.1.3. The late change of venue meant that the normal timetable for organisation had to be truncated, and planning for the event had to be adapted to the circumstances. Compromises could be made to many areas of the event, but safety and security were not among them. Whereas there could be no bidding process or development of a concept, full attention should have been paid to the formulation and agreement of venue and event risk assessments, and proper operational plans. That did not happen.

8.1.4. The truncated approach adopted was reliant on the planning for and operation of the French Cup Final: a misconceived shortcut with an event which was not a proper comparator. Such a tight timescale required enhanced oversight and monitoring of all matters which pertained to safety, with the fullest regard to joint multi-agency working.

8.1.5. In reality, the opposite occurred. There was no venue risk assessment, and no proper event risk assessment or operational plans. There were multiple communication and interoperability failures between stakeholders. Important historical and real time information was not shared. Plans were not properly agreed, and there is the clearest evidence of an absence of stakeholders working together with respect to almost all of the above factors.

8.1.6. UEFA was at the centre of the project, and the failure to ensure proper interoperability, and to challenge an absence of joint working, and to escalate and remedy such problems, was primarily theirs. However, the Préfecture de Police and FFF also bear responsibility because of their important roles in ensuring public safety.

8.1.7. The Panel concludes that assertions regarding huge numbers of ticketless supporters, and those with fake tickets, have been wrongly inflated and have been stated as fact, to deflect responsibility for the planning and operational failures of stakeholders. This is reprehensible and has involved UEFA, UEFA Events SA, FFF, the Préfecture de Police, Government Officials and French Ministers

8.2. The eight factors

8.2.1. *Displacement of LFC supporters onto RER D*

8.2.1.1. Although the numbers are disputed, there is no doubt that a large number of supporters were diverted from the main public transport route to the south of the stadium – via RER B – onto RER D. UEFA and FFF blame the “unilateral” actions of the police and/or transport networks for this, and claim that they did not learn of it until it was too late to remedy. The police deny involvement, and the transport networks assert that the displacement was a reasonable measure taken to avoid any adverse effects of a planned strike on the capacity of RER B. The transport networks further assert that their approach was transparent and had been raised in planning meetings.

8.2.1.2. The Panel has reached the following conclusions on this issue:

- a. Of itself, the factual dispute is clear evidence of a lack of communications and interoperability, and a major planning failure, between UEFA, FFF, the Préfecture de Police and the transport networks. This is remarkable given the fact that all of these stakeholders were involved in planning meetings, and all of them had representatives within the adjoining stadium and police control rooms on match day.
- b. The diversion did not adversely affect the travel of supporters to the vicinity of the stadium, nor did it cause any overcrowding or significant problems on the network. In short, there was nothing inherently wrong with the diversion: it was not a failure of itself.

8.2.1.3. According to RATP, 60% of people attending sporting events at the Stade de France, travel via three public transport routes²⁹⁶. The ordinary distribution is that a third arrive on Metro Line 13 to the north of the stadium, and two-thirds arrive via RER B or RER D to the south. Of itself, this created an obvious issue as there were only two ASPs to the south of the stadium. This factor – the huge disproportion between arriving supporters entering the stadium footprint via ASP3 and 4, and those accessing via the other ten ASPs - should have focussed those responsible for planning mobility on ensuring nothing was left to chance, everything was monitored, and there were proper contingency plans in place.

8.2.1.4. The minutes of the planning meetings record that UEFA and FFF were aware of the importance of ensuring supporters arrived at the south of the stadium primarily via RER B. They were aware of planned works on RER B, and later they were aware of planned strike action. The evidence suggests that the intention by the transport networks to shift a proportion of supporters from RER B to D, should have been known to other stakeholders days in advance of match day, as it was the subject of a media release reported by the Press Association²⁹⁷.

8.2.1.5. If the movement of a greater proportion of supporters to RER D had occurred unexpectedly, effective interoperability would have alerted each relevant stakeholder prior to match day, and in real time on match day.

8.2.1.6. Travel disruptions are notoriously common. Those responsible for last kilometre routing, and access arrangements – the police, FFF and UEFA – should have ensured sufficient monitoring of real time arrivals so as to take effective action to ensure public safety.

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296 — See 7.5.13 above.

297 — RATP reply to Additional Request – Appendix, IV.15 (p. 307)

8.2.1.7. The effect of the displacement of a large number of supporters onto RER D was that it created conditions which made the second factor more critical than it would otherwise have been.

8.2.2. Failure to effectively route supporters arriving at RER D to safely access the stadium

8.2.2.1. The 'natural' route for supporters to take to the stadium from RER D was via ASP3. The Panel has concluded that there were obvious constraints on the numbers who could safely access via ASP3, including the narrow A1 pedestrian underpass, the relatively confined approach via Avenue du Président Wilson, and the limitation of the ASP3 entry ramp itself. Furthermore, the Panel has found that there have been a number of historical congestion problems with access to the Stade de France, which were or should have been known and taken account of during the planning phase by the relevant stakeholders, including UEFA, FFF and the Préfecture.

8.2.2.2. In fact, solutions to avoid congestion on the route between RER D and the stadium were readily available. What was required was real time monitoring of the volume of supporters arriving via RER D, and a cordon at the junction of Avenue François Mitterrand, and Avenue du Président Wilson, preventing too many supporters taking a left turn down toward ASP3. The cordons could have operated a simple pulsing method to allow only a manageable number of supporters to access via that route. The 'excess' of supporters would be directed straight on, via Rue Francis de Pressensé, to the main access at ASP4 on the expansive Avenue Stade de France.

8.2.2.3. The Panel notes that FFF, supported by UEFA Events SA, put up signage to direct supporters coming from RER D to access the ground in either of the above ways. The Préfecture de Police countermanded this plan and removed the signs. Neither UEFA nor FFF escalated the dispute to the DIGES or other State authority or took any other measure which might have mitigated the problem which in fact arose on the day, other than placing a small number of volunteers at the said junction, who were ineffective. The CSDF noted that it was not informed of this dispute until after the event. If it had been, it would have raised it with stakeholders.

8.2.2.4. Furthermore, the Panel has found that UEFA shared different iterations of a map of the vicinity showing one or other of the above routes, at various different times. In particular, the significant, multi-agency security, safety and mobility meeting two days prior to the event (MD-2), chaired by an external UEFA Security Officer,

presented a map showing all supporters coming from RER D entering via ASP3, whilst the UEFA website had the same map but with supporters accessing via ASP4.

8.2.2.5. On this issue, the Panel concludes that:

- a. Not only should the key stakeholders, in particular the Préfecture de Police but also UEFA and FFF, have monitored the supporter arrival volumes in real time - factor 1 above - they should have monitored the routes between RER D and the stadium.
- b. The obvious geographical and historical problems regarding access to the stadium from RER D were or ought to have been known by the key stakeholders. In particular, there should have been a venue risk assessment which would have highlighted such issues. Had proper attention been paid to the geographical and historical problems, effective planning would have led to an operation which would have restricted the flow to ASP3 and directed the excess towards ASP4.
- c. The fact that FFF had proposed a solution which was rejected by the Préfecture de Police should have resulted in escalation to the DIGES and other State authorities by FFF and UEFA.
- d. The absence of real time monitoring, or an agreed plan to operate a safe routing scheme from RER D to the stadium was a further interoperability failure. This was compounded by a failure to involve CSDF, given their local knowledge.

8.2.3. Defective access arrangements at ASPs

8.2.3.1. The ASPs were the interface between public space and the stadium footprint, which included a controlled area outside of the turnstile perimeter, where only those with a valid ticket would be allowed entry. The ASP arrangements included 'Vigipirate' security checks under the authority of the police, and ticket activations and checks by stewards deployed by FFF.

8.2.3.2. The Panel agrees with the external UEFA Security Officer, that the ASP arrangements were "not fit for purpose". He had been responsible for outer perimeter security at the 2017 UCLF at Cardiff, and is therefore well-placed to give such an opinion. We focus on ASP3 as the epicentre of where problems occurred, but many of the shortcomings of that entry point were common to other ASPs. He asserted that ASP3 access was defective for the following reasons:

- a. There was no plan or operation to monitor or restrict the number of supporters approaching that entrance (factor two above). He observed no attempt to limit or alleviate the congestion once it arose.

- b. Entry to the controlled area was via a narrow ramp (about 10m across), which formed an obvious bottleneck. It was insufficient for the numbers accessing through this entrance.
- c. Photographs of ASP3 show that there were six channels for persons to enter between metal barriers. FFF has asserted that there were 10 lines for supporters going through the checks. UEFA undertook flowrate calculations on the basis of 15 lines. He expressed the view that there was room for about 7 lines.
- d. The positioning of two different checks at ASPs - for security and tickets - was not usual, as confirmed by CSDF. This affected throughput rates, slowing entry.
- e. The effect of two different checks on throughput was compounded by the fact that there were two types of ticket – digital and paper. In reality this meant there were three distinct processes at ASPs: security checks, chemical pen checks on paper tickets, and digital activation of mobile phone tickets.
- f. There was no ‘escape’ lane for those rejected at the checks, which meant those turned away impeded the access of those with valid tickets.
- g. Police vans partially blocked the approach. UEFA’s S&S Unit has noted that the vehicles were positioned across part of the access to ASP3, which negatively affected throughput.
- h. Security checks were more thorough than expected. UEFA observed that the Vigipirate checks were far more comprehensive than it had anticipated or assumed in its flow rate calculations, again affecting throughput rates.
- i. There was no police line across the front of the access checks. FFF asserted that this had been expected and would have regulated flow.
- j. UEFA noted that only about half of the stewards deployed on MD had completed their e-learning package, which was focussed on ticketing and access principles (this may have had a contributory effect, but it is not clear whether those deployed at ASPs were the ones who had relevant training deficits).
- k. There were no contingency plans to deal with congestion or other issues at ASPs.

8.2.3.3. The Panel notes that UEFA’s contention is that FFF were responsible for ASPs, but its staff did assist with design. UEFA, UEFA Events SA and FFF criticise failures of the police regarding the operation of ASPs. On the evidence, it appears that UEFA’s involvement in the design and operation of ASPs was limited to insisting on ticket checks and activation at ASPs, and one of the S&S Unit staff undertaking throughput calculations.

8.2.3.4. The Panel has concluded that UEFA should have taken a proactive oversight role to ensure access arrangements were safe, irrespective of who actually designed and operated them on MD. UEFA were not provided with nor did they seek to obtain any plan as to how ASPs were to work, nor did they commission a crowd modelling report as is often the case where there are challenges to access and egress arrangements.

8.2.3.5. The Panel found that the UEFA throughput calculations were completely defective, for the following reasons:

- a. They were based on approximately twice the number of lanes as their own external Security Officer reported was possible.
- b. They took no account of the effect of dual checks, compounded by two different ticketing forms.
- c. They took no account of the actual police plans relating to congestion, and the extent of the Vigipirate checks.
- d. They took no account of the absence of an 'escape' lane.

8.2.3.6. UEFA Events SA and FFF had agreed to use a plan used for the French Cup Final as the basis for safety and security at the UCLF. Apart from the fact that the UEFA S&S Unit did not see any plan for the French Cup or UCLF, the Panel has concluded that the use of the earlier match was a poor comparator. It involved two domestic clubs, and the mobility and risk profiles were completely different.

8.2.3.7. The Panel rejects attempts by UEFA, UEFA Events SA, FFF, and Préfecture de Police to blame ticketless supporters for the congestion and overwhelming of ASP3. Whether or not there were supporters and locals without valid tickets at ASP3, it could not cope with the number of supporters arriving from RER D without a cordon regulating the flow at the junction where the crowd could be split between ASP3 and 4.

8.2.3.8. The Panel also rejects any suggestion that late arriving supporters were a cause of the problems, for the same reasons, and also because the problems were apparent about three hours prior to kick-off.

8.2.3.9. The Panel has concluded that the evidence regarding the design and operation of ASP3 shows an absence of interoperability between the Préfecture, FFF, and UEFA, and a failure to involve CSDF in the planning, which had relevant

knowledge and expertise. In particular, the police and FFF appeared to be operating parallel plans which were not compatible, and with a lack of effective communication or joint operational command.

8.2.4. Ticketing: the use of two different forms of tickets

8.2.4.1. The use of both paper and blockchain digital tickets greatly complicated a situation where a large number of supporters had to be managed and directed to their entrances.

8.2.4.2. Ticket checks at ASPs involved the use of chemical pens, and should have involved assistance and an 'escape' lane and dispute process. In parallel, the activation of digital tickets on mobile phones required a different form of assistance and dispute, and the use of a handheld beacon, plus a fallback activation process. This necessitated not only several different processes but training for stewards on each.

8.2.4.3. The Panel has concluded that the overcomplicated ticketing exacerbated the other access problems, and contributed to the dangerous situation which occurred. There are arguments in favour of using either paper or digital ticketing, although the latter is almost certainly going to be the future. The Panel has concluded that a safe system can be provided with either paper or digital tickets, but the use of both is problematic.

8.2.5. Defective access arrangements at the turnstile perimeter

8.2.5.1. The plan was to use ASPs to restrict access to the concourse around the stadium to those with valid tickets. That was a laudable approach. It should have avoided the congestion and serious access problems which occurred at the turnstiles on the night.

8.2.5.2. The turnstile arrangements at SDF include half height turnstiles and tripods. These present opportunity for anyone who is prepared to jump the turnstile or dive under it. Apart from controlling access through the ASPs, the physical architecture required enough stewards to be positioned in front of and behind the turnstiles, with an effective queuing arrangement. It is well known that a lack of control at the entrance to turnstiles adversely affects throughput.

8.2.5.3. The Panel has found little evidence of effective stewarding or appropriate

queuing arrangements in front of the turnstiles from the outset, however any such arrangements were rendered ineffective when the ASP was abandoned and there was free access into the controlled concourse area. In addition, the Panel has heard much evidence of valid tickets having to be presented multiple times to gain entrance, the resulting congestion seriously impeded flow through the turnstiles, which, cumulatively exacerbated the congestion outside the turnstiles. Indeed, various turnstile blocks were closed for long periods of time as a result of the congestion.

8.2.6. Actions of locals

8.2.6.1. The Panel has received widespread evidence that groups assumed to be French residents - locals - were present around the Stade de France and in its general vicinity. Some were involved in attacks on supporters and others in the vicinity of the stadium, and in trying to gain entry to the stadium without tickets, some successfully, by breaking-in, or by climbing fences or jumping turnstiles. According to evidence from FFF, these problems were apparent from around 13:00 on match day, and continued through the day and evening, including after the match.

8.2.6.2. The Stade de France is situated in an area with significant social deprivation, and a high crime rate. There has been a history of social unrest and problems between sections of the local community and the police and other authorities. This history has included tensions accompanying major football matches occurring at the Stade de France.

8.2.6.3. The 2015 Council of Europe mission to France, reported on the problem of attacks on foreign football supporters by locals (albeit not specific to Saint-Denis), and the Panel received credible evidence of such attacks on supporters at previous international and domestic fixtures at the Stade de France.

8.2.6.4. The Préfecture de Police, FFF and CSDF have all commented on the unprecedented scale of this problem on the night. It is difficult for the Panel to comment on the scale of these problems in the past, however crime targeted at supporters and attempts to force entrance to the ground were foreseeable. These incursions led to gate closures which amplified the throughput problems already encountered.

8.2.6.5. The Panel notes that no effective action was taken to prevent these issues or when these problems became apparent in the early afternoon of MD. The

Panel further notes evidence that police officers near to the scene of attacks on supporters failed to intervene, and that the attacks continued in various places around the stadium, and on routes to transport hubs and at the stations, long after the match finished.

8.2.6.6. The Panel has concluded:

- a. There is no evidence of any measures taken to relieve community tension which was foreseeable, prior to MD, for example by meetings with community leaders.
- b. There is evidence of unhappiness by some local businesses with MD arrangements.
- c. There is no evidence that the targeting of supporters and others attending the event by locals was addressed or prioritised during the planning phase.
- d. There were insufficient police resources deployed to deal with the problems which in fact arose.
- e. Since the problems arose early in the afternoon, there is no evidence of an effective dynamic risk assessment and application of contingencies to prevent the problems continuing.

8.2.6.7. Finally in this regard, the Panel notes the request by French authorities to remove reference to the role of locals from the UEFA media release following the events of the night. This request should not have been made. UEFA should not have acted upon it, the effect of which was to contribute to an already misleading statement.

8.2.7. Use of tear gas and pepper spray in the confined space on the concourse

8.2.7.1. The Panel has considered a substantial body of eye-witness accounts from supporters and others regarding the use of tear gas and pepper spray. The Panel has also viewed photographs and footage of the use of such weaponry.

8.2.7.2. On the evidence, the Panel concludes that tear gas canisters were targeted predominantly at groups of locals, although the effect was indiscriminate. Many supporters and others attending the event were seriously affected, including children and the disabled. In addition, handheld pepper spray aerosols were deployed against individual supporters. In clear cases, the supporters were doing nothing other than holding up tickets in obvious attempts to obtain legitimate entry. The use of such weaponry led to crushing as evidenced by buckled security barriers. Although the tear gas caused groups of locals to move rapidly, this was obviously dangerous within the confined space of the concourse.

8.2.7.3. The Panel observes that the situation which led to tear gas being deployed should not have arisen, and would not have done if there had been effective engagement with the community, effective policing of crime, and effective access arrangements.

8.2.7.4. The Panel concludes that the use of tear gas and pepper spray has no place at a festival of football. Its use at UCLF22 will have disinclined families and vulnerable supporters from future attendance, and will have damaged the reputation of the event. Furthermore, it raises a question mark over the ability of the French authorities to properly manage major sporting events at the Stade de France.

8.2.8. Lack of Contingency plans

8.2.8.1. There were no contingency plans to deal with access problems at the ASPs or for consequent problems at the turnstiles. No stakeholder has suggested there were contingency plans and none of the minutes of the planning meetings refer to contingencies. The Panel views this as a particularly serious failure. Wherever large crowds attend to access an event there is a potential for access problems and congestion, which raise significant public safety issues. There was no Plan B when things went wrong.

8.2.8.2. Contingency plans should have included the rapid redeployment of stewards and police resources to a problem area, the redirection and management of crowds, the reimposition of access arrangements where they have failed, and the maintenance of throughput rates into the stadium for those with valid tickets. Contingencies should have been reinforced by effective multi-agency crisis management planning and arrangements, and means of communication with affected supporters.

8.3. Factors attributed by others

8.3.1. Having summarised conclusions on what the Panel has found to be causal factors in the events which nearly turned into disaster, we now summarise our conclusions on whether ticketless supporters or those trying to gain entry with counterfeit or blag tickets were a contributory factor. We emphasise that this is a different issue to the actions of locals, which is dealt with above at paragraph 8.2.6.

8.3.2. Supporters without valid tickets

8.3.2.1. A number of key stakeholders have stated as fact that there were a huge number of supporters trying to gain access through ASP3 and the turnstiles without valid tickets. The Panel notes that individuals trying to gain access to major sporting events without valid tickets is a well-known phenomenon, and UCLF22 was no exception. These are matters that must be taken into account in planning, and operations on the day.

8.3.2.2. The Panel notes from various planning documents that the issue was not only foreseeable but it was actually foreseen. The appropriate question is whether the number of persons attending the vicinity of the Stade de France, trying to gain access without tickets was so large and troublesome so as to overwhelm reasonable and appropriate plans.

8.3.2.3. The Panel notes that the effect of ticketless supporters is relied upon by key stakeholders to explain why they were not accountable for what happened on the night. The Panel is also aware of the sensitivities of this for other stakeholders, including the supporters, sponsors and clubs. Therefore, the Panel has been focussed and rigorous in following the actual available evidence regarding both ticketless supporters and counterfeits.

8.3.2.4. The assertions of UEFA, FFF and the French authorities, including Ministers and the Préfecture, have been based largely upon the numbers assumed to have travelled to the Stade de France via both private and public transport. The Panel has concluded:

8.3.2.5. The numbers asserted by multiple stakeholders are subjective estimates and not actual objectively measured figures, and different estimates have been asserted by different stakeholders.

8.3.2.6. Despite several targeted requests, the Panel has not been provided with contemporaneous records of the estimates (except for one data set provided orally to UEFA at around 19:45 on MD), or a clear explanation as to how they were reached or when. Some estimates were amended after the event. Consequently, these transportation figures are both inconsistent and unreliable.

8.3.2.7. There is no evidence of a mass of ticketless supporters in the vicinity of the stadium.

8.3.2.8. Footage from around the actual time of kick-off (21:36), and the evidence of the external UEFA Security Officer who was observing the perimeter at the south side of the stadium (the LFC access), indicates that there were hundreds of LFC supporters still queuing to get in, but no other substantial body of supporters outside.

8.3.2.9. The same footage and accounts indicate that there were large numbers of locals outside of the stadium at this time.

8.3.2.10. UEFA figures derived from the turnstile data, establish that 2,733 LFC valid ticketholders were unable to register their tickets at the turnstiles.

8.3.2.11. The Panel therefore concludes that while the number of supporters trying to gain access without a valid ticket is unknown, there is no evidence it was a substantial number or any more than usual at such an event. At the time of actual kick-off, there were some hundreds of Liverpool supporters still queuing to gain entry, no doubt including many of the supporters with valid tickets who did not get in at all. There were groups of locals, but no other groups of supporters. By 22:10, all ticketed supporters who still sought to enter were inside the stadium.

8.3.2.12. With respect to counterfeits, there is social media evidence of the availability of fake and 'blag' tickets (the latter designed to get the person close enough to the turnstile to be able to jump or tailgate into the stadium). There is some anecdotal evidence, second hand from stewards, that there were many fake tickets at ASP3, but this is impossible to either verify or quantify.

8.3.2.13. In terms of verifiable evidence, there was a total of 1,644 presentations of tickets with unknown QR codes at turnstiles dedicated to LFC supporters (gates X, Y and Z). The Panel notes:

- a. The number of presentations will have been substantially higher than the number of counterfeits, as the holder would be expected to attempt entry at multiple scanners.
- b. Everyone with a fake ticket would have been able to access turnstiles, given the failure of the ASP.
- c. UEFA staff candidly accepted to the Panel that counterfeit tickets were a feature at UCLFs.

8.3.2.14. As noted in 8.1.7 the Panel concludes that the problem of fake tickets has been overstated and there is no evidence that it contributed to the events of UCLF22.

8.4. Conclusions relating to specific stakeholders

8.4.1. Overview

8.4.1.1. The Panel has concluded that there were a series of failures which caused or contributed to the problems which occurred on 28th May 2022. Many of the stakeholders are accountable for those failures to one extent or another, however, the Panel's spotlight has focussed upon UEFA, FFF, and the Préfecture, because of their key roles, which should have ensured the safety of UCLF22.

8.4.1.2. In summary, the UEFA 'model' created a lacuna, whereby no one had proper oversight over the full planning and operational picture, and a particular consequence of this was that there were substantial deficits in joint working between stakeholders, which were not picked-up and remedied.

8.4.1.3. The policing model was inappropriately focussed on public order policing and failed to meet the obligations set out in the 2016 Convention: a safety, security and service model based on engagement with supporters and local communities and a multi-agency approach. On the evidence, the Panel has concluded that this led to a securitised policing approach, there was minimal proactive engagement by the police with either supporters or other partners, and no other stakeholder escalated this problem to higher French authorities. The outdated policing model was based upon flawed assumptions about risk and was over reliant on the reactive use of munitions. As such the policing operation was not only inadequate in meeting the challenges it encountered but actively contributed to the dangers that materialised.

8.4.2. UEFA (including UEFA Events SA)

8.4.2.1. The Panel has concluded that UEFA, as event owner, bears primary responsibility for failures which almost led to disaster. Whereas it was reasonable to delegate various security and safety matters to others – primarily FFF – and to defer to the constitutional position of the Préfecture de Police regarding policing duties, it did not follow that this absolved UEFA of responsibility. UEFA was central to the organisation of the event, and it should have monitored, supervised and

assisted with security and safety measures, to ensure they were fit for purpose, and to identify and remedy problems before they arose in real time.

8.4.2.2. UEFA was at the centre of the event. It had an obligation to ensure all components of the 'project' were fulfilled effectively. So far as safety and security were concerned UEFA had requirements in its bidding process, it had a dedicated S&S Unit, its Events management attended various multi-agency planning meetings, its external Security Officers chaired the important MD-2 security meeting, and it had a Safety and Security Adviser from the S&S Unit in the stadium control room.

8.4.2.3. The 'delegation and deference' model was manifestly not a contract which just transferred all obligations elsewhere, although the Panel has found that UEFA and UEFA Events SA's leadership treated it as such. UEFA did remain involved throughout, and so it should. However, it did so ineffectually, without taking responsibility and without doing so through the appropriate staff: its own S&S Unit.

8.4.2.4. The Panel has found that the presence of Events management at planning meetings was not sufficient to ensure that there were proper safety and security plans. The MD-2 security, safety and mobility meeting should have been chaired by a senior member of the UEFA S&S Unit, not external Security Officers as it should not have been their role. The Panel has not been able to identify any effective action taken by the S&S Unit Safety and Security Adviser present in the stadium control room on MD, including during the crisis.

8.4.2.5. In addition, the Saint-Denis Convention obliges State authorities to work together with organisers – UEFA must be central to how that works with respect to a UCLF. Julien Zylberstein, Managing Director of UEFA European Affairs & Governance, told the Senate hearings of UEFA's involvement with the Saint-Denis Convention and its Standing Committee, but he was less forthcoming as to why its provisions failed to ensure effective joint working, and proper engagement with supporters at UEFA's 2022 flagship event. Indeed, he failed to address that at all.

8.4.2.6. The Panel emphasises two points. Mobility and last kilometre routing may well occur in the public space outside of the private stadium footprint, but they involve 'customers' attending the event. Secondly, as is obvious from the facts, mobility and routing had a direct effect on the arrangements at the interface between the public and private spaces, and beyond.

8.4.2.7. As a result, where the Panel identifies failures, it is not open to UEFA to avoid accountability by attributing blame to others: the supporters, the transport networks, the Préfecture, or FFF. There was contributory fault from other stakeholders, but UEFA were at the wheel.

8.4.2.8. The Panel found that UEFA's operational staff were motivated and committed to their roles. Although the Panel has highlighted a number of tasks which should have been performed better, UEFA and UEFA Events SA's responsibility for the failures on 28th May was mainly the result of the following senior management failures and structural issues:

- a. The Senior management of UEFA Events SA used 'delegation and deference' to try to avoid accountability. Stewarding services were being sub-contracted, and policing authorities were fulfilling their duties: but with respect to a UEFA event. Safety and security were components of the project. The marginalisation of UEFA's own S&S Unit was a consequence.
- b. The failure of UEFA's wider senior leadership to address these issues over a number of years, despite clear knowledge of them.
- c. The failure of the Director of National Associations, who is responsible for the S&S Unit, and the failure of the Head of the Unit himself, to escalate the structural problems and side-lining of the unit.

8.4.2.9. In summary, the senior management of UEFA Events SA was responsible for each component of the UCLF project. Safety and security matters should have been viewed as a specific component and overseen by the dedicated UEFA S&S Unit. Its responsibility should have included:

- a. Overseeing each aspect of planning which affected safety and security and ensuring it was appropriate.
- b. Attending all planning meetings involving S&S issues, and fully engaging with all relevant partners over plans and arrangements.
- c. Ensuring effective joint working with each relevant stakeholder, in particular the Préfecture de Police and FFF, but also the CSDF, transport networks, the Clubs, their respective national football policing authorities, supporter associations, and local authorities responsible for the fan zones.
- d. Ensuring that it received properly tested and validated venue and event risk assessments.

- e. Ensuring it received and oversaw operational plans for the private security and safety function, and received the operational order or summary of policing plan from the Préfecture, and critiquing these as and where they were not consistent with the Saint-Denis Convention.
- f. Ensuring it checked the safety and security of mobility arrangements to the vicinity of the stadium, and in particular routing and safety within the last kilometre.
- g. Ensuring it checked all access arrangements (ASPs and turnstiles) and made sure they were fit for purpose. This would include testing throughput calculations, and taking account of all features of the entrances.
- h. Ensuring there were contingency plans for a range of foreseeable problems, including access point failures, and congestion.
- i. Ensuring that all stewards were appropriately trained and accredited, not only in accordance with the law, but also UEFA's requirements for the event.
- j. Ensuring that there were clear lines of communication with partners in real time on MD, and that all stakeholders were fully engaged with joint working principles.
- k. Ensuring it had sufficient observers to spot emerging issues in real time.
- l. Ensuring that there was an effective, agreed multi-agency crisis management plan for emergencies.
- m. Escalating problems with partners which it was unable to resolve.

8.4.2.10. On the evidence, the Panel has concluded that the S&S Unit was marginalised by UEFA Events SA senior management. Insofar as it engaged with any of the above, the S&S Unit did not do so effectively. If the Unit had been properly engaged, with clear lines of responsibility, the Panel has no reason to believe it would not have done so effectively, and there is a likelihood that the problems that were allowed to arise on 28th May would have been identified and rectified before they happened.

8.4.2.11. The Panel has noted that UEFA's external Security Officer deployed to observe the south of the stadium had identified that the ASPs were not fit for purpose when he arrived at the ground in the mid-afternoon of MD. He passed that view on, firstly to a colleague and then on the S&S Unit WhatsApp message group. No effective action followed. Although it was late to rectify the problems, the Panel concludes that UEFA representatives in the control room should have taken decisive action and escalated these concerns with the police commander and FFF. Even at that stage, measures could have been taken to monitor and regulate the

flow of people going towards ASP3, diverting the excess to ASP4. The positioning of police vans and the cooperation between police and stewards could have been improved, and the numbers of officers and stewards increased.

8.4.2.12. The Panel has noted the absence of contingency plans regarding problems at the ASPs or turnstiles. The Panel has also noted that there was no multi-agency crisis plan, and when problems occurred there was no joined-up approach. The absence of any such plans was a fundamental failure by the stakeholders involved, which had real consequences on the night. It is a clear example of the need for a lead agency to ensure planning is robust, and to identify such lacunae. As event owner, UEFA was that agency.

8.4.2.13. Furthermore, although the Panel believes the decision to delay the kick-off was correct, it notes that the process by which it happened was confused, and involved a meeting of the President of UEFA and other members of the senior leadership team in a stairwell near to the VIP area. A decision to delay kick-off either results from a security or public safety issue, or has consequences for safety. It should be taken by those responsible for security and public safety: by a crisis meeting in the control room, chaired by the police commander or his/her representative. If the decision is taken or has to be ratified elsewhere, those involved will not have the information or expertise required, and irrelevant factors - such as the interests of broadcasters - may be taken into account.

8.4.2.14. Once the decision to delay kick-off had been taken, UEFA Events SA displayed messages on the stadium big screens. The Panel notes that no attempt at communication with those outside the stadium occurred. This could have occurred through the App and website, by a request to Liverpool stewards to spread the message, or by megaphone messaging at the turnstiles. The first big screen message asserted that the delay was due to a security issue, and that message was swiftly replaced by one stating that the delay had been caused by the late arrival of supporters. It was manifestly inaccurate that 'lateness' had anything to do with the problems on 28th May. This is a matter of great sensitivity to Liverpool supporters because, for more than two decades, 'late supporters' were falsely accused of causing the Hillsborough disaster.

8.4.2.15. The Panel has no hesitation in finding that the message should not have been displayed. It is never appropriate to post messages which are untrue. However, the Panel does accept that this was a crass error of judgment rather than anything more, and there was no intention to cause distress. UEFA has explained

that it uses pre-prepared messages, because it is too complicated to compile messages in the moment and translate into multiple languages. The Panel has been informed that UEFA Events SA has already taken measures to rectify this issue.

8.4.2.16. The Panel has noted the media release put out by UEFA in the immediate aftermath of the event on the night. There are two points of importance. Firstly, it blamed supporters with fake tickets. Secondly its original draft noted that locals had contributed to the problems. The first assertion was incorrect and should not have been made. The second was correct, but was edited out of the version that was published, at the request of the French authorities. This was not a factual correction by the French authorities, as several UEFA staff and officials had witnessed the scenes of locals engaged in disorder and attacks on supporters. If UEFA had to put out a media release it should have only included assertions based on verified data, and it should not have been self-censored, at the request of others.

8.4.2.17. Subsequently, UEFA has not recognised its own role or that of other stakeholders in the problems on the night, nor has it corrected its assertions about the supporters that have been removed from its website after request by FSE and Spirit of Shankly. In a UEFA presentation dated 8th June, UEFA was still blaming late supporters many without valid tickets for the problems. The Panel finds, that eleven days after the event, it was unacceptable that UEFA continued to attribute blame to the supporters.

8.4.2.18. UEFA Events SA's senior management gave evidence to the Senate hearings on behalf of UEFA. CEO Martin Kallen's account of what occurred was seriously flawed and contained assertions that were objectively untrue. In particular, Mr Kallen asserted that UEFA had staged previous events at the SDF without incident, making particular reference to the 2006 UCLF at which he was present. In fact, UEFA reported after the 2006 match that there had been serious problems, including interoperability failures with the police and access problems. In interview, Mr Kallen claimed not to know about congestion problems that had occurred on the RER D to stadium route at the 2016 French Cup Final, even though they had triggered a review before the Euro 2016 matches which occurred at the SDF. Similarly, he told the Panel he had not seen an April 2022 report from FSE which had been provided as part of the planning for the UCLF22 which had again warned of congestion problems at this same area of the approach to the SDF.

8.4.2.19. The Panel concludes that it is beyond question that UEFA's representatives should have been properly briefed, and should have ensured

that they gave only robust, accurate and complete evidence to a parliamentary committee holding hearings to determine what changes should be made to improve public safety. Mr Kallen and Mr Zylberstein did not do so.

8.4.3. Fédération Française de Football (FFF)

8.4.3.1. The Panel notes that UEFA delegated many organisational issues to FFF. In particular, FFF had a central role in planning and operating security and safety measures at UCLF22. The Panel concludes that FFF failed to establish effective interoperability with multiple partners, including the transport networks, Préfecture de Police, SDF and UEFA.

8.4.3.2. We have been unable to resolve the factual dispute as to who knew what, when, about the diversion of a substantial volume of supporters onto RER D. We have already commented on the fact that the dispute itself evidences the lack of effective joint working regarding the mobility of supporters to the vicinity of the stadium.

8.4.3.3. However, whatever the plans were thought to be, travel arrangements are notoriously susceptible to change. The Panel notes that there was a representative of the networks in the stadium control room alongside both FFF and UEFA, yet apparently no real time awareness of the much larger numbers arriving by RER D. It appears that FFF and UEFA did not make any or sufficient checks on this until too late.

8.4.3.4. The Panel has concluded that the problem posed by a larger than expected volume of supporters arriving via RER D should have been an obvious concern to FFF, because:

- a. It had regularly staged events at the SDF and knew of the geographical issues on that approach.
- b. It was aware that ASP3 had limited access, that there had been access problems at the domestic Cup final and that the police were planning to route all supporters arriving via RER D in that direction.
- c. It had been in dispute with the Préfecture de Police about the signage, and its proposal to split supporters arriving at RER D between ASP3 and ASP4.

8.4.3.5. The Panel has therefore concluded that FFF should have ensured it had real time information about arrival volumes at RER D, through effective communication with the transport network or through placing stewards at the

RER D station and along the approaches to the stadium. Furthermore, it should have escalated the dispute with the Préfecture de Police to the DIGES or other ministerial level, with the involvement of UEFA. The fact it did none of these was a serious failure.

8.4.3.6. The Panel has further concluded that FFF failed to obtain or prepare a venue risk assessment, or to share a proper operational plan with partners, including UEFA.

8.4.3.7. The ASP arrangements had been delegated to FFF. They were seriously defective for the reasons already stated. FFF had failed to properly consider the effect of the configuration on throughput rates in general, and in particular on the restricted ASP3 access. FFF may have placed reliance upon the flawed UEFA calculations, however, given it was delegated to make these arrangements, it should have made sure the access points were completely safe. Again, the Panel has noted that FFF has criticised the police involvement at ASP3 regarding the blocking of access by vans, the failure to police the front of the checks, and the comprehensive rather than profiled security checks. The Panel views these criticisms as the clearest evidence – indeed an admission – of a lack of interoperability between the police and FFF.

8.4.3.8. Responsibility for operation of the turnstiles was also delegated to FFF. The Panel has found that those arrangements were unable to cope with any increased pressure, as occurred once ASP3 broke down. The fact that congestion at turnstiles reduces throughput or leads to their closure is well known, and leads to an obviously dangerous crush situation. The Panel concludes that there should have been robust contingency plans to deal with such eventuality. The failure to have such contingency plans was a significant failure.

8.4.3.9. Once the crisis occurred, FFF indicate that it liaised with the police commander. There is no record of this or any joint decisions, which makes the level of real time interoperability difficult to assess. A joint emergency strategy between the police and the stewards was vital to alleviating the dangerous situation outside the turnstiles, to manage the crowd – including by preventing further people joining the congestion from behind – and alleviate pressure on the turnstiles to ensure they stayed open and to maximise throughput. The Panel has found no evidence of any organised attempt to do so. Multiple accounts by supporters illustrate chaotic turnstile operation with multiple gate closures, and no effective management on the concourse.

8.4.4. Consortium Stade de France (CSDF)

8.4.4.1. The Panel notes that the CSDF had an important role as stadium operator, but it was not a central stakeholder in UCLF22, as it was not the event owner or organiser. However, as CSDF retained legal responsibility for fire security and seated capacity it was involved in multi-agency planning meetings.

8.4.4.2. CSDF indicated to the Panel that:

- a. It was not aware until after the event that a large number of supporters had been displaced from RER B to D, and if it had been so aware it would have raised “a big alarm signal”.
- b. It was unaware that the Préfecture de Police had overruled a FFF plan to route arriving supporters from RER D to the main avenue between RER B and the stadium (Avenue du Stade de France), and signage to that effect had been removed. If it had been aware, CSDF would have raised it as an issue, as its view was that routes to the stadium were not taken seriously enough, given the environment.
- c. The outer perimeter is usually only a counter terrorism check, and the addition of ticket checks was recent, and needed proper trialling.
- d. The access at ASP3 was obviously tight, it was not optimal to have security and ticket checks together, and there was no ‘escape’ lane for those rejected.

8.4.4.3. The Panel concludes from the above that the venue security staff should always be involved in mobility and access planning as they have local knowledge and ‘muscle memory’ of previous problems, and they should be sighted on any security and safety issue that arises. The Panel has already commented on the lack of a venue risk assessment. A venue operator would be a key contributor to the venue risk assessment, which would highlight recurrent problems.

8.4.5. The DIGES and French State

8.4.5.1. The Panel notes the role of the DIGES is to lead and coordinate the activities of the State administrations and public institutions involved in the organisation of major sporting events. It is a very important role, and in this case the DIGES chaired a number of the early planning meetings and played a part in facilitating local authority engagement with fan zones, and in assisting rail and airport management of arriving supporters.

8.4.5.2. In the aftermath, the DIGES undertook the first report on the events surrounding the UCLF22 and he found several key failures, which the Panel has taken into account. Importantly the DIGES criticised the Préfecture de Police for adopting a security rather than supporter engagement policing model for the game, which he says was founded on a completely inaccurate understanding of the Hillsborough disaster, 33 years previously. The DIGES also found that it was a mistake to remove FFF routing signage, and the police should have directed supporters arriving at RER D to B. He reported that there had been historical congestion problems on the route between RER D and the stadium, and he criticised the arrangements at ASP3.

8.4.5.3. The Panel is astonished that the policing model was influenced by a view of Liverpool hooliganism based on Hillsborough. The Panel fails to understand why this was not apparent to the DIGES (and FFF and UEFA) during the planning phase, given his institutional coordination role. Similarly, the Panel has found substantial interoperability failures across the relevant partners, and it is disappointing that this was not something that the DIGES became aware of, given his role and ability to escalate problems and seek a remedy.

8.4.5.4. The Panel has noted that the DIGES did not have access to SDF footage when undertaking his investigation immediately after the events. He told the Panel that this was because he had no investigative powers. The Panel takes the view that the DIGES should have asked the SDF to retain its footage, whether or not he had a power to order it. A judicial order could then have been obtained for the purposes of investigations, by other state institutions.

8.4.5.5. The DIGES made a number of recommendations in his report, including the need for institutionalised national governance for major sporting events, a need to optimise access flows to the stadium, and to improve interoperability. The Panel respectfully endorses those recommendations. However, the Panel comments that the first recommendation mirrors that made by the CoE delegation to France in 2015, which has not been actioned. In considering this recommendation, the Panel urges the French authorities to examine how the substantial interoperability failures in the planning and operations of UCLF22 were not identified and remedied by existing mechanisms, and how the proposed national governance would rectify that problem.

8.4.5.6. The Panel further notes that the access and interoperability issues were well known and had both been a feature of the UCLF at SDF in 2006. They appear to be ingrained, and should be looked at as such.

8.4.5.7. These comments underpin Recommendation One at the conclusion of this report: that there needs to be oversight of actioning recommendations from official inquiries and reports. If there is no process, recommendations are too often forgotten.

8.4.5.8. The Panel notes with concern that French Ministers and authorities blamed the supporters in the immediate aftermath of the events. Furthermore, the Panel is concerned that French authorities asked UEFA to remove reference to locals contributing to the problems, when manifestly they must have known that was the case.

8.4.6. *Préfecture de Police*

8.4.6.1. The Panel has found that there was a striking lack of joint working by the police. No summary of the policing plan for UCLF22 was provided to UEFA or FFF.

8.4.6.2. Despite the fact that the Préfecture de Police was present or represented at many planning meetings there was an unresolved dispute with FFF regarding the routing of supporters to the stadium from RER D. The Préfecture de Police denies knowledge of the shift of supporters onto RER D, indicating this was a decision taken by the transport network SNCF. Different partners and records of meetings suggest otherwise, however, whoever was involved there was a failure to communicate: a failure of effective joint working.

8.4.6.3. The Préfecture de Police indicated that with a 'normal' volume of supporters arriving at RER D there would have been no problems with access. On that basis the police planned that all those arriving from RER D would access the stadium via ASP3, and in fact they directed supporters to do just that on the day.

8.4.6.4. There is consensus between stakeholders that the number of supporters arriving at RER D was greater than 'normal'. Those responsible for public safety cannot rely on 'normal' levels. They must plan to identify factors which may cause a difference to the normal, and crucially they must be vigilant in real time. The Panel are clear that the police should have monitored all access routes to the stadium, and in particular the one from RER D because of the known access problems via the A1 underpass and ASP3. If they had done so, it would have been obvious that too many supporters were approaching ASP3 and a simple cordon could have been applied to divert others to ASP4.

8.4.6.5. The Panel has already detailed the multiple problems relating to ASP3. The Préfecture de Police failed to regulate the numbers of supporters approaching the stadium via that entry point. Once congestion occurred, remedial action was too little too late. Immediate cordoning to prevent further supporters joining the congested area and re-routing those at the back of the crowd would have alleviated the problem. The police commanders had access to live CCTV footage in the control room, and there was a significant police presence at ASP3. The situation should have been obvious as it began to occur but instead it took the police about two hours before any remedial action was taken.

8.4.6.6. At ASP3, the Panel has concluded that the parking of police vans exacerbated the bottleneck. Evidence from UEFA and FFF makes it clear to the Panel that there was no effective joint plan for ASP3, nor any effective relationship between the stakeholders to remedy it in real time. UEFA and FFF have asserted that they expected a line of police at the front of ASP3 to control access to the checks, and they were surprised at the intensity of the Vigipirate checks. If there had been an effective joint plan, there would have been no such misconception. No one appears to have consulted CSDF who told the Panel that there were clear problems with the ASP3 arrangements.

8.4.6.7. The Préfecture de Police was reliant in part upon stewarding arrangements to ensure public security and safety. The interface between their operations and the stewarding, particularly at access points, was crucial. The lack of joint working added to the effect of the poor design of those arrangements.

8.4.6.8. The Panel has already made its conclusion that there was an absence of contingency plans. Given the importance of the integrity of the ASPs, and the turnstile access, it was a serious and remarkable failure that there were no contingency plans for access problems.

8.4.6.9. As addressed elsewhere, the Panel has received multiple accounts of criminal attacks on supporters throughout the access and egress periods, and some accounts of police officers standing by and not intervening. The Panel has concluded that there was no attempt to understand or de-escalate community tension, or any effective plan to police crime and protect supporters from muggings, assaults and pickpocketing, despite the problem being foreseeable. The Panel further notes that there is clear evidence that disorder by locals occurred from early afternoon, and concludes that there was an absence of dynamic risk assessment and reaction from the police in this regard.

8.4.6.10. Some witnesses have referred to cultural issues and the hierarchical structure of policing in France, as factors in what went wrong. Every nation has its own approach to policing security and safety, and it is not for the Panel to descend into such matters. UEFA and other international sporting bodies must engage with existing State authorities and ensure that guarantees for appropriate public authority engagement – including policing – are in place before bids are determined. UEFA has very considerable ‘soft power’ – it can literally take its ball elsewhere – and it has tools at its disposal, such as the 2016 Convention which is binding upon its signatories.

8.4.6.11. The requirement for policing authorities to adopt a supporter engagement approach, and the imperative for effective joint working must be viewed as non-negotiable. References to cultural differences or deference to national systems should not be viewed as relevant factors.

9. Recommendations

9. Recommendations

9.1. Introduction

9.1.1. The UCLF is more than a football match. It is a festival of football and should be promoted as such. In open societies, supporters are free to travel to host cities with or without tickets. UEFA's longstanding experience, both at club and national tournament levels, demonstrates that certain supporters regularly travel to events en masse with or without tickets.

9.1.2. From the outset, all stakeholders involved with the delivery of UCLFs should therefore view the event as a festival, embrace all supporters and treat fan zones as an integral and positive part of planning. Such an approach is entirely in line with the Saint-Denis Convention and its underlying principles and when adopted should deliver an approach based upon safety, security, and service.

9.1.3. It has been recognised by UEFA, and is supported by scientific research, that where large crowds of supporters are positively facilitated and met with a proportionate and graded response to policing, fewer security or public order problems emerge²⁹⁸. Historically, this ethos has formed the basis for UEFA's approach to football fixtures and tournaments with an international dimension since Euro 2004. This knowledge and experience are now enshrined within the Saint-Denis Convention.

9.1.4. The Panel has determined its narrative of events, identified failures which caused or contributed to what went wrong, and have made conclusions as to who was accountable.

9.1.5. It is evident from our inquiry that the near miss experienced at UCLF22 was largely the result of poor planning, a lack of oversight of plans, poor interoperability between various stakeholders, and a lack of contingencies. In this regard we concur with the conclusions of the French Senate. However, as the event owner, it is our view that it was ultimately UEFA who was responsible for the failure of these multiple stakeholders to realise their shared obligation to comply with the Saint-Denis Convention. In other words, this was not a failure of policy so much as it was a failure of oversight by UEFA in adequately ensuring that policy was applied.

²⁹⁸ — See "A new agenda for football crowd management: reforming legal and policing responses to risk", Pearson, G. & Stott, C. (2022)

9.1.6. UEFA maintains that it always puts the safety and security of supporters at the heart of its requirements. We have no reason to dispute this. However, it is self-evident that UEFA failed to achieve this objective at UCLF22. Its expressed commitment to an integrated approach broke down. Hence UEFA must take responsibility for oversight of delivery, irrespective of whether these are considered to be private stewarding matters routinely delegated to other partners or fall under the public duties of policing authorities.

9.1.7. Safety and security can never be compromised. However, since multiple stakeholders are involved, this duty can only be realised if a holistic and integrated approach is achieved. The UEFA model underpinning UCLF22 - whereby UEFA Events SA project managed all the component parts of arrangements for a UCLF - was flawed in this regard and therefore must change.

9.1.8. It is the Panel's conclusion that the policing model for UCLF22 was not fit for purpose and was inconsistent with the facilitation oriented, dialogue led, and graded approach required by the Convention. Specifically, an overly securitised approach, unilateral actions by police, an overwhelming focus on misperceived public order threats posed by Liverpool fans, poor cooperation with the event organiser, lack of engagement with supporters and over reliance on munitions were all clear features of what went wrong at UCLF22.

9.1.9. The Panel found no evidence that so called ticketless supporters or those in possession of forged tickets played any significant causal role in the problems that occurred at UCLF22. In contrast, the Panel did find evidence that the dual digital and paper ticket format was a factor that, in combination with others, undermined throughput at critical entry points.

9.1.10. Therefore, we make the following 21 recommendations.

9.2. Recommendation 1:

9.2.1. Given UEFA experienced serious interoperability difficulties with the policing authorities at the previous UCLF at the Stade de France in 2006. The CoE delegation of 2015 made a series of recommendations which were not actioned by the French authorities. Where failures are identified, UEFA must not just move on, but must rather exercise due diligence to ensure corrective action is taken where required, in advance of future events. This should be clearly documented, and a system instituted to ensure it is included in the consideration of future bids, and the planning of future events.

9.2.2. It is a key feature of many inquiries and reviews that recommendations are never properly considered or put into action. The reasons for this are varied, but without a robust process, the likelihood of recommendations being ignored, or a lack of inertia leading to them being forgotten, increases exponentially.

9.2.3. Hence our first recommendation addresses this issue by focusing on creating internal compliance mechanisms within UEFA. UEFA should construct a process to ensure the recommendations made by the Panel below are implemented, including where appropriate, by other stakeholders.

9.2.4. To ensure transparency, by the 8th May 2023, UEFA should post on its website an action plan containing a summary of action taken with respect to each of the recommendations made in this report. It should highlight matters outstanding and provide reasoning why any recommendations have not been adopted. The published action plan should be regularly updated until all recommendations have been subject to remedial action or considered and rejected with reasoning.

9.3. Recommendation 2:

9.3.1. UEFA, through its allocation process and subsequent agreements, contracts and guarantees, should always require that all stakeholders – public and private – adopt the facilitation and service approach set out in the Convention.

9.3.2. In this respect UEFA should therefore provide proactive and demonstrable support to the stakeholders to facilitate all supporters who wish to travel to the host city for a UCLF final. Accordingly, supporters arriving in the host city without access to match tickets should never be understood or treated as inherently a public order problem but facilitated as tourists who are travelling to be a part of the festival the authorities are seeking to promote.

9.4. Recommendation 3:

9.4.1. Specifically, we recommend that safety, security, and service oversight must be recognised by UEFA, and UEFA Events SA, as an integrated but distinct component of UCLF operations, so that such issues always remain the primary responsibility of the UEFA S&S Unit. The Head of the Unit should have express responsibility and accountability for oversight and signing-off all measures relating to safety and security, and where any significant dispute arises with other

stakeholders, either public authorities (including the police) or private entities, the Head of the Unit should be responsible for escalating them to a resolution.

9.4.2. To adequately discharge its duty, the responsibilities of the UEFA S&S Unit should include those responsibilities we set out in detail elsewhere in this Report. However, in summary we propose that under a new UEFA model the S&S Unit should adopt primacy regarding the following responsibilities.

- a. The S&S unit should provide ongoing guidance and advice on security and safety matters to partners at all stages of the bid process and once a venue is selected to work closely with all stakeholders regarding the formation of staging agreements, contracts and guarantees, and the drawing-up of the operational plan.
- b. The S&S unit should take part in all relevant planning meetings, monitor all private stewarding arrangements, and approve them only when they are fit for purpose and optimal. In particular the S&S Unit should ensure that there are robust venue and event risk assessments, a multi-agency operational plan for mobility, safety and security, and a summary policing plan.
- c. The Head of the S&S Unit should chair the final multi-agency security and safety meeting prior to a UCLF.
- d. The S&S Unit should make sure that all stewards are fully trained and accredited, both to national standards, but also to UEFA requirements.
- e. They should oversee the safety and security requirements of disabled and other vulnerable supporters, including children and the elderly (see below).
- f. In particular, the S&S unit should be responsible for liaising with policing and Government authorities to monitor compliance with the Saint-Denis Convention, particularly in terms of the policing model.
- g. They should ensure that there is effective communication and interoperability built into the private and public security and safety plans and provisions and that there are contingency plans for all foreseeable emergencies.
- h. They should ensure there is an effective and agreed multi-agency crisis management plan, to be instituted in the event of an emergency. Where they occur the S&S Unit should seek to actively resolve disagreements between partners and escalate any which remain. This responsibility should extend to mobility of supporters to the vicinity of the venue, arrangements for approach in the last kilometre, and access and should include consideration of all manner of threat and risk, including crime and congestion.

- i. UEFA S&S Unit should set clear criteria for when a crowd modelling report should be commissioned. These should include where the topography of the area is difficult for the movement of large crowds, including narrow underpasses, bridges and walkways, bottlenecks, and narrow entrances, local crime issues, and a history of previous congestion problems.
- j. The S&S Unit should ensure that all oversight, dispute resolution and escalation, and approvals are fully documented.

9.5. Recommendation 4:

9.5.1. UEFA has a policy already in place to ensure compliance with the Convention as this relates to disabled supporters. This clearly failed at UCLF 2022. Therefore, we recommend that the UEFA S&S Unit develops its capacity in this domain to ensure that mobility and access arrangements are as safe and secure as possible for supporters with any disabilities or special needs, and that service to them is optimised.

9.5.2. This should include fuller and more proactive engagement with disabled supporter organisations and the respective clubs to determine needs and requirements, as part of UEFA's fan dialogue policy. Furthermore, UEFA should proactively monitor all relevant service provisions for disabled supporters, and indeed other vulnerable supporters including children and the elderly, during the planning and delivery phases. Similarly, the S&S Unit should escalate deficits through project management, to resolve them in advance of MD regarding the mobility and access arrangements for this category of fans.

9.6. Recommendation 5:

9.6.1. The evidence from UCLF22 demonstrates that the CSDF may have identified and escalated problems which were apparently not obvious to others, as it had memory of previous local issues and problems. Although local variation will occur, where relevant, UEFA should require as a term of the contract with the host stadium, that the appropriate stadium safety team or equivalent be directly and more fully involved in planning. This should relate to mobility issues beyond the stadium itself and include routing, the last kilometre, access points, local intelligence relating to crime, topography, traffic management and parking. It should also include contributing to and agreeing the venue and event risk assessments, and operational plan.

9.7. Recommendation 6:

9.7.1. We recommend that it is made a requirement for UCLF host stadiums to have well managed security perimeters, welcome services & crowd guidance and orientation. This should be integrated with efficient channelling and proper stewarding deployment avoiding congestions at turnstiles. In its oversight role the UEFA S&S Unit should stress test the electronic turnstile systems to ensure sufficient functionality. Moreover, more rigorous procedures must be developed to calculate flow through these access points and such calculations must be stress tested before the event.

9.8. Recommendation 7:

9.8.1. Effective cooperation between the event owner, the event organiser and the policing authorities are required under the Convention as is a graded and engagement focused policing approach. UEFA should therefore make it a formal requirement of the bidding process that the police will commit to compliance with the Convention. This should include a commitment to provide a summary of the policing operational plan to the S&S Unit in good time prior to MD.

9.9. Recommendation 8:

9.9.1. Where it is not already exercised, the UEFA S&S Unit should proactively identify and engage Police Commanders by supporting access to relevant expertise and inviting them to be active observers of police operations of UCL quarter and semi-finals to gain experience, particularly of the supporter profile of potential finalist clubs. Where problems are identified or subsequently occur relating to interoperability, communication, and the delivery of policing plans, in the planning phase, if they cannot be resolved, these should be escalated to Government authorities who should themselves then act to realise the obligations to which they are committed by the Convention.

9.10. Recommendation 9:

9.10.1. The Panel therefore recommends that UEFA move as rapidly as possible to digital ticketing at future UCLFs. UEFA should ensure host venues are fully capable of supporting this, from the bidding process onward. Given that digital ticketing is at present relatively novel, and ticketing for the clubs is not straightforward, UEFA should obtain an independent expert audit of digital ticketing arrangements in good time before its UCLF23 event.

9.11. Recommendation 10:

9.11.1. UEFA should optimise its communications and messaging toward supporters, using as many platforms as possible, regarding event facilities, mobility, routing and access arrangements. During the planning phase, UEFA should engage with partners to synchronise messaging, and it should make the UEFA Communications team responsible for monitoring and ensuring no messaging conflicts arise prior to MD or in real time. Above all else it should embed the involvement of supporter organisations and Finalist club stewards in its communication strategy, to effectively spread information and urgent messages. UEFA should also consider the use of large screens at key entry points and monitor and ensure the integrity of event relevant signage.

9.12. Recommendation 11:

9.12.1. It is recommended that there is scrutiny by UEFA to ensure that finalists clubs fulfil their obligation under the UEFA Club Licensing Regulations to have one or several defined Supporter Liaison Officer to act as the key contact for supporters. The role of the SLO should be made clear, including involvement in security planning and supporting information dialogue between event organisers and supporters. As part of their preparations for a UCLF, clubs should ensure their SLOs play an active role in designing, clarifying, and implementing communication to and from their supporters regarding the mobility concept and participate in preparatory visits as well security and organisational meetings. Clubs should also carry out their own due diligence on the UCLF venue and surrounding area from the perspective of their supporters.

9.13. Recommendation 12:

9.13.1. Whilst this was evident at UCLF22, it is also clear their input during the planning phase was ignored and their observers during the event played no meaningful role within the operation. This was despite the fact FSE had predicted problems which ultimately materialised. This lack of integration should not have happened, and in future that UEFA proactively integrate supporter perspectives and input into the planning and delivery stages through better collaboration with FSE and its affiliated organisations.

9.13.2. We therefore recommend that Football Supporters Europe and its affiliated supporter organisations therefore need to be involved as meaningful stakeholders throughout the planning process and their representatives need to act on the day

of the UCLF as integrated observers. They should also be involved in post-match analysis. Protocols for achieving this should be laid out in writing.

9.14. Recommendation 13:

9.14.1. The poor monitoring of flow patterns and advising of supporters on suitable routes to the stadium were clear failures at UCLF22. We recommend that UEFA should therefore require the host Federation to deploy customer service stewards, not only to key parts of the transport network, but also across the last kilometre routes. These stewards – or marshals - should be trained and briefed to provide information and guidance to supporters (in their own language), but also to provide situation reports as necessary, and as problems arise, to the control rooms. We suggest Finalists club stewards are also deployed in such roles, as mandated by UEFA S&S Regulations.

9.15. Recommendation 14:

9.15.1. Medical and First aid personnel should be always visible and accessible, including inside the ASP, at the gates, and in the stadium concourse.

9.16. Recommendation 15:

9.16.1. As has been the case historically, UEFA should always conduct post event scrutiny. However, in the case of UCLF22 post event analysis by key stakeholders including UEFA and other Governmental authorities was inaccurate by incorrectly attributing blame to ticketless supporters. Therefore, it is evident that UEFA's processes for post-hoc analysis should be more analytically and objectively robust. To achieve this, we recommend that UEFA draw in relevant external operational, academic, and supporter-based expertise. In the circumstances where events have gone well this routine scrutiny enables the capture and dissemination of scientific knowledge and operational good practice.

9.16.2. If UEFA has failed to resolve issues prior to a UCLF, it must not merely ask why but also act on this feedback when it is created. UEFA will be back in those stadiums and in those jurisdictions in future, and in the meanwhile, there will be many other major sporting events which would benefit from UEFA learning (e.g., the Olympics). UEFA should also avoid 'rushing to judgment' and communicating its conclusions in the absence of conducting these forms of more robust analysis.

9.16.3. Specifically, where failures with policing are identified, UEFA should seek dialogue with Government authorities and assistance through the compliance mechanisms of the CoE regarding the application of the Convention. Ultimately, UEFA should make clear to State authorities that it will hold its events elsewhere if issues of non-compliance persist.

9.17. Recommendation 16:

9.17.1. Given the extent of non-compliance with the Saint-Denis Convention evidenced in this report, the Panel respectfully recommends that the CoE Monitoring Committee reviews how compliance with the Convention can be better monitored and its obligations more comprehensively enforced.

9.18. Recommendation 17:

9.18.1. The Panel notes that the DIGES and Senate have made recommendations which may work towards resolving the interoperability difficulties both we and they identified. Both the DIGES and the Senate have made respectful reference to the work of this Inquiry and the assistance it may provide to French authorities. With that in mind, the Panel encourages French Government authorities to follow the recommendations of the 2015 CoE Monitoring Committee and the DIGES in terms of management and oversight of major sporting events at an inter-ministerial level.

9.19. Recommendation 18:

9.19.1. Given the conclusions of the Panel on the extent of the failure of joint working between the Préfecture de Police and other partners, and the non-compliance with obligations under the Convention, the Panel respectfully recommends that the Ministries of Interior and Sport institute their own review of the model used for the policing of sporting events. This should involve supporters' representatives, external experts and academics to ensure transparency and objectivity. This could take place under the auspices of the National Committee on Supporters (see 4.4.6.).

9.19.2. As acknowledged, the Panel noted its significant concerns about the deployment of tear gas and pepper spray on the one hand, and the absence of any discernible engagement or dialogue with supporters on the other. In particular, the guarantees sought should include an assurance that the policing authorities will operate a supporter engagement model, and that the deployment of riot police

and the use of weaponry including tear gas and pepper spray, will only ever be used proportionately in circumstances where ECHR Article 2 rights are at issue.

9.20. Recommendation 19:

9.20.1. The panel recommends that French authorities review the framework relating to the retention and provision of footage and other material, for the purposes of investigations which are likely to improve security and public safety. The Panel further recommends that this is a matter which should be addressed by UEFA in its requirements of host States.

9.21. Recommendation 20:

9.21.1. In the UEFA Bid Requirements document for UCLF bidders are asked to confirm they will adhere to the Council of Europe Convention on an Integrated Safety, Security and Service Approach at Football Matches and Other Sports Events (Council of Europe Treaty Series - No. 218). We recommend this document should also obligate stakeholders to undertake robust scrutiny to ensure such compliance.

9.21.2. In the case of UCLF22 no bidding process took place and therefore no such confirmation was received. In future, it is recommended that, in addition to receiving confirmation from stakeholders, there is also scrutiny by UEFA S&S unit to ensure that compliance is being achieved during the planning process. To facilitate this, we recommend that for UCLFs, Government provides a nominated State representative to take part in the planning processes with a specific remit of ensuring interoperability of the policing and other national and local authorities. In effect this representative would act as single point of contact (SPOC) for UEFA S&S and other partners.


9.22. Recommendation 21:

9.22.1. Finally, the panel has focused on UCLF22, but evidence suggests that similar problems, particularly regarding policing and access for disabled supporters, are regularly experienced, though to a lesser scale, by supporters attending other UEFA governed fixtures. As per Recommendation 15, we recommend that UEFA and the CoE Monitoring Committee looks closely at their capacity to apply some of the above recommendations more generically to avoid similar dangers developing beyond the remit of the UCLF alone.

Annex


Annex

Figure 1: Map of the Stade de France and surrounds (note the A1 motorway running north to south and A86 Motorway running East to West)²⁹⁹.



²⁹⁹ — Groupe de liaison UCLF – UCLF 22 // Stade de France // Saint-Denis (4 March 2022) - Appendix, VI.1 (p. 2403)

Figure 2: Gates and turnstiles at the SDF³⁰⁰.




300 — Photo from a Panel member

Figure 3: Slide presented by UEFA Events SA showing expected route of travel from rail stations to SDF³⁰¹.



301 — Groupe de liaison UCLF – UCLF 22 // Stade de France // Saint-Denis (4 March 2022) - Appendix, VI.1 (p. 2393)

Figure 4: Map of planned turnstile queue management at the SDF OSP³⁰².



302 — Réunion avec la Préfecture de Paris – UCLF 22 // Stade de France // Saint-Denis (18 March 2022) - Appendix, VI.4 (p. 2453)

Figure 5: Slides presented at the MD-2 Meeting covering the mobility plan clearly indicates awareness of intention to flow movement from RER D to Wilson ramp and ASP3³⁰³.






Figure 6: UEFA Slides from its post Event analysis meeting June 8th showing arrangement of ASPs and stadium entry gates³⁰⁴.



304 — UEFA Analysis and initial findings related to the matchday events at Stade de France (8 June 2022) - Appendix, VI.16 (p. 2686)

Figure 7: The various and different maps and slides disseminated by UEFA Events SA during the planning phase.

MAP 1³⁰⁵: Presented to both sets of finalists at finalist meeting on 6th May.



MAP 2³⁰⁶ : Presented at meeting by local authorities 19th May.

Parking autocars pour les supporters du Real Madrid CF (zone G)

- La Zone G semble présenter des risques liés à la distance et la situation géographique du parking.
- En complément de la zone G, il est suggéré:
 - De sécuriser la zone G avec le soutien des forces de l'ordre et de s'assurer que la zone est rendue libre en déplaçant les véhicules préalablement garés à cet endroit.
 - De confirmer les zones de parking autour de l'université de Saint-Denis.

Parking autocars pour les supporters de Liverpool FC (Zone F)

- La capacité offerte semble insuffisante pour prendre en charge l'ensemble de la demande autocar. Il convient d'étudier les possibilités d'extension du parking et / ou d'allouer une zone de parking supplémentaire sur le RER B ou RER D afin de gérer le surplus de demande.
- Point d'attention:** Il est très probable que les autocars de Liverpool soient remplis de spectateurs AVEC et SANS billet de match. Un filtrage devra être mis en place au préalable afin de réduire au maximum l'arrivée massive de supporters sans billet dans le périmètre du stade.

Parking voitures pour les supporters de Liverpool FC tentant d'accéder la zone de pré-filtrage

- Confirmer que le centre commercial du Millénaire peut être utilisé pour les supporters de Liverpool FC.

Accès piéton des supporters de Liverpool FC


- Orienter les supporters de Liverpool FC arrivant en autocars ou par le RER D sur la rue de Pressensé afin d'éviter un afflux massif de supporters sur la rampe du stade en bas de l'entrée T (VIPs).

305 — UEFA Champions League Finalists' Meeting (6 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.8 (p. 2575)

306 — UEFA Presentation UCLF 22 // Stade de France // Saint-Denis (19 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.9 (p. 2601)

Figure 7 (cont.): The various and different maps and slides disseminated by UEFA Events SA during the planning phase.

MAP 3 ³⁰⁷: Presented at the MD-2 security meeting Chaired by UEFA Security Officer 26th May.



307 — UEFA Presentation Liverpool FC VS Real Madrid CF (26 May 2022) - Appendix, VI.12 (p. 2639)

Figure 7 (cont.): The various and different maps and slides disseminated by UEFA Events SA during the planning phase.


MAP 4³⁰⁸: Event Guide via UEFA website.



308 — UCLF22 Event Guide, UEFA (Website no longer available)

Figure 7 (cont.): The various and different maps and slides disseminated by UEFA Events SA during the planning phase.


MAP 5³⁰⁹: Map presented in UEFA’s Position statement to the Panel 18th August.



309 — UEFA Position Statement – Appendix, IV.1 (p. 23)

Figure 8: Images of ASP3 and ASP4 in operation at UCLF22.


ASP3 – 18:07³¹⁰



310 — Photo supplied by UEFA

Figure 8 (cont.): Images of ASP3 and ASP4 in operation at UCLF22.

ASP4 – 18:23³¹¹



³¹¹ — Photo supplied by UEFA

Figure 9: Photo from CAFE report showing spectators standing with wheelchair users behind.³¹²



³¹² — [UEFA Champions League Final 2022: CAFE Post Final Report](#) (September 2022) (p. 17)

